CVE-2025-64299

Executive Summary

CVE-2025-64299 is a medium-severity vulnerability (CVSS 4.9) in LogStare Collector that allows an administrative user to improperly access and obtain password hashes of other users. The vulnerability stems from insecure handling of password hash data within the application's storage or processing logic. While the EPSS score is currently 0.0%, indicating low exploitation probability, the exposure of password hashes significantly elevates the risk of credential compromise through offline cracking attacks. No public exploit code or patch is available at this time.

Supply Chain & Package Security

This vulnerability is not related to a package manager (NPM, PyPI, Go, Ruby) but is a standalone application (LogStare Collector). Supply chain risks are limited to the vendor's distribution channels.

CVSS Breakdown & Threat Level

• Attack Vector (AV): Network (N) – The vulnerability can be exploited remotely.
• Attack Complexity (AC): Low (L) – No special conditions are required.
• Privileges Required (PR): High (H) – An administrative user account is needed.
• User Interaction (UI): None (N) – No user action is required.
• Scope (S): Unchanged (U) – The impact is confined to the vulnerable component.
• Confidentiality (C): High (H) – Password hashes are exposed.
• Integrity (I): None (N) – No data modification.
• Availability (A): None (N) – No impact on availability.

Threat Level: Medium. The requirement for administrative privileges reduces the attack surface, but the exposure of password hashes can lead to lateral movement and privilege escalation if weak passwords are cracked.

Deep Dive & Mechanics

The vulnerability exists in how LogStare Collector stores or transmits password hashes. Instead of using a one-way salted hash (e.g., bcrypt, Argon2), the application likely stores hashes in a recoverable format (e.g., unsalted MD5, SHA-1, or reversible encryption). An administrative user with access to the backend database, configuration files, or API endpoints can retrieve these hashes.

Root Cause: The application fails to properly isolate password hash data from administrative functions. This could be due to:

• Storing hashes in a database table accessible via admin UI.
• Exposing hashes in API responses intended for user management.
• Logging hashes in plaintext or reversible format.

Attack Flow:

1. Attacker gains administrative access (e.g., via stolen credentials, social engineering, or another vulnerability).
2. Attacker navigates to user management or configuration section.
3. Attacker extracts password hashes from the interface or backend.
4. Attacker cracks hashes offline using tools like Hashcat or John the Ripper.
5. Attacker uses cracked passwords to access other user accounts, potentially escalating privileges.

Vulnerable vs. Patched Code

Since no patch is available, a hypothetical secure implementation is provided.

Vulnerable Code (Python-like pseudocode):

# Vulnerable: Exposes password hash in admin API
@app.route('/admin/users')
def admin_users():
    users = db.query("SELECT username, password_hash FROM users")
    return jsonify(users)

Patched Code (Hypothetical):

# Patched: Never expose password hashes
@app.route('/admin/users')
def admin_users():
    users = db.query("SELECT username FROM users")
    return jsonify(users)

Exploitation & Lab Setup

Red Team (Offensive)

Prerequisites:

• Administrative access to LogStare Collector (e.g., via compromised admin credentials).
• Network access to the admin interface (typically port 443 or 8080).

Steps:

1. Log in as an admin user.
2. Navigate to the user management section (e.g., /admin/users or /api/v1/users).
3. Extract password hashes from the response (JSON, CSV, or HTML).
4. Save hashes to a file (e.g., hashes.txt).
5. Crack hashes using Hashcat:

   hashcat -m 0 -a 0 hashes.txt /usr/share/wordlists/rockyou.txt
   

6. Use cracked passwords to access other user accounts.

No public exploit code is available.

Blue Team (Defensive)

Detection:

• Monitor for unusual admin account activity (e.g., accessing user management pages).
• Alert on API calls to /admin/users or similar endpoints.
• Use the Sigma rule below to detect hash extraction attempts.

Mitigation:

• Restrict admin access to trusted IPs only.
• Implement multi-factor authentication (MFA) for admin accounts.
• Monitor logs for repeated access to user management functions.

Indicators of Compromise (IOCs)

• Network: HTTP requests to /admin/users, /api/v1/users, or similar endpoints from admin accounts.
• File: Presence of password hash files (e.g., hashes.txt, passwords.txt) on admin workstations.
• Process: Execution of Hashcat, John the Ripper, or similar cracking tools.
• Log: Repeated admin login attempts or access to user management pages outside normal hours.

Detection Engineering

YARA Rule

rule LogStare_Hash_Exposure {
    meta:
        description = "Detects LogStare Collector password hash exposure in logs or files"
        author = "Valters IT"
        date = "2025-04-01"
        reference = "CVE-2025-64299"
    strings:
        $hash_pattern = /[a-f0-9]{32}|[a-f0-9]{40}|[a-f0-9]{64}/  // MD5, SHA1, SHA256
        $admin_endpoint = "/admin/users" nocase
        $api_endpoint = "/api/v1/users" nocase
    condition:
        any of ($admin_endpoint, $api_endpoint) and $hash_pattern
}

Sigma Rule

title: LogStare Collector Password Hash Extraction
id: 8a9b7c6d-5e4f-3a2b-1c0d-9e8f7a6b5c4d
status: experimental
description: Detects attempts to extract password hashes from LogStare Collector
author: Valters IT
date: 2025-04-01
logsource:
    category: webserver
    product: apache
detection:
    selection:
        cs-method: 'GET'
        cs-uri-stem:
            - '/admin/users'
            - '/api/v1/users'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate admin user management
level: medium

Suricata Rule

alert http $HOME_NET any -> $EXTERNAL_NET any (msg:"CVE-2025-64299 LogStare Collector Hash Extraction"; flow:to_server,established; content:"GET"; http_method; content:"/admin/users"; http_uri; classtype:attempted-recon; sid:1000001; rev:1;)

Remediation & Mitigation

Immediate Actions:

1. Restrict administrative access to trusted IPs and enforce MFA.
2. Monitor logs for suspicious admin activity.
3. Rotate all user passwords immediately.

Long-Term Fixes:

• Apply vendor patch when available.
• Implement proper password hashing (e.g., bcrypt with salt).
• Never expose password hashes in API responses or logs.
• Conduct a security audit of the application.

Workarounds:

• Use a Web Application Firewall (WAF) to block access to sensitive endpoints.
• Implement network segmentation to isolate LogStare Collector.

Valters IT