CVE-2025-65415
Executive Summary
CVE-2025-65415 describes a session fixation vulnerability in docuFORM Managed Print Service Client version 11.11c. The flaw resides in the login page, allowing an attacker to fixate a user’s session identifier (session ID) before authentication. After the victim logs in, the attacker can reuse the same session ID to gain unauthorized access to the victim’s authenticated session. This can lead to privilege escalation, data exposure, or unauthorized actions within the print management console.
The vulnerability has a CVSS score of 5.4 (Medium), with low attack complexity but requiring user interaction. No public exploit code or proof-of-concept is currently available, and no patch has been released by the vendor. The EPSS score is 0.0%, indicating very low exploitation likelihood in the wild at this time.
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CVSS Breakdown & Threat Level
- CVSS Vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N
- Base Score: 5.4 (Medium)
- Attack Vector: Network (AV:N) – The attack can be launched remotely.
- Attack Complexity: Low (AC:L) – No special conditions required.
- Privileges Required: None (PR:N) – No authentication needed to initiate the attack.
- User Interaction: Required (UI:R) – The victim must click a crafted link or visit a malicious page.
- Scope: Unchanged (S:U) – The vulnerable component and the attacker’s target are the same.
- Confidentiality Impact: Low (C:L) – Limited data exposure possible.
- Integrity Impact: Low (I:L) – Limited ability to modify data.
- Availability Impact: None (A:N) – No denial-of-service impact.
Threat Level: Medium. The attack requires user interaction, but once successful, an attacker can hijack an authenticated session, potentially accessing sensitive print job data or administrative functions.
Deep Dive & Mechanics
Session fixation occurs when an application does not regenerate the session identifier upon successful authentication. In docuFORM Managed Print Service Client 11.11c, the login page accepts a session ID provided by the attacker (e.g., via a URL parameter or cookie). The attacker crafts a link containing a known session ID and tricks the victim into clicking it. The victim logs in, and the server associates the attacker’s session ID with the victim’s authenticated session. The attacker then uses the same session ID to impersonate the victim.
Attack Flow:
- Attacker obtains a valid session ID from the docuFORM server (e.g., by visiting the login page).
- Attacker crafts a URL:
https://target/docuform/login?sessionid=ATTACKER_SESSION_ID - Attacker sends the link to the victim via phishing email or social engineering.
- Victim clicks the link, logs in with their credentials.
- Server does not regenerate the session ID, so the attacker’s session ID becomes authenticated.
- Attacker uses the same session ID to access the victim’s session.
Root Cause: The application fails to call a session regeneration function (e.g., session_regenerate_id() in PHP or equivalent in other languages) after successful authentication.
Vulnerable vs. Patched Code
Since no patch is available, the vulnerable code pattern is described generically. The fix would involve regenerating the session ID upon login.
Vulnerable Code (Conceptual):
// login.php - VULNERABLE
session_start();
$username = $_POST['username'];
$password = $_POST['password'];
if (authenticate($username, $password)) {
$_SESSION['user'] = $username;
// No session regeneration
header('Location: dashboard.php');
}
Patched Code (Conceptual):
// login.php - PATCHED
session_start();
$username = $_POST['username'];
$password = $_POST['password'];
if (authenticate($username, $password)) {
session_regenerate_id(true); // Regenerate session ID
$_SESSION['user'] = $username;
header('Location: dashboard.php');
}
Exploitation & Lab Setup
Red Team (Attack Simulation)
Prerequisites:
- Access to a docuFORM Managed Print Service Client 11.11c instance.
- Ability to send a crafted link to a victim.
Steps:
- Obtain a session ID by visiting the login page and capturing the
PHPSESSIDcookie (or similar). - Craft a URL:
http://target/docuform/login?PHPSESSID=ATTACKER_SESSION_ID - Send the link to the victim via email or social engineering.
- Wait for the victim to log in.
- Use the same session ID (e.g., set cookie in browser) to access the application as the victim.
Example using cURL:
# Step 1: Get a session ID
curl -c cookies.txt http://target/docuform/login
# Extract session ID from cookies.txt (e.g., PHPSESSID=abc123)
# Step 2: Craft link (send to victim)
# Step 3: After victim logs in, use the same session ID
curl -b "PHPSESSID=abc123" http://target/docuform/dashboard
Blue Team (Detection & Defense)
Defensive Measures:
- Monitor for multiple login attempts using the same session ID from different IP addresses.
- Implement session regeneration upon authentication.
- Use HTTP-only and Secure flags on session cookies.
- Enforce short session timeouts.
Detection:
- Look for session IDs that appear in logs before and after authentication without change.
- Alert on login events where the session ID was not regenerated (custom application logging).
Indicators of Compromise (IOCs)
- Network: HTTP requests containing a
PHPSESSID(or similar) parameter in the URL of the login page. - Logs: Login events where the session ID remains the same before and after authentication.
- Cookies: Session cookies that are not regenerated after login.
- User Agent: Any user agent that appears to reuse a session ID from a different source IP.
Example IOC Log Entry:
192.168.1.100 - - [01/Jan/2025:12:00:00 +0000] "GET /docuform/login?PHPSESSID=abc123 HTTP/1.1" 200
192.168.1.100 - - [01/Jan/2025:12:01:00 +0000] "POST /docuform/login HTTP/1.1" 302
192.168.1.200 - - [01/Jan/2025:12:02:00 +0000] "GET /docuform/dashboard HTTP/1.1" 200 (using same PHPSESSID=abc123)
Detection Engineering
YARA Rule
rule CVE_2025_65415_SessionFixation {
meta:
description = "Detects session fixation attempts against docuFORM Managed Print Service Client"
author = "Valters IT"
date = "2025-01-01"
cve = "CVE-2025-65415"
strings:
$s1 = "PHPSESSID=" nocase
$s2 = "docuform" nocase
$s3 = "login" nocase
condition:
all of ($s1, $s2, $s3) and #s1 > 1
}
Sigma Rule
title: Session Fixation Attempt Against docuFORM
id: 12345678-1234-1234-1234-123456789012
status: experimental
description: Detects HTTP requests containing a session ID parameter in the login URL, indicating a session fixation attack.
author: Valters IT
date: 2025/01/01
logsource:
category: webserver
product: apache
detection:
selection:
cs-uri-query|contains: "PHPSESSID="
cs-uri-stem|contains: "/docuform/login"
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Legitimate use of session ID in URL (rare)
level: medium
Suricata Rule
alert http any any -> any any (msg:"CVE-2025-65415 Session Fixation Attempt"; flow:to_server; content:"PHPSESSID="; http_uri; content:"/docuform/login"; http_uri; classtype:attempted-user; sid:1000001; rev:1;)
Remediation & Mitigation
Immediate Actions:
- Regenerate Session ID: Modify the login page to call
session_regenerate_id(true)after successful authentication. - Validate Session Origin: Check that the session ID matches the IP address or user agent (defense in depth).
- Use Secure Cookies: Set
HttpOnly,Secure, andSameSite=Strictflags on session cookies.
Long-Term Fix:
- Apply vendor patch when available.
- Conduct a security audit of the authentication flow.
- Implement multi-factor authentication (MFA) to reduce impact of session hijacking.
Workarounds:
- Disable URL-based session ID transmission (if configurable).
- Use a Web Application Firewall (WAF) to block requests with session IDs in the URL.
Valters IT Signature Report generated by Valters IT Cyber Threat Intelligence Division