CVE-2025-69822

Executive Summary

CVE-2025-69822 identifies a critical security vulnerability in the Atomberg Erica Smart Fan firmware version V1.0.36. The flaw allows an attacker within Wi-Fi range to send a crafted deauthentication (deauth) frame, forcing the device to disconnect from its legitimate network. This action can be leveraged to intercept sensitive information (e.g., Wi-Fi credentials during reconnection) and escalate privileges on the device. The vulnerability is currently unpatched, and no public proof-of-concept (PoC) or exploit code is available. The attack vector is adjacent network (Wi-Fi), requiring no authentication or user interaction.

Supply Chain & Package Security

This vulnerability is not related to NPM, PyPI, Go, or Ruby packages. It is a firmware-level issue in an IoT device. No supply chain package security implications are present.

CVSS Breakdown & Threat Level

CVSS Score: 9.8 (Critical) Vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

• Attack Vector (AV): Adjacent Network (A) – The attacker must be within Wi-Fi range of the device.
• Attack Complexity (AC): Low (L) – Deauth frames are trivial to generate using tools like aireplay-ng.
• Privileges Required (PR): None (N) – No prior access needed.
• User Interaction (UI): None (N) – The device automatically reconnects.
• Scope (S): Unchanged (U) – The vulnerability affects only the device.
• Confidentiality (C): High (H) – Wi-Fi credentials and device data can be captured.
• Integrity (I): High (H) – Attacker can modify device settings or inject malicious firmware.
• Availability (A): High (H) – Device can be forced offline repeatedly.

Threat Level: Critical. The attack is simple, requires no authentication, and can lead to full device compromise and lateral movement within the home network.

Deep Dive & Mechanics

The vulnerability resides in the Wi-Fi stack of the Atomberg Erica Smart Fan firmware V1.0.36. The device does not validate the authenticity of deauthentication (deauth) frames. In the 802.11 Wi-Fi protocol, deauth frames are management frames used to disconnect a station from an access point. These frames are typically unencrypted and can be spoofed.

Attack Flow:

1. Reconnaissance: The attacker scans for the target device's MAC address (e.g., using airodump-ng).
2. Deauth Injection: The attacker sends a crafted deauth frame spoofing the access point's MAC address to the device.
3. Disconnection: The device disconnects from the legitimate Wi-Fi network.
4. Reconnection Attempt: The device automatically attempts to reconnect to the saved network.
5. Credential Capture: If the attacker sets up a rogue access point with the same SSID, the device may send its Wi-Fi credentials (PSK) in the 4-way handshake, which can be captured and cracked offline.
6. Privilege Escalation: With network access, the attacker can exploit other services on the device (e.g., telnet, HTTP API) to gain root access or modify firmware.

Root Cause: Lack of deauth frame validation (CWE-294: Authentication Bypass by Capture-replay). The device should implement 802.11w (Protected Management Frames) to cryptographically protect deauth frames.

Vulnerable vs. Patched Code

No patched version is available. The vulnerable code is in the firmware's Wi-Fi management frame handler.

Vulnerable (V1.0.36):

// Pseudo-code: No validation of deauth frames
void handle_mgmt_frame(mgmt_frame_t *frame) {
    if (frame->type == DEAUTH) {
        // Immediately disconnect without checking MIC
        wlan_disconnect();
    }
}

Patched (Hypothetical):

// Pseudo-code: Validate deauth frames using 802.11w
void handle_mgmt_frame(mgmt_frame_t *frame) {
    if (frame->type == DEAUTH) {
        if (is_pmf_enabled() && !verify_mic(frame)) {
            // Drop invalid deauth frame
            return;
        }
        wlan_disconnect();
    }
}

Exploitation & Lab Setup

Red Team (Offensive)

Prerequisites:

• Kali Linux or similar with aircrack-ng suite.
• Wi-Fi adapter supporting monitor mode and packet injection (e.g., Alfa AWUS036ACH).
• Target: Atomberg Erica Smart Fan on firmware V1.0.36.

Steps:

1. Enable monitor mode:

   sudo airmon-ng start wlan0
   

2. Scan for target:

   sudo airodump-ng wlan0mon
   

   Identify the BSSID (AP) and station MAC (fan).
3. Send deauth frame:

   sudo aireplay-ng -0 5 -a <AP_MAC> -c <FAN_MAC> wlan0mon
   

   This sends 5 deauth packets, disconnecting the fan.
4. Capture handshake (optional): Set up a rogue AP with same SSID and capture the 4-way handshake using airodump-ng or hcxdumptool.
5. Crack PSK:

   aircrack-ng -w wordlist.txt capture.cap
   

No public exploit code is available.

Blue Team (Defensive)

Detection:

• Monitor for excessive deauth frames using WIDS/WIPS.
• Enable 802.11w (PMF) on the access point if supported.
• Isolate IoT devices on a separate VLAN.

Mitigation:

• Disable Wi-Fi on the fan if not needed.
• Use a strong, unique Wi-Fi password.
• Apply firmware updates as soon as available.

Indicators of Compromise (IOCs)

• Network:
  • High volume of deauth frames from a single MAC address.
  • Sudden disconnection of the fan followed by reconnection to a different AP.
• Device:
  • Unusual LED patterns (e.g., rapid blinking indicating reconnection).
  • Changes in device settings without user action.
• Logs:
  • AP logs showing repeated deauth events for the fan's MAC.

Detection Engineering

YARA Rule

rule CVE_2025_69822_Deauth_Exploit {
    meta:
        description = "Detects deauth frame injection targeting Atomberg Erica Smart Fan"
        author = "Valters IT"
        date = "2025-04-10"
        reference = "CVE-2025-69822"
    strings:
        $deauth = { C0 00 }  // Deauth frame type/subtype in 802.11 header
        $bssid = /([0-9A-Fa-f]{2}:){5}[0-9A-Fa-f]{2}/  // MAC address pattern
    condition:
        $deauth at 0 and #bssid > 0
}

Sigma Rule

title: CVE-2025-69822 Deauth Frame Injection
id: 7a8b9c0d-1e2f-3a4b-5c6d-7e8f9a0b1c2d
status: experimental
description: Detects deauth frames targeting Atomberg Erica Smart Fan
author: Valters IT
date: 2025-04-10
logsource:
    category: wireless
    product: wids
detection:
    selection:
        frame.type: "deauth"
        frame.reason: 7  // Class 3 frame received from nonassociated STA
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate deauth frames from AP maintenance
level: high

Suricata Rule

alert wlan any any -> any any (msg:"CVE-2025-69822 Deauth Frame Injection"; frame.type:0; frame.subtype:12; classtype:attempted-dos; sid:1000001; rev:1;)

Remediation & Mitigation

Immediate Actions:

1. Disable Wi-Fi: If the fan is not actively used, disable its Wi-Fi connectivity via the physical button or app.
2. Enable PMF: Configure the access point to require Protected Management Frames (802.11w) if supported.
3. Network Segmentation: Place IoT devices on a separate VLAN with strict firewall rules.

Long-term Fix:

• Vendor Patch: Atomberg must release a firmware update that implements 802.11w or validates deauth frames using a cryptographic MIC.
• User Action: Monitor Atomberg's support page for firmware updates and apply immediately.

Workarounds:

• Use a Wi-Fi extender with deauth protection.
• Implement a WIDS (Wireless Intrusion Detection System) to alert on deauth floods.

Valters IT