CVE-2025-67789

Executive Summary

CVE-2025-67789 is an authorization bypass vulnerability in DriveLock, a device control and endpoint security solution. The flaw allows an authenticated user to retrieve the computer count of other DriveLock tenants via the DriveLock API. This is a classic case of insecure direct object reference (IDOR), where the API fails to properly verify that the requesting user belongs to the tenant whose data is being accessed. The vulnerability affects DriveLock versions 24.1 before 24.1.6, 24.2 before 24.2.7, and 25.1 before 25.1.5. While the CVSS score is low (3.1) due to the limited impact (only computer count leakage), it represents a significant information disclosure risk in a multi-tenant environment, potentially enabling tenant enumeration and reconnaissance for further attacks.

Supply Chain & Package Security

DriveLock is a proprietary commercial software product. There are no open-source packages (NPM, PyPI, Go, Ruby) associated with this vulnerability. The supply chain risk is limited to the integrity of the DriveLock update mechanism and the trustworthiness of the vendor's distribution channels.

CVSS Breakdown & Threat Level

• CVSS Score: 3.1 (Low)
• Vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N
• Attack Vector (AV): Network (N) – The vulnerability is exploitable remotely over the network.
• Attack Complexity (AC): Low (L) – No special conditions or complex attack sequences are required.
• Privileges Required (PR): Low (L) – An attacker needs valid credentials for any DriveLock tenant.
• User Interaction (UI): None (N) – No user interaction is required.
• Scope (S): Unchanged (U) – The vulnerable component and the impacted component are the same.
• Confidentiality (C): Low (L) – Only the computer count is disclosed, not full system details.
• Integrity (I): None (N) – No data modification is possible.
• Availability (A): None (N) – No denial of service impact.

Threat Level: Low. The vulnerability only leaks a numeric count of computers per tenant. However, in a competitive or targeted environment, this information can be used to identify high-value tenants or map the deployment scale.

Deep Dive & Mechanics

The vulnerability resides in the DriveLock API endpoint that returns the number of computers managed by a tenant. The API likely accepts a tenant identifier (e.g., tenant ID or name) as a parameter. Due to missing or insufficient authorization checks, an authenticated user from Tenant A can supply Tenant B's identifier and receive the computer count for Tenant B.

Root Cause: The API does not enforce that the authenticated user's session token or API key is bound to the tenant being queried. This is a classic IDOR (CWE-639) vulnerability.

Attack Flow:

1. Attacker authenticates to DriveLock API with valid credentials for Tenant A.
2. Attacker sends a request to the vulnerable endpoint, e.g., GET /api/v1/tenants/{tenant_id}/computer-count.
3. Attacker iterates through possible tenant IDs (e.g., numeric IDs or UUIDs) or uses a known tenant name from Tenant B.
4. The API returns the computer count for Tenant B without verifying that the attacker's session belongs to Tenant B.

Impact: The attacker can enumerate the number of endpoints managed by each tenant, revealing organizational size and deployment scale. This information can be used for competitive intelligence or to prioritize targets for further attacks.

Vulnerable vs. Patched Code

The exact code is proprietary, but the vulnerability pattern is typical of IDOR in REST APIs.

Vulnerable Code (Conceptual):

@app.route('/api/v1/tenants/<tenant_id>/computer-count')
@authenticated
def get_computer_count(tenant_id):
    # Missing tenant ownership check
    count = db.query("SELECT COUNT(*) FROM computers WHERE tenant_id = ?", tenant_id)
    return {"count": count}

Patched Code (Conceptual):

@app.route('/api/v1/tenants/<tenant_id>/computer-count')
@authenticated
def get_computer_count(tenant_id):
    current_user_tenant = get_current_user_tenant()  # from session/token
    if current_user_tenant != tenant_id:
        return {"error": "Forbidden"}, 403
    count = db.query("SELECT COUNT(*) FROM computers WHERE tenant_id = ?", tenant_id)
    return {"count": count}

The patch adds a check to ensure the authenticated user's tenant matches the requested tenant ID.

Exploitation & Lab Setup

Red Team

Prerequisites:

• Valid credentials for any DriveLock tenant.
• Network access to the DriveLock API endpoint.
• Knowledge of other tenant IDs (can be brute-forced if numeric or guessed if UUIDs are predictable).

Exploitation Steps:

1. Authenticate to the DriveLock API and obtain a session token.
2. Use a tool like curl or a custom script to query the vulnerable endpoint:

   curl -H "Authorization: Bearer <token>" \
        "https://drivelock.example.com/api/v1/tenants/2/computer-count"
   

3. Iterate through tenant IDs:

   for id in {1..100}; do
       curl -s -H "Authorization: Bearer <token>" \
            "https://drivelock.example.com/api/v1/tenants/$id/computer-count"
   done
   

4. Collect the computer counts for each tenant.

Lab Setup:

• Deploy a vulnerable DriveLock instance (version 24.1.5 or earlier) in a controlled environment.
• Create multiple tenants with different numbers of computers.
• Use a test user account from Tenant A to exploit the API against Tenant B.

Blue Team

Detection:

• Monitor API logs for requests to /api/v1/tenants/*/computer-count from users who do not belong to the requested tenant.
• Alert on rapid sequential requests to different tenant IDs from the same user (tenant enumeration).
• Implement rate limiting on the API endpoint.

Hunting:

• Search for anomalous patterns in API access logs where a single user queries multiple tenant IDs.
• Correlate user authentication events with tenant ID changes in API requests.

Prevention:

• Apply strict authorization checks on all API endpoints that accept tenant identifiers.
• Use tenant-scoped API keys that are bound to a specific tenant at creation time.
• Implement logging and alerting for authorization failures.

Indicators of Compromise (IOCs)

• Network: HTTP requests to /api/v1/tenants/*/computer-count with varying tenant IDs from the same authenticated session.
• Logs: API access logs showing 403 Forbidden responses followed by 200 OK for different tenant IDs (indicating brute-forcing).
• Behavior: A single user account querying multiple tenant IDs in a short time window.

Detection Engineering

YARA Rule

rule CVE_2025_67789_DriveLock_IDOR {
    meta:
        description = "Detects exploitation attempts of CVE-2025-67789 DriveLock IDOR vulnerability"
        author = "Valters IT"
        date = "2025-04-10"
        reference = "CVE-2025-67789"
    strings:
        $api_path = "/api/v1/tenants/"
        $computer_count = "computer-count"
        $http_get = "GET"
    condition:
        $http_get and $api_path and $computer_count
}

Sigma Rule

title: DriveLock API IDOR - Computer Count Enumeration
id: 7a8b9c0d-1e2f-3a4b-5c6d-7e8f9a0b1c2d
status: experimental
description: Detects attempts to enumerate computer counts across multiple DriveLock tenants via the API.
author: Valters IT
date: 2025-04-10
logsource:
    category: web
    product: drivelock
detection:
    selection:
        cs-method: 'GET'
        cs-uri-stem|startswith: '/api/v1/tenants/'
        cs-uri-stem|endswith: '/computer-count'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate multi-tenant administrators
level: medium

Suricata Rule

alert http $HOME_NET any -> $EXTERNAL_NET any (
    msg:"CVE-2025-67789 DriveLock API IDOR - Computer Count Enumeration";
    flow:to_server,established;
    content:"GET";
    http_method;
    content:"/api/v1/tenants/";
    http_uri;
    content:"/computer-count";
    http_uri;
    classtype:attempted-recon;
    sid:1000001;
    rev:1;
)

Remediation & Mitigation

Immediate Actions:

1. Upgrade DriveLock to version 24.1.6, 24.2.7, or 25.1.5 (or later) as per the vendor's advisory.
2. If immediate patching is not possible, implement a Web Application Firewall (WAF) rule to block requests to /api/v1/tenants/*/computer-count from users who do not belong to the requested tenant.
3. Review API access logs for signs of exploitation.

Long-term Measures:

• Conduct a security audit of all DriveLock API endpoints for similar IDOR vulnerabilities.
• Implement tenant-scoped API keys that are cryptographically bound to a specific tenant.
• Enforce strict authorization checks on all API endpoints that accept tenant identifiers.
• Enable detailed logging and monitoring for API access patterns.

Workarounds:

• Disable the vulnerable API endpoint if not required for business operations.
• Restrict API access to trusted IP ranges only.

Report generated by Valters IT DevSecOps & CTI Division