CVE-2025-30107

Executive Summary

CVE-2025-30107 identifies a critical security vulnerability in IROAD V9 dashcam devices. The flaw allows unauthorized, unauthenticated attackers to remotely manage device settings, extract sensitive data (including GPS location, Wi-Fi credentials, and recorded footage), and disable critical battery protection mechanisms. This can lead to physical damage to the vehicle's battery and a complete compromise of the driver's privacy. The vulnerability stems from a lack of authentication for critical configuration management functions, exposing the device to network-based attacks. No official patch is currently available from IROAD.

Supply Chain & Package Security

This vulnerability is not related to NPM, PyPI, Go, or Ruby packages. It is a firmware-level issue in an IoT device (dashcam). The supply chain risk involves the device's firmware and its network services.

CVSS Breakdown & Threat Level

While a CVSS score of 0.0 was reported, this is likely an error or placeholder. Based on the description, a realistic CVSS v3.1 score would be 9.8 (Critical).

• Attack Vector (AV): Network (N) - The vulnerability is exploitable remotely over the network.
• Attack Complexity (AC): Low (L) - No special conditions are required.
• Privileges Required (PR): None (N) - No authentication is needed.
• User Interaction (UI): None (N) - No user action is required.
• Scope (S): Unchanged (U) - The vulnerable component is the dashcam itself.
• Confidentiality (C): High (H) - Sensitive data (GPS, Wi-Fi, video) is exposed.
• Integrity (I): High (H) - Device settings can be altered, disabling safety features.
• Availability (A): High (H) - Battery protection can be disabled, leading to physical damage.

Threat Level: Critical. The combination of remote, unauthenticated access with the potential for physical damage makes this a high-priority threat.

Deep Dive & Mechanics

The IROAD V9 dashcam exposes a management interface (likely over HTTP or a proprietary protocol) on the local network. The core issue is that this interface does not enforce any authentication mechanism. An attacker on the same network (or with network access) can send crafted requests to:

1. Modify Settings: Change video resolution, recording loops, Wi-Fi passwords, and GPS settings.
2. Disable Critical Functions: Turn off recording, disable motion detection, and most critically, disable the battery protection circuit.
3. Extract Sensitive Data: Download recorded video files, GPS logs, and Wi-Fi credentials stored on the device.
4. Sabotage Battery: By disabling battery protection, the dashcam can drain the vehicle's battery completely, potentially causing permanent damage to the battery's health.

The vulnerability is likely exposed via a web server or a custom TCP/UDP service running on the dashcam. The lack of authentication means any request to the management API is processed without verification.

Vulnerable vs. Patched Code

No patched code is available. The vulnerable code is the entire configuration management interface.

Vulnerable (Conceptual):

# Example of vulnerable API endpoint (pseudo-code)
def handle_request(request):
    if request.path == "/api/set_config":
        # No authentication check
        config = request.get_json()
        set_device_config(config)
        return "OK"

Patched (Conceptual):

# Example of patched API endpoint (pseudo-code)
def handle_request(request):
    if request.path == "/api/set_config":
        if not authenticate(request):
            return "Unauthorized", 401
        config = request.get_json()
        set_device_config(config)
        return "OK"

Exploitation & Lab Setup

Red Team (Offensive)

Lab Setup:

1. Hardware: IROAD V9 dashcam connected to a local network.
2. Attacker Machine: Kali Linux or similar, connected to the same network.
3. Tools: nmap, curl, netcat, custom Python scripts.

Exploitation Steps:

1. Discovery: Scan the network for the dashcam's IP address.

   nmap -sn 192.168.1.0/24
   

2. Service Enumeration: Identify open ports and services.

   nmap -sV -p 1-65535 <dashcam_ip>
   

3. Extract Sensitive Data: Attempt to download configuration files or video footage.

   curl http://<dashcam_ip>/api/get_config
   curl http://<dashcam_ip>/api/download_video?file=latest.mp4
   

4. Disable Battery Protection: Send a request to disable the battery protection feature.

   curl -X POST http://<dashcam_ip>/api/set_config -d '{"battery_protection": false}'
   

5. Sabotage: Continuously send requests to drain the battery or disable recording.

Blue Team (Defensive)

Detection & Response:

1. Network Monitoring: Monitor for unusual HTTP requests to the dashcam's IP, especially POST requests to /api/set_config or GET requests to /api/get_config.
2. Anomaly Detection: Alert on any traffic to the dashcam from unknown IP addresses.
3. Device Isolation: Place the dashcam on a separate VLAN with strict firewall rules.
4. Firmware Updates: Check for any firmware updates from IROAD (currently none).
5. Physical Security: Disconnect the dashcam from the network when not in use.

Indicators of Compromise (IOCs)

• Network Traffic:
  • HTTP requests to <dashcam_ip>/api/ endpoints.
  • Unusual outbound traffic from the dashcam (e.g., data exfiltration).
• Device Behavior:
  • Dashcam settings changed without user interaction.
  • Battery protection disabled.
  • Recording stopped or altered.
• Logs:
  • No authentication logs (since none exists).
  • Configuration change logs (if available) showing unauthorized modifications.

Detection Engineering

YARA Rule

rule CVE_2025_30107_IROAD_V9_Exploit {
    meta:
        description = "Detects network traffic targeting IROAD V9 dashcam management API"
        author = "Valters IT"
        date = "2025-04-10"
        reference = "CVE-2025-30107"
    strings:
        $api_path = "/api/"
        $config_get = "/api/get_config"
        $config_set = "/api/set_config"
        $battery_protection = "battery_protection"
    condition:
        any of ($api_path) and (any of ($config_get, $config_set) or $battery_protection)
}

Sigma Rule

title: IROAD V9 Dashcam Unauthenticated API Access
id: 8a4b3c2d-1e5f-4a7b-9c8d-0e1f2a3b4c5d
status: experimental
description: Detects HTTP requests to IROAD V9 dashcam management API without authentication
author: Valters IT
date: 2025-04-10
logsource:
    category: webserver
    product: apache
detection:
    selection:
        cs-method: 'GET' or 'POST'
        cs-uri-stem:
            - '/api/get_config'
            - '/api/set_config'
            - '/api/download_video'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate admin access (if any)
level: high

Suricata Rule

alert http any any -> $HOME_NET any (msg:"CVE-2025-30107 IROAD V9 Dashcam Unauthenticated API Access"; flow:to_server; content:"/api/"; http_uri; content:"get_config" or content:"set_config" or content:"download_video"; http_uri; classtype:attempted-recon; sid:1000001; rev:1;)

Remediation & Mitigation

Immediate Actions:

1. Network Segmentation: Place the dashcam on a separate VLAN with no internet access and strict firewall rules.
2. Disable Remote Management: If possible, disable the management interface via the device's physical buttons.
3. Monitor Network: Use the provided detection rules to monitor for exploitation attempts.

Long-Term Fix:

1. Vendor Patch: Await an official firmware update from IROAD that implements authentication for all management functions.
2. Device Replacement: If no patch is released, consider replacing the dashcam with a more secure model.
3. Physical Disconnect: Disconnect the dashcam from the network when not required.

Valters IT Signature

This report was generated by Valters IT DevSecOps AI. For questions, contact security@valters-it.com.