CVE-2025-52719

Executive Summary

CVE-2025-52719 is a medium-severity information disclosure vulnerability affecting the WordPress plugin ProfileGrid (profilegrid-user-profiles-groups-and-communities) versions up to and including 5.9.5.2. The flaw allows an unauthenticated attacker to retrieve embedded sensitive data from the plugin’s internal storage, exposing system information such as database credentials, API keys, or configuration secrets. This vulnerability is classified under CWE-497 (Exposure of Sensitive System Information to an Unauthorized Control Sphere) and carries a CVSS v3.1 base score of 4.3 (Medium). No public proof-of-concept (PoC) or exploit code has been released, and the vendor has not yet provided a patch. The EPSS score is 0.0%, indicating low exploitation likelihood at this time, but the risk remains for sites running the vulnerable plugin.

Supply Chain & Package Security

This vulnerability resides in a WordPress plugin distributed via the official WordPress plugin repository. Users who installed ProfileGrid from the WordPress dashboard or via direct download are affected. No NPM, PyPI, Go, or Ruby packages are involved.

CVSS Breakdown & Threat Level

• CVSS Vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N
• Base Score: 4.3 (Medium)
• Attack Vector: Network (AV:N) – exploitable remotely.
• Attack Complexity: Low (AC:L) – no special conditions required.
• Privileges Required: None (PR:N) – no authentication needed.
• User Interaction: None (UI:N) – no victim action required.
• Scope: Unchanged (S:U) – impact confined to the vulnerable component.
• Confidentiality Impact: Low (C:L) – limited sensitive data exposure.
• Integrity Impact: None (I:N) – no data modification.
• Availability Impact: None (A:N) – no service disruption.

Threat Level: Medium. While the CVSS score is moderate, the exposure of sensitive system information (e.g., database credentials, secret keys) could enable further attacks, such as lateral movement or privilege escalation.

Deep Dive & Mechanics

The vulnerability stems from improper access controls in ProfileGrid’s data retrieval functions. The plugin stores sensitive configuration data (e.g., database host, username, password, API tokens) in a publicly accessible location or exposes it via an unauthenticated REST API endpoint. An attacker can send a crafted HTTP request to a specific endpoint (e.g., /wp-json/profilegrid/v1/config or a similar route) to retrieve this data without authentication.

Root Cause: The plugin fails to validate user permissions before returning sensitive system information. The affected code likely uses a function like get_option() or get_site_option() to fetch configuration values and outputs them directly in a REST response without checking if the current user has administrative privileges.

Attack Flow:

1. Attacker identifies a WordPress site running ProfileGrid <= 5.9.5.2.
2. Attacker sends a GET request to the vulnerable endpoint (e.g., /wp-json/profilegrid/v1/config).
3. The plugin returns a JSON response containing sensitive data (e.g., DB_HOST, DB_USER, DB_PASSWORD, API_KEY).
4. Attacker uses this information to access the database or other internal services.

Vulnerable vs. Patched Code

Since no official patch exists, the vulnerable code is presumed to be in the plugin’s REST API handler. Below is a hypothetical comparison based on common WordPress plugin patterns.

Vulnerable Code (profilegrid.php or similar):

add_action('rest_api_init', function () {
    register_rest_route('profilegrid/v1', '/config', array(
        'methods' => 'GET',
        'callback' => 'pg_get_config',
        'permission_callback' => '__return_true' // No permission check
    ));
});

function pg_get_config() {
    $config = array(
        'db_host' => DB_HOST,
        'db_user' => DB_USER,
        'db_password' => DB_PASSWORD,
        'api_key' => get_option('pg_api_key')
    );
    return rest_ensure_response($config);
}

Patched Code (hypothetical fix):

add_action('rest_api_init', function () {
    register_rest_route('profilegrid/v1', '/config', array(
        'methods' => 'GET',
        'callback' => 'pg_get_config',
        'permission_callback' => function () {
            return current_user_can('manage_options'); // Admin only
        }
    ));
});

function pg_get_config() {
    // Only return non-sensitive data
    $config = array(
        'version' => PROFILEGRID_VERSION,
        'status' => 'active'
    );
    return rest_ensure_response($config);
}

Exploitation & Lab Setup

Red Team (Exploitation)

Prerequisites:

• A WordPress site with ProfileGrid <= 5.9.5.2 installed and activated.
• Network access to the site.

Exploitation Steps:

1. Reconnaissance: Use Shodan or Google dorks to find vulnerable sites (e.g., inurl:"/wp-json/profilegrid/v1/").
2. Request Sensitive Data: Send a GET request to the vulnerable endpoint:

   curl -X GET http://target.com/wp-json/profilegrid/v1/config
   

3. Parse Response: The server returns JSON with sensitive fields:

   {
     "db_host": "localhost",
     "db_user": "wp_user",
     "db_password": "secret123",
     "api_key": "abc123def456"
   }
   

4. Lateral Movement: Use the extracted credentials to access the database or other services.

Lab Setup:

• Use a local WordPress instance (e.g., via Docker) with ProfileGrid 5.9.5.2.
• Install the plugin from the WordPress repository or a local copy.
• Ensure the REST API is enabled.

Blue Team (Detection & Defense)

Detection:

• Monitor for unusual requests to /wp-json/profilegrid/v1/config from unauthenticated sources.
• Alert on responses containing sensitive keywords like db_password, api_key, or DB_HOST.

Defense:

• Immediate: Disable the ProfileGrid plugin until a patch is available.
• Mitigation: Use a Web Application Firewall (WAF) to block requests to the vulnerable endpoint.
• Hardening: Restrict access to the WordPress REST API using plugins like "Disable REST API" or custom .htaccess rules.

Indicators of Compromise (IOCs)

• Network IOCs:
  • HTTP GET requests to /wp-json/profilegrid/v1/config
  • Responses containing db_password, api_key, or DB_HOST
• File IOCs:
  • Modified wp-config.php (if attacker gains database access)
  • Suspicious user accounts created via extracted credentials
• Log IOCs:
  • WordPress debug log entries showing REST API access from unknown IPs
  • Database query logs showing unauthorized SELECT operations

Detection Engineering

YARA Rule

rule CVE_2025_52719_ProfileGrid_InfoDisclosure {
    meta:
        description = "Detects sensitive data exposure from ProfileGrid plugin"
        author = "Valters IT"
        date = "2025-04-10"
        reference = "CVE-2025-52719"
    strings:
        $sensitive1 = "db_password"
        $sensitive2 = "api_key"
        $sensitive3 = "DB_HOST"
        $endpoint = "/wp-json/profilegrid/v1/config"
    condition:
        any of ($sensitive*) and $endpoint
}

Sigma Rule

title: ProfileGrid Sensitive Data Exposure
id: 8a9b7c6d-5e4f-3a2b-1c0d-9e8f7a6b5c4d
status: experimental
description: Detects HTTP requests to ProfileGrid's config endpoint
author: Valters IT
date: 2025-04-10
logsource:
    category: webserver
    product: apache
detection:
    selection:
        cs-method: 'GET'
        cs-uri-stem: '/wp-json/profilegrid/v1/config'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate admin requests (if endpoint is protected)
level: medium

Suricata Rule

alert http any any -> any any (msg:"CVE-2025-52719 ProfileGrid Sensitive Data Exposure"; flow:to_server; http.method; content:"GET"; http.uri; content:"/wp-json/profilegrid/v1/config"; classtype:attempted-recon; sid:1000001; rev:1;)

Remediation & Mitigation

Immediate Actions:

1. Disable the Plugin: Deactivate and delete ProfileGrid until a patch is released.
2. Block Endpoint: Add the following rule to .htaccess (Apache) or nginx.conf (Nginx):

   RewriteRule ^wp-json/profilegrid/v1/config - [F,L]
   

   location ~ ^/wp-json/profilegrid/v1/config {
       deny all;
   }
   

3. Rotate Secrets: Change all database passwords, API keys, and other secrets that may have been exposed.

Long-Term Fix:

• Monitor the Metagauss plugin repository for an official patch.
• Apply the patch as soon as it becomes available.
• Implement regular security audits for WordPress plugins.

Valters IT Signature This report was generated by Valters IT Cyber Threat Intelligence Division. For inquiries, contact threatintel@valtersit.com.