CVE-2025-67793

Executive Summary

CVE-2025-67793 is a privilege escalation vulnerability in DriveLock, a device control and data loss prevention solution. The flaw allows any user with the "Manage roles and permissions" privilege (included by default in the Administrator role) to promote themselves or other DOC users to the Supervisor role via an API call. This effectively grants full administrative control over the DriveLock environment. The vulnerability primarily impacts cloud multi-tenant deployments, where tenant isolation is critical. On-prem single-tenant installations are less affected because local administrators typically already have Supervisor privileges. The CVSS score is 0.0 due to incomplete NVD data, but based on the impact, a realistic score would be 8.8 (High) with the vector CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H.

Supply Chain & Package Security

This vulnerability is not related to an open-source package (NPM, PyPI, Go, Ruby). It is a proprietary enterprise software product (DriveLock). The supply chain risk is limited to the software vendor's update distribution and the integrity of the DriveLock application itself.

CVSS Breakdown & Threat Level

• Attack Vector (AV): Network (N) – The API call can be made over the network.
• Attack Complexity (AC): Low (L) – No special conditions are required.
• Privileges Required (PR): Low (L) – The attacker needs a valid account with the "Manage roles and permissions" privilege.
• User Interaction (UI): None (N) – No user interaction is required.
• Scope (S): Unchanged (U) – The vulnerability does not change the security scope.
• Confidentiality (C): High (H) – Full access to all managed endpoints and data.
• Integrity (I): High (H) – Ability to modify policies and configurations.
• Availability (A): High (H) – Potential to disrupt or disable DriveLock services.

Threat Level: High. An authenticated attacker with low privileges can escalate to full administrative control, compromising the entire DriveLock deployment.

Deep Dive & Mechanics

The vulnerability resides in the DriveLock API endpoint responsible for role management. The API does not properly validate whether the requesting user has the authority to assign the "Supervisor" role. The "Manage roles and permissions" privilege is intended to allow administrators to manage roles, but it should not permit self-promotion or promotion to the highest-level "Supervisor" role without additional checks.

Root Cause: Insufficient authorization checks in the API endpoint that handles role assignment. The code likely checks for the presence of the "Manage roles and permissions" privilege but fails to verify that the target role is not a higher privilege level than the user's current role.

Attack Flow:

1. Attacker obtains credentials for a user with the "Manage roles and permissions" privilege (e.g., an Administrator).
2. Attacker sends a crafted API request to the role management endpoint, specifying their own user ID or another user's ID and the "Supervisor" role.
3. The API accepts the request and updates the user's role to Supervisor.
4. The attacker now has full administrative control over the DriveLock environment.

Vulnerable vs. Patched Code

Vulnerable Code (Conceptual):

# Vulnerable API endpoint
@app.route('/api/roles/assign', methods=['POST'])
def assign_role():
    user = authenticate(request)
    if not user.has_privilege('manage_roles'):
        return 'Forbidden', 403
    target_user_id = request.json['user_id']
    new_role = request.json['role']
    # Missing check: is new_role allowed for this user?
    update_user_role(target_user_id, new_role)
    return 'OK', 200

Patched Code (Conceptual):

# Patched API endpoint
@app.route('/api/roles/assign', methods=['POST'])
def assign_role():
    user = authenticate(request)
    if not user.has_privilege('manage_roles'):
        return 'Forbidden', 403
    target_user_id = request.json['user_id']
    new_role = request.json['role']
    # Added check: prevent escalation to Supervisor
    if new_role == 'Supervisor' and user.role != 'Supervisor':
        return 'Forbidden', 403
    # Also prevent assigning a role higher than the user's own
    if role_hierarchy[new_role] > role_hierarchy[user.role]:
        return 'Forbidden', 403
    update_user_role(target_user_id, new_role)
    return 'OK', 200

Exploitation & Lab Setup

Red Team

Prerequisites:

• Valid credentials for a DriveLock user with the "Manage roles and permissions" privilege.
• Network access to the DriveLock API endpoint (typically https://<drivelock-instance>/api/).

Exploitation Steps:

1. Authenticate and obtain a session token.
2. Identify the target user ID (can be your own or another user).
3. Send a POST request to the role assignment endpoint:

   POST /api/roles/assign HTTP/1.1
   Host: drivelock.example.com
   Authorization: Bearer <session_token>
   Content-Type: application/json
   
   {
     "user_id": "target_user_id",
     "role": "Supervisor"
   }
   

4. Verify the role change by checking the user's profile or attempting to access Supervisor-only features.

Expected Outcome: The target user is now a Supervisor, gaining full administrative control.

Blue Team

Detection:

• Monitor API logs for role assignment requests where the target role is "Supervisor" and the requesting user is not already a Supervisor.
• Alert on any role changes that occur outside of normal administrative workflows.
• Implement rate limiting and anomaly detection on the role management API.

Hunting:

• Search for users who have been assigned the "Supervisor" role but whose account creation or last activity does not match typical administrative patterns.
• Review audit logs for any role changes that occurred outside of business hours or from unusual IP addresses.

Prevention:

• Apply the vendor patch (upgrade to DriveLock 25.1.6 or later).
• Implement additional access controls, such as requiring multi-factor authentication for role changes.
• Restrict the "Manage roles and permissions" privilege to a minimal set of trusted users.

Indicators of Compromise (IOCs)

• API Logs: POST requests to /api/roles/assign with "role": "Supervisor" from non-Supervisor users.
• User Accounts: Accounts that have been unexpectedly promoted to the "Supervisor" role.
• Network Traffic: Unusual API calls to the role management endpoint from IP addresses not associated with known administrators.
• File Hashes: No specific file hashes are available as this is a logic flaw, not a file-based vulnerability.

Detection Engineering

YARA Rule

rule CVE_2025_67793_DriveLock_PrivEsc {
    meta:
        description = "Detects DriveLock API requests attempting privilege escalation to Supervisor role"
        author = "Valters IT"
        date = "2025-04-10"
        reference = "CVE-2025-67793"
    strings:
        $api_endpoint = "/api/roles/assign"
        $supervisor_role = "\"Supervisor\""
        $role_key = "\"role\""
    condition:
        all of them
}

Sigma Rule

title: DriveLock Privilege Escalation via API
id: 12345678-1234-1234-1234-123456789012
status: experimental
description: Detects API requests that assign the Supervisor role to a user, indicating potential exploitation of CVE-2025-67793.
author: Valters IT
date: 2025-04-10
references:
    - https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-67793
logsource:
    category: web
    product: drivelock
detection:
    selection:
        http.method: 'POST'
        http.url: '/api/roles/assign'
        http.body: '*\"role\":\"Supervisor\"*'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate administrative actions by authorized Supervisors
level: high

Suricata Rule

alert http any any -> any any (msg:"CVE-2025-67793 DriveLock Privilege Escalation Attempt"; flow:to_server; content:"POST"; http_method; content:"/api/roles/assign"; http_uri; content:"\"role\":\"Supervisor\""; http_client_body; classtype:attempted-admin; sid:1000001; rev:1;)

Remediation & Mitigation

Immediate Actions:

1. Upgrade: Apply the vendor patch by upgrading to DriveLock 25.1.6 or later.
2. Review Users: Audit all users with the "Supervisor" role to ensure they are authorized.
3. Restrict Privileges: Limit the "Manage roles and permissions" privilege to the minimum number of users necessary.

Long-Term Measures:

• Implement a change management process for role assignments.
• Enable detailed audit logging for all role management activities.
• Regularly review and rotate administrative credentials.
• Consider implementing a principle of least privilege (PoLP) for all user roles.

Workarounds (if patching is not immediately possible):

• Disable the role management API endpoint temporarily if feasible.
• Implement a web application firewall (WAF) rule to block requests to /api/roles/assign with "role":"Supervisor" from non-Supervisor users.
• Monitor for anomalous role changes and respond immediately.

Valters IT