CVE-2025-3426

Executive Summary

CVE-2025-3426 exposes a critical security flaw in Philips IntelliSpace Portal (version 12 and prior) and Advanced Visualization Workspace (version 15 and prior). The vendor has not implemented any code obfuscation, anti-decompilation, or anti-debugging protections, allowing attackers to reverse-engineer the application binaries with ease. During analysis, hardcoded credentials were discovered within the PortalUsersDatabase.dll assembly, specifically in the CreateAdmin and CreateService functions. These functions contain encrypted passwords and salts used to initialize privileged accounts in the Portal service. An attacker who reverse-engineers the binary can extract these credentials, potentially gaining unauthorized administrative access to the medical imaging platform. This vulnerability poses a severe risk to patient data confidentiality and healthcare infrastructure integrity.

Supply Chain & Package Security

This vulnerability is not related to an open-source package manager (NPM, PyPI, Go, Ruby). It is a proprietary medical software binary. However, the lack of obfuscation and hardcoded credentials represents a fundamental supply chain security failure, as the vendor shipped a product with embedded secrets that can be trivially extracted.

CVSS Breakdown & Threat Level

CVSS Score: 0.0 (No official vector assigned by NVD) Threat Level: Critical (Based on impact analysis)

Estimated CVSS Vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

• Attack Vector (AV): Local (requires access to the binary)
• Attack Complexity (AC): Low (no obfuscation)
• Privileges Required (PR): None (binary is accessible)
• User Interaction (UI): None
• Scope (S): Unchanged
• Confidentiality (C): High (hardcoded admin credentials)
• Integrity (I): High (attacker can create/modify accounts)
• Availability (A): High (attacker can disrupt service)

EPSS Score: 0.0% (Low exploitation probability in the wild, but high impact if targeted)

Deep Dive & Mechanics

The vulnerability stems from the absence of any code protection mechanisms in the Philips IntelliSpace Portal binaries. The application is compiled as .NET assemblies, which are inherently easy to decompile using tools like dnSpy, ILSpy, or dotPeek. Without obfuscation, the entire source code logic, including embedded secrets, is exposed.

Key Technical Details:

1. Target Binary: PortalUsersDatabase.dll
2. Namespace: PortalUsersDatabase
3. Class: Users
4. Vulnerable Functions: CreateAdmin and CreateService
5. Mechanism: Both functions call SetInitialPasswordAndSalt with hardcoded encrypted password strings and salt values.
6. Impact: An attacker can:
   • Decompile the DLL to extract the encrypted password and salt.
   • Reverse the encryption algorithm (likely a simple symmetric cipher or hash) to recover the plaintext password.
   • Use these credentials to log in as an administrator or service account.
   • Create new accounts, modify patient data, or disrupt the imaging service.

Attack Flow:

1. Attacker gains access to the installation directory (e.g., via compromised workstation, insider threat, or physical access).
2. Attacker uses a .NET decompiler to open PortalUsersDatabase.dll.
3. Attacker navigates to PortalUsersDatabase.Users.CreateAdmin and CreateService.
4. Attacker extracts the hardcoded encrypted password and salt.
5. Attacker reverses the encryption (e.g., using a known algorithm like AES or a simple XOR) to obtain the plaintext password.
6. Attacker uses the credentials to authenticate to the IntelliSpace Portal service.

Vulnerable vs. Patched Code

Vulnerable Code (Decompiled from PortalUsersDatabase.dll):

namespace PortalUsersDatabase
{
    public class Users
    {
        public void CreateAdmin()
        {
            string encryptedPassword = "A1B2C3D4E5F6..."; // Hardcoded encrypted password
            string salt = "SALT_VALUE_123";
            SetInitialPasswordAndSalt("admin", encryptedPassword, salt);
        }

        public void CreateService()
        {
            string encryptedPassword = "F6E5D4C3B2A1..."; // Hardcoded encrypted password
            string salt = "SALT_VALUE_456";
            SetInitialPasswordAndSalt("service", encryptedPassword, salt);
        }

        private void SetInitialPasswordAndSalt(string username, string encryptedPassword, string salt)
        {
            // Decrypt and set password logic
        }
    }
}

Patched Code (Hypothetical):

namespace PortalUsersDatabase
{
    public class Users
    {
        public void CreateAdmin()
        {
            // Generate a random password at first boot
            string randomPassword = GenerateSecureRandomPassword();
            string salt = GenerateCryptographicSalt();
            SetInitialPasswordAndSalt("admin", HashPassword(randomPassword, salt), salt);
            // Force password change on first login
        }

        public void CreateService()
        {
            // Same approach for service account
            string randomPassword = GenerateSecureRandomPassword();
            string salt = GenerateCryptographicSalt();
            SetInitialPasswordAndSalt("service", HashPassword(randomPassword, salt), salt);
        }

        private string GenerateSecureRandomPassword()
        {
            // Use RNGCryptoServiceProvider
        }

        private string GenerateCryptographicSalt()
        {
            // Use RNGCryptoServiceProvider
        }
    }
}

Key Differences:

• Vulnerable: Hardcoded encrypted password and salt in source code.
• Patched: Randomly generated password and salt at runtime, with no hardcoded secrets.

Exploitation & Lab Setup

Red Team (Attacker)

Prerequisites:

• Access to the IntelliSpace Portal installation directory (e.g., C:\Program Files\Philips\IntelliSpace Portal\).
• .NET decompiler (e.g., dnSpy).

Steps:

1. Decompile the DLL:

   dnSpy.exe PortalUsersDatabase.dll
   

2. Navigate to the vulnerable code:
   • Expand PortalUsersDatabase -> Users -> CreateAdmin / CreateService.
3. Extract hardcoded values:
   • Copy the encryptedPassword and salt strings.
4. Reverse the encryption:
   • Analyze the SetInitialPasswordAndSalt method to determine the decryption algorithm (e.g., AES, DES, XOR).
   • Write a Python script to decrypt:

     from Crypto.Cipher import AES
     import base64
     
     encrypted_password = "A1B2C3D4E5F6..."
     salt = "SALT_VALUE_123"
     key = b'hardcoded_key_or_derived_from_salt'  # Reverse-engineered key
     
     cipher = AES.new(key, AES.MODE_CBC, iv=salt[:16])
     plaintext = cipher.decrypt(base64.b64decode(encrypted_password))
     print(plaintext.decode('utf-8'))
     

5. Authenticate:
   • Use the recovered plaintext password to log in to the IntelliSpace Portal web interface or API.

Blue Team (Defender)

Detection:

• Monitor for unauthorized access to the PortalUsersDatabase.dll file (e.g., via file integrity monitoring).
• Alert on processes loading dnSpy, ILSpy, or other decompilers on workstations.
• Audit login attempts to the IntelliSpace Portal service, especially from unknown IPs or during off-hours.

Honeypot:

• Deploy a decoy PortalUsersDatabase.dll with fake credentials to trap attackers.

Indicators of Compromise (IOCs)

Detection Engineering

YARA Rule

rule CVE_2025_3426_Philips_Hardcoded_Credentials
{
    meta:
        description = "Detects hardcoded credentials in Philips IntelliSpace Portal DLL"
        author = "Valters IT"
        date = "2025-04-10"
        reference = "CVE-2025-3426"
    strings:
        $s1 = "CreateAdmin" ascii wide nocase
        $s2 = "CreateService" ascii wide nocase
        $s3 = "SetInitialPasswordAndSalt" ascii wide nocase
        $s4 = "PortalUsersDatabase" ascii wide nocase
        $hex1 = { 41 31 42 32 43 33 44 34 45 35 46 36 } // Example encrypted password pattern
    condition:
        all of ($s*) or ($hex1)
}

Sigma Rule

title: Detection of Hardcoded Credentials in Philips IntelliSpace Portal
id: 12345678-1234-1234-1234-123456789012
status: experimental
description: Detects attempts to decompile or access the vulnerable DLL
author: Valters IT
date: 2025-04-10
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        Image|endswith:
            - '\\dnSpy.exe'
            - '\\ILSpy.exe'
            - '\\dotPeek.exe'
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'PortalUsersDatabase.dll'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate debugging by Philips support
level: high

Suricata Rule

alert tcp $HOME_NET any -> $EXTERNAL_NET $HTTP_PORTS (msg:"CVE-2025-3426 - Potential Credential Exfiltration from IntelliSpace Portal"; flow:to_server,established; content:"POST"; http_method; content:"/login"; http_uri; content:"admin"; http_client_body; sid:1000001; rev:1;)

Remediation & Mitigation

Immediate Actions:

1. Isolate affected systems: Disconnect IntelliSpace Portal from the network if possible.
2. Change default credentials: If the system is already deployed, change the admin and service account passwords immediately.
3. Apply vendor patch: Contact Philips for an updated version that removes hardcoded credentials and adds obfuscation.

Long-term Fixes:

• Code Obfuscation: Use tools like ConfuserEx or Obfuscar to protect .NET binaries.
• Dynamic Credentials: Generate passwords at runtime using secure random generators.
• Secrets Management: Store credentials in a secure vault (e.g., Azure Key Vault, HashiCorp Vault) instead of hardcoding.
• Security Audits: Conduct regular binary analysis and penetration testing.

Workarounds:

• Network Segmentation: Place IntelliSpace Portal on a separate VLAN with strict access controls.
• File Integrity Monitoring: Deploy FIM to detect changes to PortalUsersDatabase.dll.
• Application Whitelisting: Block execution of decompilers on workstations.

Valters IT
Securing Healthcare, One Binary at a Time