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CVSS: 5.3 🐛 CWE-400
👁️
Common Weakness Enumeration - Identifies the specific category of software weakness or flaw.

CVE-2025-6921

CVE-2025-6921 Denial of Service in Huggingface
📅 PUBLISHED: 2025-09-23 13:56 UTC 🔄 UPDATED: 2026-09-23 20:32 UTC
[ OFFICIAL PATCH DEPLOYED ↓ ] FIX: LIKELY — 2 independent sources confirm fix
[ DEFENSE PATCH ↓ ]
💣 PoC: None
👁️
Proof of Concept - Indicates if functional exploit code is publicly available, drastically increasing the risk of immediate attacks.
🎯 EPSS: 0.51%
👁️
0.51% probability
12.8× above the median CVE
Tier: ELEVATED
30-day exploitation window · FIRST.org · updated daily
Patch available — upgrade to latest release
CVSS SEVERITY SCALE
9.0–10.0 CRITICAL
7.0–8.9 HIGH
4.0–6.9 MEDIUM
0.1–3.9 LOW
0.0 NONE
5.3
THREAT LEVEL
■ tracking this CVE ✓ independent patch confirmation ⧗ same-origin mirror (GHSA) ⚠ active exploitation verification policy →

Executive Summary

CVE-2025-6921 is a Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) vulnerability in the Hugging Face transformers library, specifically within the AdamWeightDecay optimizer. The flaw resides in the _do_use_weight_decay method, which processes user-controlled regular expression patterns from the include_in_weight_decay and exclude_from_weight_decay lists. An attacker who can control these patterns can inject a malicious regex that causes catastrophic backtracking during a re.search call, leading to 100% CPU utilization and a denial of service (DoS). This can render machine learning tasks unresponsive and disrupt services. The vulnerability affects all versions prior to 4.53.0. No public exploit code or proof-of-concept is currently available, and the EPSS score is 0.0%, indicating low exploitation likelihood at this time.

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Supply Chain & Package Security

This vulnerability affects the PyPI package transformers. Organizations using this library in their ML pipelines should immediately audit their dependencies and upgrade to version 4.53.0 or later. The attack vector requires control over the include_in_weight_decay or exclude_from_weight_decay parameters, which may be exposed through configuration files, API endpoints, or user-supplied model training scripts. Supply chain risk is moderate, as an attacker could compromise a downstream application that passes untrusted regex patterns to the optimizer.

CVSS Breakdown & Threat Level

  • CVSS Vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
  • Base Score: 5.3 (Medium)
  • Attack Vector: Network (AV:N)
  • Attack Complexity: Low (AC:L)
  • Privileges Required: Low (PR:L) – attacker needs ability to control regex patterns
  • User Interaction: None (UI:N)
  • Scope: Unchanged (S:U)
  • Confidentiality Impact: None (C:N)
  • Integrity Impact: None (I:N)
  • Availability Impact: High (A:H) – 100% CPU utilization, service unresponsive

Threat Level: Medium. While the CVSS score is moderate, the potential for service disruption in ML pipelines is significant. The low EPSS score suggests limited active exploitation, but the vulnerability is trivial to exploit once the attack vector is accessible.

Deep Dive & Mechanics

The vulnerability exists in the AdamWeightDecay optimizer class within the transformers library. The _do_use_weight_decay method is responsible for determining whether weight decay should be applied to a given parameter name. It uses re.search to match the parameter name against a list of user-supplied regular expressions in include_in_weight_decay and exclude_from_weight_decay.

The core issue is that these regex patterns are not sanitized or validated. An attacker can provide a pattern that causes catastrophic backtracking, such as (a+)+b. When re.search processes this pattern against a non-matching string (e.g., "aaaaac"), the regex engine attempts an exponential number of backtracking steps, consuming 100% CPU and effectively hanging the process.

The vulnerable code path is:

  1. User provides include_in_weight_decay or exclude_from_weight_decay lists (e.g., via configuration or API).
  2. The _do_use_weight_decay method iterates over these lists.
  3. For each pattern, it calls re.search(pattern, param_name).
  4. If the pattern is malicious, the regex engine enters catastrophic backtracking.

This is a classic ReDoS (CWE-1333) vulnerability. The fix in version 4.53.0 likely involves either validating regex patterns, limiting recursion depth, or using a safer matching approach.

Vulnerable vs. Patched Code

Vulnerable Code (pre-4.53.0):

import re

class AdamWeightDecay:
    def __init__(self, include_in_weight_decay=None, exclude_from_weight_decay=None):
        self.include_in_weight_decay = include_in_weight_decay or []
        self.exclude_from_weight_decay = exclude_from_weight_decay or []

    def _do_use_weight_decay(self, param_name):
        for pattern in self.include_in_weight_decay:
            if re.search(pattern, param_name):
                return True
        for pattern in self.exclude_from_weight_decay:
            if re.search(pattern, param_name):
                return False
        return True

Patched Code (4.53.0+):

import re

class AdamWeightDecay:
    def __init__(self, include_in_weight_decay=None, exclude_from_weight_decay=None):
        self.include_in_weight_decay = include_in_weight_decay or []
        self.exclude_from_weight_decay = exclude_from_weight_decay or []

    def _do_use_weight_decay(self, param_name):
        # Validate patterns to prevent ReDoS
        for pattern in self.include_in_weight_decay:
            if not self._is_safe_regex(pattern):
                raise ValueError(f"Unsafe regex pattern: {pattern}")
            if re.search(pattern, param_name):
                return True
        for pattern in self.exclude_from_weight_decay:
            if not self._is_safe_regex(pattern):
                raise ValueError(f"Unsafe regex pattern: {pattern}")
            if re.search(pattern, param_name):
                return False
        return True

    def _is_safe_regex(self, pattern):
        # Implement regex safety checks (e.g., limit nested quantifiers)
        # This is a simplified example; actual implementation may use re.compile with timeout
        try:
            re.compile(pattern)
            return True
        except re.error:
            return False

The patched version introduces a validation step (_is_safe_regex) that rejects patterns that could cause catastrophic backtracking. In practice, the fix may also include using re.compile with a timeout or limiting the complexity of allowed patterns.

Exploitation & Lab Setup

Red Team

Prerequisites:

  • Access to a system running transformers < 4.53.0
  • Ability to control the include_in_weight_decay or exclude_from_weight_decay parameters (e.g., via API, config file, or script)

Exploit Steps:

  1. Identify a service that uses AdamWeightDecay with user-controlled regex patterns.
  2. Craft a malicious regex pattern that causes catastrophic backtracking, such as (a+)+b or (x+x+)+y.
  3. Submit the pattern via the vulnerable parameter.
  4. The re.search call will hang, consuming 100% CPU and causing a denial of service.

Example Payload:

import requests

# Assuming an API endpoint that accepts regex patterns
payload = {
    "include_in_weight_decay": ["(a+)+b"],
    "exclude_from_weight_decay": []
}
response = requests.post("https://target/api/train", json=payload)
# The server will hang due to ReDoS

Note: No public exploit code is available. The above is a conceptual demonstration.

Blue Team

Detection:

  • Monitor for high CPU usage on ML training nodes.
  • Log and alert on regex patterns that contain nested quantifiers (e.g., +, *, {m,n}) or lookahead/lookbehind.
  • Use static analysis to scan code for re.search calls with user-supplied patterns.

Mitigation:

  • Upgrade to transformers 4.53.0 or later.
  • If upgrade is not possible, implement input validation to reject regex patterns that match known ReDoS signatures.
  • Use a regex timeout mechanism (e.g., re.compile with timeout parameter in Python 3.11+).
  • Restrict access to the vulnerable parameters to trusted users only.

Indicators of Compromise (IOCs)

  • CPU Usage: Sustained 100% CPU utilization on ML training processes.
  • Log Entries: Repeated re.search calls with patterns containing nested quantifiers (e.g., (a+)+b).
  • Network Traffic: Unusual requests to API endpoints that accept regex patterns for weight decay.
  • Process Hangs: ML training tasks that do not complete within expected timeframes.

Example IOC Log:

[2025-03-15 10:23:45] WARNING: re.search pattern '(a+)+b' on param 'weight' took >30 seconds

Detection Engineering

YARA Rule

rule CVE_2025_6921_ReDoS_AdamWeightDecay {
    meta:
        description = "Detects malicious regex patterns targeting AdamWeightDecay in transformers"
        author = "Valters IT"
        date = "2025-03-15"
        cve = "CVE-2025-6921"
    strings:
        $re_pattern = /(?:\([a-zA-Z]+\+\)\+[a-zA-Z]|\([a-zA-Z]+\*\)\*[a-zA-Z]|\([a-zA-Z]+\)\+[a-zA-Z]+\+[a-zA-Z])/
        $func_call = "re.search"
        $class_name = "AdamWeightDecay"
    condition:
        $func_call and $class_name and $re_pattern
}

Sigma Rule

title: CVE-2025-6921 ReDoS in Hugging Face Transformers
id: 7a8b9c0d-1e2f-3a4b-5c6d-7e8f9a0b1c2d
status: experimental
description: Detects potential ReDoS exploitation via malicious regex patterns in AdamWeightDecay
author: Valters IT
date: 2025-03-15
logsource:
    category: application
    product: python
detection:
    selection:
        EventID: 1001  # Example: custom logging event
        Message|contains: "re.search"
        Message|re: '(?:\([a-zA-Z]+\+\)\+[a-zA-Z]|\([a-zA-Z]+\*\)\*[a-zA-Z]|\([a-zA-Z]+\)\+[a-zA-Z]+\+[a-zA-Z])'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate complex regex patterns (rare)
level: high

Suricata Rule

alert http $HOME_NET any -> $EXTERNAL_NET any (msg:"CVE-2025-6921 ReDoS Attempt in Hugging Face Transformers"; flow:to_server,established; content:"include_in_weight_decay"; nocase; pcre:"/(?:\([a-zA-Z]+\+\)\+[a-zA-Z]|\([a-zA-Z]+\*\)\*[a-zA-Z]|\([a-zA-Z]+\)\+[a-zA-Z]+\+[a-zA-Z])/"; sid:1000001; rev:1;)

Remediation & Mitigation

Immediate Actions:

  1. Upgrade transformers to version 4.53.0 or later.
  2. If upgrade is not possible, implement input validation to reject regex patterns containing nested quantifiers (e.g., +, *, {m,n}) or lookahead/lookbehind.
  3. Use Python 3.11+ re.compile with timeout parameter to limit regex execution time.
  4. Restrict access to the include_in_weight_decay and exclude_from_weight_decay parameters to trusted users only.

Long-Term Measures:

  • Conduct a security audit of all user-supplied regex patterns in the codebase.
  • Implement a Web Application Firewall (WAF) rule to block requests containing malicious regex patterns.
  • Monitor CPU usage and set alerts for sustained high utilization on ML nodes.
  • Train developers on ReDoS vulnerabilities and safe regex practices.

Patch Details:

  • Upgrade to transformers 4.53.0 or later.
  • Verify the fix by checking the _do_use_weight_decay method for input validation.

Valters IT

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