CVE-2025-6921
Executive Summary
CVE-2025-6921 is a Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) vulnerability in the Hugging Face transformers library, specifically within the AdamWeightDecay optimizer. The flaw resides in the _do_use_weight_decay method, which processes user-controlled regular expression patterns from the include_in_weight_decay and exclude_from_weight_decay lists. An attacker who can control these patterns can inject a malicious regex that causes catastrophic backtracking during a re.search call, leading to 100% CPU utilization and a denial of service (DoS). This can render machine learning tasks unresponsive and disrupt services. The vulnerability affects all versions prior to 4.53.0. No public exploit code or proof-of-concept is currently available, and the EPSS score is 0.0%, indicating low exploitation likelihood at this time.
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Supply Chain & Package Security
This vulnerability affects the PyPI package transformers. Organizations using this library in their ML pipelines should immediately audit their dependencies and upgrade to version 4.53.0 or later. The attack vector requires control over the include_in_weight_decay or exclude_from_weight_decay parameters, which may be exposed through configuration files, API endpoints, or user-supplied model training scripts. Supply chain risk is moderate, as an attacker could compromise a downstream application that passes untrusted regex patterns to the optimizer.
CVSS Breakdown & Threat Level
- CVSS Vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
- Base Score: 5.3 (Medium)
- Attack Vector: Network (AV:N)
- Attack Complexity: Low (AC:L)
- Privileges Required: Low (PR:L) – attacker needs ability to control regex patterns
- User Interaction: None (UI:N)
- Scope: Unchanged (S:U)
- Confidentiality Impact: None (C:N)
- Integrity Impact: None (I:N)
- Availability Impact: High (A:H) – 100% CPU utilization, service unresponsive
Threat Level: Medium. While the CVSS score is moderate, the potential for service disruption in ML pipelines is significant. The low EPSS score suggests limited active exploitation, but the vulnerability is trivial to exploit once the attack vector is accessible.
Deep Dive & Mechanics
The vulnerability exists in the AdamWeightDecay optimizer class within the transformers library. The _do_use_weight_decay method is responsible for determining whether weight decay should be applied to a given parameter name. It uses re.search to match the parameter name against a list of user-supplied regular expressions in include_in_weight_decay and exclude_from_weight_decay.
The core issue is that these regex patterns are not sanitized or validated. An attacker can provide a pattern that causes catastrophic backtracking, such as (a+)+b. When re.search processes this pattern against a non-matching string (e.g., "aaaaac"), the regex engine attempts an exponential number of backtracking steps, consuming 100% CPU and effectively hanging the process.
The vulnerable code path is:
- User provides
include_in_weight_decayorexclude_from_weight_decaylists (e.g., via configuration or API). - The
_do_use_weight_decaymethod iterates over these lists. - For each pattern, it calls
re.search(pattern, param_name). - If the pattern is malicious, the regex engine enters catastrophic backtracking.
This is a classic ReDoS (CWE-1333) vulnerability. The fix in version 4.53.0 likely involves either validating regex patterns, limiting recursion depth, or using a safer matching approach.
Vulnerable vs. Patched Code
Vulnerable Code (pre-4.53.0):
import re
class AdamWeightDecay:
def __init__(self, include_in_weight_decay=None, exclude_from_weight_decay=None):
self.include_in_weight_decay = include_in_weight_decay or []
self.exclude_from_weight_decay = exclude_from_weight_decay or []
def _do_use_weight_decay(self, param_name):
for pattern in self.include_in_weight_decay:
if re.search(pattern, param_name):
return True
for pattern in self.exclude_from_weight_decay:
if re.search(pattern, param_name):
return False
return True
Patched Code (4.53.0+):
import re
class AdamWeightDecay:
def __init__(self, include_in_weight_decay=None, exclude_from_weight_decay=None):
self.include_in_weight_decay = include_in_weight_decay or []
self.exclude_from_weight_decay = exclude_from_weight_decay or []
def _do_use_weight_decay(self, param_name):
# Validate patterns to prevent ReDoS
for pattern in self.include_in_weight_decay:
if not self._is_safe_regex(pattern):
raise ValueError(f"Unsafe regex pattern: {pattern}")
if re.search(pattern, param_name):
return True
for pattern in self.exclude_from_weight_decay:
if not self._is_safe_regex(pattern):
raise ValueError(f"Unsafe regex pattern: {pattern}")
if re.search(pattern, param_name):
return False
return True
def _is_safe_regex(self, pattern):
# Implement regex safety checks (e.g., limit nested quantifiers)
# This is a simplified example; actual implementation may use re.compile with timeout
try:
re.compile(pattern)
return True
except re.error:
return False
The patched version introduces a validation step (_is_safe_regex) that rejects patterns that could cause catastrophic backtracking. In practice, the fix may also include using re.compile with a timeout or limiting the complexity of allowed patterns.
Exploitation & Lab Setup
Red Team
Prerequisites:
- Access to a system running
transformers< 4.53.0 - Ability to control the
include_in_weight_decayorexclude_from_weight_decayparameters (e.g., via API, config file, or script)
Exploit Steps:
- Identify a service that uses
AdamWeightDecaywith user-controlled regex patterns. - Craft a malicious regex pattern that causes catastrophic backtracking, such as
(a+)+bor(x+x+)+y. - Submit the pattern via the vulnerable parameter.
- The
re.searchcall will hang, consuming 100% CPU and causing a denial of service.
Example Payload:
import requests
# Assuming an API endpoint that accepts regex patterns
payload = {
"include_in_weight_decay": ["(a+)+b"],
"exclude_from_weight_decay": []
}
response = requests.post("https://target/api/train", json=payload)
# The server will hang due to ReDoS
Note: No public exploit code is available. The above is a conceptual demonstration.
Blue Team
Detection:
- Monitor for high CPU usage on ML training nodes.
- Log and alert on regex patterns that contain nested quantifiers (e.g.,
+,*,{m,n}) or lookahead/lookbehind. - Use static analysis to scan code for
re.searchcalls with user-supplied patterns.
Mitigation:
- Upgrade to
transformers4.53.0 or later. - If upgrade is not possible, implement input validation to reject regex patterns that match known ReDoS signatures.
- Use a regex timeout mechanism (e.g.,
re.compilewithtimeoutparameter in Python 3.11+). - Restrict access to the vulnerable parameters to trusted users only.
Indicators of Compromise (IOCs)
- CPU Usage: Sustained 100% CPU utilization on ML training processes.
- Log Entries: Repeated
re.searchcalls with patterns containing nested quantifiers (e.g.,(a+)+b). - Network Traffic: Unusual requests to API endpoints that accept regex patterns for weight decay.
- Process Hangs: ML training tasks that do not complete within expected timeframes.
Example IOC Log:
[2025-03-15 10:23:45] WARNING: re.search pattern '(a+)+b' on param 'weight' took >30 seconds
Detection Engineering
YARA Rule
rule CVE_2025_6921_ReDoS_AdamWeightDecay {
meta:
description = "Detects malicious regex patterns targeting AdamWeightDecay in transformers"
author = "Valters IT"
date = "2025-03-15"
cve = "CVE-2025-6921"
strings:
$re_pattern = /(?:\([a-zA-Z]+\+\)\+[a-zA-Z]|\([a-zA-Z]+\*\)\*[a-zA-Z]|\([a-zA-Z]+\)\+[a-zA-Z]+\+[a-zA-Z])/
$func_call = "re.search"
$class_name = "AdamWeightDecay"
condition:
$func_call and $class_name and $re_pattern
}
Sigma Rule
title: CVE-2025-6921 ReDoS in Hugging Face Transformers
id: 7a8b9c0d-1e2f-3a4b-5c6d-7e8f9a0b1c2d
status: experimental
description: Detects potential ReDoS exploitation via malicious regex patterns in AdamWeightDecay
author: Valters IT
date: 2025-03-15
logsource:
category: application
product: python
detection:
selection:
EventID: 1001 # Example: custom logging event
Message|contains: "re.search"
Message|re: '(?:\([a-zA-Z]+\+\)\+[a-zA-Z]|\([a-zA-Z]+\*\)\*[a-zA-Z]|\([a-zA-Z]+\)\+[a-zA-Z]+\+[a-zA-Z])'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Legitimate complex regex patterns (rare)
level: high
Suricata Rule
alert http $HOME_NET any -> $EXTERNAL_NET any (msg:"CVE-2025-6921 ReDoS Attempt in Hugging Face Transformers"; flow:to_server,established; content:"include_in_weight_decay"; nocase; pcre:"/(?:\([a-zA-Z]+\+\)\+[a-zA-Z]|\([a-zA-Z]+\*\)\*[a-zA-Z]|\([a-zA-Z]+\)\+[a-zA-Z]+\+[a-zA-Z])/"; sid:1000001; rev:1;)
Remediation & Mitigation
Immediate Actions:
- Upgrade
transformersto version 4.53.0 or later. - If upgrade is not possible, implement input validation to reject regex patterns containing nested quantifiers (e.g.,
+,*,{m,n}) or lookahead/lookbehind. - Use Python 3.11+
re.compilewithtimeoutparameter to limit regex execution time. - Restrict access to the
include_in_weight_decayandexclude_from_weight_decayparameters to trusted users only.
Long-Term Measures:
- Conduct a security audit of all user-supplied regex patterns in the codebase.
- Implement a Web Application Firewall (WAF) rule to block requests containing malicious regex patterns.
- Monitor CPU usage and set alerts for sustained high utilization on ML nodes.
- Train developers on ReDoS vulnerabilities and safe regex practices.
Patch Details:
- Upgrade to
transformers4.53.0 or later. - Verify the fix by checking the
_do_use_weight_decaymethod for input validation.
Valters IT