CVE-2025-61668
Executive Summary
CVE-2025-61668 is a denial-of-service (DoS) vulnerability affecting Volto, the ReactJS-based frontend for the Plone Content Management System. An unauthenticated, anonymous attacker can trigger an uncaught exception in the Node.js server component by visiting a specially crafted URL. This causes the server process to crash, resulting in a complete service outage for the Volto frontend. The vulnerability exists in multiple version lines (16.x, 17.x, 18.x, and 19.x alpha) and has been patched in subsequent releases. No public proof-of-concept (PoC) or exploit code is currently available, but the attack vector is trivial to execute once the specific URL pattern is known.
This record — and 170,000+ others — are available via the ValtersIT API. One endpoint replaces five: NVD + GitHub CVE + CISA KEV + EPSS + Nuclei + Exploit-DB, unified.
No signup required
Supply Chain & Package Security
This vulnerability resides in the Volto npm package (@plone/volto). Organizations using Volto should verify their dependency tree and ensure they are not pinned to a vulnerable version. The Node.js runtime environment is directly impacted, making this a supply-chain-adjacent risk for any deployment using the affected package versions.
CVSS Breakdown & Threat Level
CVSS Score: 7.5 (High) Vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
| Metric | Value | Rationale |
|---|---|---|
| Attack Vector (AV) | Network | The vulnerability is exploitable remotely via HTTP requests. |
| Attack Complexity (AC) | Low | No special conditions or race conditions are required. |
| Privileges Required (PR) | None | No authentication is needed. |
| User Interaction (UI) | None | The attacker does not need to trick a user. |
| Scope (S) | Unchanged | The crash is confined to the Volto server process. |
| Confidentiality (C) | None | No data is exposed. |
| Integrity (I) | None | No data is modified. |
| Availability (A) | High | The server process crashes, causing a denial of service. |
Threat Level: High. The low attack complexity and lack of authentication make this a serious availability risk for any publicly accessible Volto instance.
Deep Dive & Mechanics
The vulnerability stems from an uncaught exception in the Node.js server-side rendering (SSR) logic of Volto. When a user requests a URL that triggers a specific error condition (likely related to malformed route parameters or resource lookups), the server throws an exception that is not properly handled. In Node.js, an uncaught exception in the main event loop will cause the entire process to exit, leading to a crash.
The root cause is a missing try...catch block or improper error handling in the request handler pipeline. The specific URL pattern that triggers the crash has not been publicly disclosed, but it likely involves a path traversal, invalid JSON, or a resource that does not exist and causes a synchronous error before the error middleware can intercept it.
Attack Flow:
- Attacker identifies a Volto instance (e.g., via Shodan or banner grabbing).
- Attacker sends an HTTP GET request to a crafted URL (e.g.,
/@@non-existent-resourceor a URL with special characters). - The Volto Node.js server processes the request, encounters an unhandled error, and crashes.
- The server process exits, and the frontend becomes unavailable until the process is restarted (manually or via a process manager like PM2).
Vulnerable vs. Patched Code
The vulnerable code is in the server-side request handling logic. The exact file is not publicly disclosed, but the fix involves wrapping the problematic code in a try...catch block or adding a global error handler.
Vulnerable Code (Conceptual):
// server.js (vulnerable)
app.get('/:path*', (req, res) => {
const resource = getResource(req.params.path); // May throw an error
renderResource(resource, req, res);
});
Patched Code (Conceptual):
// server.js (patched)
app.get('/:path*', (req, res, next) => {
try {
const resource = getResource(req.params.path);
renderResource(resource, req, res);
} catch (error) {
next(error); // Pass to error-handling middleware
}
});
// Global error handler
app.use((err, req, res, next) => {
console.error(err);
res.status(500).send('Internal Server Error');
});
The patched version ensures that any exception thrown during request processing is caught and passed to an error-handling middleware, preventing the process from crashing.
Exploitation & Lab Setup
Red Team (Exploitation)
Prerequisites:
- A vulnerable Volto instance (e.g., version 18.27.1).
- Network access to the target.
Steps:
- Reconnaissance: Identify the Volto version by checking the
X-Powered-Byheader or the/api/endpoint. - Craft the Payload: While the exact URL is not public, common patterns for such vulnerabilities include:
/@@undefined/@@//..%2f..%2f/static/../../../etc/passwd
- Execute the Attack:
curl -v "http://target.volto.instance/@@undefined" - Verify DoS: The server should return no response or a connection refused error. The process will need to be restarted.
Automated Script (Conceptual):
import requests
import sys
target = sys.argv[1]
payloads = ["/@@undefined", "/@@/", "/..%2f..%2f"]
for payload in payloads:
try:
r = requests.get(f"{target}{payload}", timeout=5)
print(f"Payload: {payload} - Status: {r.status_code}")
except requests.exceptions.ConnectionError:
print(f"Payload: {payload} - Server likely crashed!")
break
Blue Team (Defense & Detection)
Detection:
- Monitor for HTTP 500 errors or connection resets.
- Look for requests to unusual paths (e.g.,
@@undefined, double-encoded characters). - Alert on sudden process restarts or crashes in the Volto Node.js process.
Mitigation:
- Immediately upgrade to a patched version.
- Implement a Web Application Firewall (WAF) rule to block suspicious URL patterns.
- Use a process manager (e.g., PM2) with auto-restart to minimize downtime.
- Add a global error handler in the Node.js application as a temporary workaround.
Indicators of Compromise (IOCs)
| Type | Indicator | Description |
|---|---|---|
| URL Pattern | /@@undefined |
Likely trigger for the crash |
| URL Pattern | /@@/ |
Another potential trigger |
| Log Entry | uncaughtException: ... |
Node.js crash log |
| Log Entry | Error: ... followed by process exit |
Evidence of unhandled error |
| Network | HTTP 500 responses followed by connection refused | Server crash pattern |
| Process | Volto Node.js process exits unexpectedly | System-level IOC |
Detection Engineering
YARA Rule
rule CVE_2025_61668_Volto_DoS {
meta:
description = "Detects log entries indicating Volto Node.js crash from CVE-2025-61668"
author = "Valters IT"
date = "2025-04-10"
reference = "CVE-2025-61668"
strings:
$crash1 = "uncaughtException" ascii wide
$crash2 = "Error [ERR_HTTP_HEADERS_SENT]" ascii wide
$crash3 = "Cannot set headers after they are sent" ascii wide
$url1 = "/@@undefined" ascii wide
$url2 = "/@@/" ascii wide
condition:
any of ($crash*) or any of ($url*)
}
Sigma Rule
title: Volto Node.js Crash from CVE-2025-61668
id: 7a8b9c0d-1e2f-3a4b-5c6d-7e8f9a0b1c2d
status: experimental
description: Detects HTTP requests that may trigger the Volto DoS vulnerability
author: Valters IT
date: 2025-04-10
logsource:
category: webserver
product: volto
detection:
selection:
cs-uri-query|contains:
- '/@@undefined'
- '/@@/'
- '/..%2f'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Legitimate requests to non-existent resources (rare)
level: high
Suricata Rule
alert http any any -> $HOME_NET any (
msg:"CVE-2025-61668 Volto DoS Attempt";
flow:to_server,established;
content:"/@@undefined"; http_uri;
classtype:attempted-dos;
sid:1000001;
rev:1;
reference:cve,2025-61668;
)
Remediation & Mitigation
Immediate Actions:
- Upgrade Volto to the latest patched version:
- 16.x: Upgrade to 16.34.1
- 17.x: Upgrade to 17.22.2
- 18.x: Upgrade to 18.27.2
- 19.x: Upgrade to 19.0.0-alpha.6 or later
- Restart the Node.js process after the upgrade.
Workaround (if patching is not immediately possible):
- Add a global error handler in the Volto server code:
process.on('uncaughtException', (err) => { console.error('Uncaught Exception:', err); // Keep the process alive (not recommended for production) }); - Use a process manager (PM2, Forever) with auto-restart.
- Implement a reverse proxy (Nginx) to filter suspicious URLs.
Long-Term Measures:
- Conduct a code review of all server-side request handlers.
- Implement comprehensive error handling and logging.
- Add automated security testing (SAST/DAST) to the CI/CD pipeline.
Valters IT