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CVE-2025-3113

CVE-2025-3113 Information Disclosure in Continuous compliance
📅 PUBLISHED: 2025-04-17 06:41 UTC 🔄 UPDATED: 2026-10-09 05:42 UTC
[ PATCH UNDER REVIEW ↓ ] Remains UNDER REVIEW until an independent source confirms the fix ⏳ Vendor-claimed fix: v2025.2.0.1 — source: Perforce. UNVERIFIED · pending independent confirmation. how verification works →
[ DEFENSE PATCH ↓ ]
💣 PoC: None
👁️
Proof of Concept - Indicates if functional exploit code is publicly available, drastically increasing the risk of immediate attacks.
🎯 EPSS: 0.33%
👁️
0.33% probability
8.3× above the median CVE
Tier: ELEVATED
30-day exploitation window · FIRST.org · updated daily
VULNERABLE: version not auto-detected — verify your deployed version locally
CVSS SEVERITY SCALE
9.0–10.0 CRITICAL
7.0–8.9 HIGH
4.0–6.9 MEDIUM
0.1–3.9 LOW
0.0 NONE
9.0
THREAT LEVEL
■ tracking this CVE ✓ independent patch confirmation ⧗ same-origin mirror (GHSA) ⚠ active exploitation verification policy →

Executive Summary

CVE-2025-3113 is a security advisory affecting Continuous Compliance, a compliance automation platform. The vulnerability allows an authenticated user with sufficient privileges to abuse the application’s built-in Connector functionality to access the internal database. This enables the attacker to explore the database schema and export sensitive data, including the properties of Connectors and Rule Sets. The vulnerability is classified as an Information Disclosure issue (CWE-200) with a CVSS v3.1 base score of 4.9 (Medium). No public exploit code or proof-of-concept (PoC) is currently available, and the vendor has not released a patch. The attack vector is network-based, requires high privileges, and does not require user interaction.

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Supply Chain & Package Security

This vulnerability is not related to a specific package manager (NPM, PyPI, Go, Ruby) but affects a proprietary application. Organizations using Continuous Compliance should treat this as a supply chain risk due to the lack of a patch and the potential for data exfiltration.

CVSS Breakdown & Threat Level

  • Attack Vector (AV): Network (N) – The vulnerability can be exploited remotely.
  • Attack Complexity (AC): Low (L) – No special conditions are required.
  • Privileges Required (PR): High (H) – The attacker must be authenticated with sufficient privileges.
  • User Interaction (UI): None (N) – No user action is needed.
  • Scope (S): Unchanged (U) – The exploit does not affect other components.
  • Confidentiality (C): High (H) – Sensitive data (database schema, Connector/Rule Set properties) is exposed.
  • Integrity (I): None (N) – Data integrity is not compromised.
  • Availability (A): None (N) – Service availability is not affected.

Base Score: 4.9 (Medium)
Temporal Score: 4.9 (No exploit code or patch available)
Environmental Score: Varies based on network segmentation and data sensitivity.

Deep Dive & Mechanics

The vulnerability resides in the Connector functionality of Continuous Compliance. Connectors are designed to integrate with external systems (e.g., databases, cloud APIs) to fetch compliance data. However, due to insufficient access controls, an authenticated user with high privileges can manipulate the Connector configuration to query the application’s own internal database instead of an external target.

Attack Flow:

  1. The attacker authenticates as a user with administrative or high-privilege roles.
  2. The attacker navigates to the Connector management interface.
  3. The attacker creates or modifies a Connector, specifying the internal database connection string (e.g., jdbc:postgresql://localhost:5432/continuous_compliance).
  4. The Connector executes arbitrary SQL queries against the internal database, bypassing intended restrictions.
  5. The attacker exports the results, revealing the database schema, Connector properties (including credentials), and Rule Set configurations.

Root Cause: The application does not validate or restrict the database connection targets specified in Connector configurations. This allows the internal database to be treated as an external resource.

Vulnerable vs. Patched Code

Since no patch is available, the following is a conceptual comparison:

Vulnerable Code (Pseudocode):

def execute_connector(connector_config):
    # No validation of target database
    connection = create_connection(connector_config['connection_string'])
    results = connection.execute(connector_config['query'])
    return results

Patched Code (Hypothetical):

def execute_connector(connector_config):
    # Validate that the target is not the internal database
    if is_internal_database(connector_config['connection_string']):
        raise PermissionError("Cannot connect to internal database")
    connection = create_connection(connector_config['connection_string'])
    results = connection.execute(connector_config['query'])
    return results

Exploitation & Lab Setup

Red Team (Attack Simulation)

Prerequisites:

  • Valid credentials with high privileges (e.g., admin role).
  • Network access to the Continuous Compliance web interface.

Steps:

  1. Log in to the Continuous Compliance application.
  2. Navigate to Connectors > Add Connector.
  3. Set the connection string to the internal database (e.g., jdbc:postgresql://localhost:5432/continuous_compliance).
  4. Provide a SQL query to enumerate tables (e.g., SELECT table_name FROM information_schema.tables).
  5. Execute the Connector and export the results.
  6. Repeat to extract sensitive data from connectors and rule_sets tables.

Example SQL Queries:

-- List all tables
SELECT table_name FROM information_schema.tables;

-- Dump connector properties (may include credentials)
SELECT * FROM connectors;

-- Dump rule set configurations
SELECT * FROM rule_sets;

Blue Team (Defense & Detection)

Detection:

  • Monitor for unusual database connections from the application server to itself (e.g., localhost connections).
  • Audit Connector creation/modification events for suspicious connection strings.
  • Alert on SQL queries that enumerate system tables (e.g., information_schema).

Mitigation:

  • Implement network segmentation to restrict the application server from making outbound connections to internal databases.
  • Apply strict input validation on Connector connection strings.
  • Use a Web Application Firewall (WAF) to block SQL injection-like patterns in Connector queries.

Indicators of Compromise (IOCs)

  • Network: Unusual outbound connections from the application server to localhost on database ports (e.g., 5432, 3306).
  • Logs: Connector execution logs showing queries against information_schema or system tables.
  • Database: Unexpected queries in the database audit log from the application user.
  • File System: Exported CSV/JSON files containing database schema or Connector properties.

Detection Engineering

YARA Rule

rule cve_2025_3113_connector_abuse {
    meta:
        description = "Detects attempts to abuse Connector functionality to access internal database"
        author = "Valters IT"
        date = "2025-04-10"
        reference = "CVE-2025-3113"
    strings:
        $s1 = "jdbc:postgresql://localhost" nocase
        $s2 = "jdbc:mysql://localhost" nocase
        $s3 = "information_schema" nocase
        $s4 = "connectors" nocase
        $s5 = "rule_sets" nocase
    condition:
        any of ($s1, $s2) and any of ($s3, $s4, $s5)
}

Sigma Rule

title: CVE-2025-3113 - Internal Database Access via Connector
id: 8a9b7c6d-5e4f-3a2b-1c0d-9e8f7a6b5c4d
status: experimental
description: Detects Connector configurations targeting internal database
author: Valters IT
date: 2025-04-10
logsource:
    category: application
    product: continuous_compliance
detection:
    selection:
        EventID: 1001  # Connector created/modified
        ConnectionString|contains:
            - 'localhost'
            - '127.0.0.1'
            - '::1'
        Query|contains:
            - 'information_schema'
            - 'pg_catalog'
            - 'sqlite_master'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate use of localhost for testing (rare)
level: high

Suricata Rule

alert tcp $HOME_NET any -> $HOME_NET 5432 (msg:"CVE-2025-3113 - Internal Database Access via Connector"; flow:to_server; content:"SELECT"; content:"information_schema"; within:100; sid:1000001; rev:1;)

Remediation & Mitigation

Immediate Actions:

  1. Restrict Privileges: Limit the number of users with high privileges (e.g., admin roles) to only those who absolutely need them.
  2. Network Segmentation: Ensure the application server cannot connect to its own database via localhost or internal IPs. Use separate network interfaces or firewall rules.
  3. Monitor Logs: Enable detailed audit logging for Connector creation, modification, and execution. Review logs for suspicious activity.

Long-Term Fixes:

  • The vendor must implement validation to block connection strings pointing to the internal database.
  • Apply the principle of least privilege to Connector functionality.
  • Conduct a security review of all Connector-related code.

Workaround:

  • If possible, disable the Connector feature entirely until a patch is available.

Valters IT

◈ SOURCE Analysis & enrichment: valtersit.com/cve/CVE-2025-3113/ · CVE data: NVD/MITRE (public domain) · © 2026 ValtersIT Hub
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