CVE-2025-60969

Executive Summary

CVE-2025-60969 identifies a Directory Traversal vulnerability in the EndRun Technologies Sonoma D12 Network Time Server (GPS) running firmware version 6010-0076-000 Ver 4.00. This flaw allows an unauthenticated attacker to read arbitrary files from the device’s filesystem, potentially exposing sensitive configuration data, credentials, or cryptographic keys. The vulnerability is classified under CWE-22 (Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory). No public proof-of-concept (PoC) or exploit code has been released as of this analysis, and the vendor has not issued a patch. The EPSS score is 0.0%, indicating low exploitation likelihood in the wild, but the impact on confidentiality is high if exploited.

Supply Chain & Package Security

This vulnerability is not related to any open-source package ecosystem (NPM, PyPI, Go, Ruby). It affects a proprietary embedded device firmware. No OSV or GitHub advisory data is available.

CVSS Breakdown & Threat Level

The CVSS vector is not provided in the NVD data. Based on the description (directory traversal, unauthenticated, network-accessible), a reasonable estimated vector is: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N

• Attack Vector (AV): Network – the NTP server is typically exposed on the network.
• Attack Complexity (AC): Low – no special conditions required.
• Privileges Required (PR): None – no authentication needed.
• User Interaction (UI): None – no user action required.
• Scope (S): Unchanged – the vulnerable component is the only affected asset.
• Confidentiality (C): High – sensitive files can be read.
• Integrity (I): None – no file modification.
• Availability (A): None – no denial of service.

Threat Level: Medium (estimated score ~7.5). The lack of public exploit and low EPSS reduces immediate risk, but the potential for sensitive data exposure warrants attention.

Deep Dive & Mechanics

The Sonoma D12 is a network time server appliance that synchronizes time via GPS and NTP. The web management interface or NTP-related endpoints likely handle file paths without proper sanitization. An attacker can inject path traversal sequences (e.g., ../) to escape the intended web root or configuration directory and read arbitrary files.

Vulnerable Endpoint: The exact endpoint is unknown, but common candidates include:

• /cgi-bin/... or /admin/... for configuration retrieval.
• NTP log or debug endpoints that accept a filename parameter.

Attack Flow:

1. Attacker sends a crafted HTTP request to the device’s management interface.
2. The request includes a parameter like file=../../etc/passwd or log=../../../etc/shadow.
3. The server fails to validate the path and returns the contents of the requested file.
4. Attacker extracts sensitive data (e.g., credentials, certificates, firmware secrets).

Impact: Full read access to the filesystem, including:

• /etc/passwd, /etc/shadow – user credentials.
• /etc/ssl/ – TLS certificates and keys.
• /etc/config/ – device configuration files.
• Firmware binaries – potential for reverse engineering.

Vulnerable vs. Patched Code

No patch is available. The vulnerable code likely resembles:

# Vulnerable pseudo-code
def get_log_file(filename):
    path = "/var/log/" + filename
    with open(path, 'r') as f:
        return f.read()

A patched version would sanitize the filename:

# Patched pseudo-code
import os
def get_log_file(filename):
    # Ensure filename is safe
    if ".." in filename or "/" in filename:
        return "Invalid filename"
    path = os.path.join("/var/log/", filename)
    # Also ensure path is within /var/log/
    if not os.path.realpath(path).startswith("/var/log/"):
        return "Access denied"
    with open(path, 'r') as f:
        return f.read()

Exploitation & Lab Setup

Red Team (Offensive)

Lab Environment:

• EndRun Sonoma D12 with firmware 6010-0076-000 Ver 4.00.
• Attacker machine (Kali Linux) on the same network segment.

Exploitation Steps:

1. Identify the device’s IP (e.g., via Nmap scan on port 80/443 or NTP port 123).
2. Probe for directory traversal:

   curl -v "http://<device_ip>/cgi-bin/log?file=../../../etc/passwd"
   

3. If successful, extract sensitive files:

   curl "http://<device_ip>/cgi-bin/log?file=../../../etc/shadow" -o shadow.txt
   curl "http://<device_ip>/cgi-bin/log?file=../../../etc/ssl/private.key" -o key.pem
   

4. Use extracted credentials for further lateral movement.

No public exploit code is available. The above is a hypothetical approach based on common directory traversal patterns.

Blue Team (Defensive)

Detection & Response:

• Monitor HTTP logs for path traversal patterns (../, %2e%2e/, ..%252f).
• Deploy WAF rules to block requests containing ../ in query parameters.
• Restrict management interface access to trusted IPs only.
• Implement file integrity monitoring on critical system files.

Honeypot: Set up a fake endpoint that logs traversal attempts and alerts SOC.

Indicators of Compromise (IOCs)

• Network IOCs:
  • HTTP requests with ../ or %2e%2e in URI or query parameters.
  • Outbound connections from the device to unknown IPs (data exfiltration).
• File IOCs:
  • Unauthorized access to /etc/passwd, /etc/shadow, /etc/ssl/.
  • Modified log files indicating traversal attempts.
• System IOCs:
  • Unexpected processes reading sensitive files.
  • Changes to device configuration (e.g., new admin accounts).

Detection Engineering

YARA Rule

rule CVE_2025_60969_Directory_Traversal {
    meta:
        description = "Detects directory traversal attempts against EndRun Sonoma D12"
        author = "Valters IT"
        date = "2025-04-10"
        reference = "CVE-2025-60969"
    strings:
        $traversal1 = "../"
        $traversal2 = "..\\"
        $traversal3 = "%2e%2e%2f"
        $traversal4 = "%2e%2e\\"
        $sensitive = "/etc/passwd" nocase
        $sensitive2 = "/etc/shadow" nocase
        $sensitive3 = "/etc/ssl/" nocase
    condition:
        any of ($traversal*) and any of ($sensitive*)
}

Sigma Rule

title: CVE-2025-60969 Directory Traversal Attempt
id: 7a8b9c0d-1e2f-3a4b-5c6d-7e8f9a0b1c2d
status: experimental
description: Detects HTTP requests with path traversal patterns targeting EndRun Sonoma D12
author: Valters IT
date: 2025-04-10
logsource:
    category: webserver
    product: apache
detection:
    selection:
        cs-method: 'GET'
        cs-uri-query|contains:
            - '../'
            - '..%2f'
            - '%2e%2e%2f'
            - '..\\'
            - '%2e%2e\\'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate use of '..' in some applications (rare)
level: high

Suricata Rule

alert http any any -> any any (msg:"CVE-2025-60969 Directory Traversal Attempt"; flow:to_server; content:"../"; http_uri; nocase; content:"/etc/"; http_uri; nocase; classtype:attempted-recon; sid:1000001; rev:1;)

Remediation & Mitigation

Immediate Actions:

1. Isolate the device: Place the Sonoma D12 behind a firewall and restrict management interface access to authorized IPs only.
2. Disable unnecessary services: If the web interface is not required, disable it via device configuration.
3. Monitor logs: Enable detailed logging and forward to a SIEM for analysis.

Long-term Fix:

• Vendor patch: Await an official firmware update from EndRun Technologies. Contact the vendor for a timeline.
• Workaround: If patching is not possible, implement a reverse proxy (e.g., Nginx) with input validation to block path traversal patterns before they reach the device.

Configuration Example (Nginx reverse proxy):

location / {
    proxy_pass http://sonoma_d12_backend;
    # Block path traversal
    if ($args ~* "\.\.") {
        return 403;
    }
}

Valters IT
Senior DevSecOps & Cyber Threat Intelligence Analyst