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CVSS: 6.8 CVSS:3.1/AV:P/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H 🐛 CWE-78
👁️
Common Weakness Enumeration - Identifies the specific category of software weakness or flaw.

CVE-2025-8655

CVE-2025-8655 Remote Code Execution in Kenwood
📅 PUBLISHED: 2025-08-06 01:19 UTC 🔄 UPDATED: 2026-08-12 09:03 UTC
[ ZERO-DAY / UNPATCHED ] [ DEFENSE PATCH ↓ ]
💣 PoC: Public
👁️
Proof of Concept - Indicates if functional exploit code is publicly available, drastically increasing the risk of immediate attacks.
🎯 EPSS: 0.30%
👁️
0.30% probability
7.4× above the median CVE
Tier: ELEVATED
30-day exploitation window · FIRST.org · updated daily
🥷 MITRE: T1203
👁️
MITRE ATT&CK Tactic - Describes the strategy hackers use to execute this attack.
VULNERABLE: UNKNOWN / CHECK VENDOR
CVSS VECTOR BREAKDOWN 6.8
AV: P Attack Vector Physical
AC: L Attack Complexity Low
PR: N Privileges Required None
UI: N User Interaction None
S: U Scope Unchanged
C: H Confidentiality High
I: H Integrity High
A: H Availability High
6.8
THREAT LEVEL
■ tracking this CVE ✓ independent patch confirmation ⧗ same-origin mirror (GHSA) ⚠ active exploitation verification policy →

Executive Summary

CVE-2025-8655 is a critical command injection vulnerability in the Kenwood DMX958XR in-car multimedia receiver. The flaw resides in the libSystemLib library during the firmware update process. A physically present attacker can exploit this by injecting arbitrary system commands through a user-supplied string that is not properly validated before being passed to a system call. Successful exploitation grants root-level code execution, allowing full control over the device. The vulnerability has a CVSS score of 6.8 (Medium) due to the requirement of physical access, but the impact is severe as it can lead to complete compromise of the head unit and potentially the vehicle's network.

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Supply Chain & Package Security

This vulnerability is not related to NPM, PyPI, Go, or Ruby packages. It is a firmware-level issue in an embedded device.

CVSS Breakdown & Threat Level

  • CVSS Score: 6.8 (Medium)
  • Vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:P/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
  • Attack Vector: Physical (AV:P) – The attacker must have physical access to the device.
  • Attack Complexity: Low (AC:L) – No special conditions are required.
  • Privileges Required: None (PR:N) – No authentication needed.
  • User Interaction: None (UI:N) – No user action required.
  • Scope: Unchanged (S:U) – The vulnerability affects only the device.
  • Confidentiality Impact: High (C:H) – Full data access.
  • Integrity Impact: High (I:H) – Full control over device operations.
  • Availability Impact: High (A:H) – Potential for denial of service.

Threat Level: High for physically accessible environments (e.g., car dealerships, repair shops, valet parking). The exploit is straightforward and does not require authentication.

Deep Dive & Mechanics

The vulnerability is a classic OS command injection in the firmware update mechanism. The Kenwood DMX958XR uses a library (libSystemLib) to handle firmware updates. When a user (or attacker) initiates a firmware update, the device processes a user-supplied string (likely a filename or path) without proper sanitization. This string is then passed to a system call (e.g., system(), popen(), or exec()). By injecting shell metacharacters (e.g., ;, |, &&, `), an attacker can execute arbitrary commands as root.

Root Cause: Lack of input validation and use of unsafe functions that execute shell commands.

Attack Flow:

  1. Attacker gains physical access to the device (e.g., via USB or SD card slot).
  2. Attacker inserts a malicious firmware file or manipulates the update process.
  3. The device reads the user-supplied string (e.g., filename) and passes it to a system call.
  4. The injected command executes with root privileges.

Vulnerable vs. Patched Code

Vulnerable Code (Conceptual):

void update_firmware(char *user_input) {
    char cmd[256];
    snprintf(cmd, sizeof(cmd), "firmware_update_tool %s", user_input);
    system(cmd);  // Unsafe: user_input can contain shell metacharacters
}

Patched Code (Conceptual):

void update_firmware(char *user_input) {
    // Validate and sanitize input
    if (!is_valid_filename(user_input)) {
        log_error("Invalid input");
        return;
    }
    // Use execve with arguments to avoid shell interpretation
    char *args[] = {"firmware_update_tool", user_input, NULL};
    execve("/usr/bin/firmware_update_tool", args, NULL);
}

Key Differences:

  • The patched code validates the input (e.g., only alphanumeric characters and dots).
  • It uses execve() instead of system(), which does not invoke a shell, preventing command injection.

Exploitation & Lab Setup

Red Team (Exploitation)

Prerequisites:

  • Physical access to a Kenwood DMX958XR device.
  • A USB drive or SD card.
  • Basic knowledge of shell scripting.

Exploit Steps:

  1. Create a malicious firmware file with a crafted filename:
    firmware.bin;id > /tmp/pwned.txt
    
  2. Insert the USB drive into the device.
  3. Navigate to the firmware update menu and select the malicious file.
  4. The device executes the command, writing the output of id to /tmp/pwned.txt.

Proof-of-Concept (PoC) Script:

#!/bin/bash
# CVE-2025-8655 PoC - Command Injection via Firmware Update
# Usage: ./exploit.sh <device_ip> (if network accessible) or physical USB

echo "Creating malicious firmware file..."
echo "FAKE_FIRMWARE_DATA" > "firmware.bin;echo PWNED > /tmp/pwned.txt;"
echo "Insert USB and select the file in firmware update menu."

Note: No public exploit code is available from Exploit-DB.

Blue Team (Detection & Defense)

Detection:

  • Monitor for unexpected firmware update attempts.
  • Log all system calls from the firmware update process.
  • Use file integrity monitoring (FIM) on critical binaries.

Defense:

  • Restrict physical access to the device.
  • Disable USB/SD card slots if not needed.
  • Implement input validation on all user-supplied strings.
  • Use secure coding practices (e.g., avoid system() calls).

Indicators of Compromise (IOCs)

File-Based IOCs:

  • Suspicious filenames containing shell metacharacters (e.g., ;, |, &&).
  • Unexpected files in /tmp/ or /var/ directories (e.g., /tmp/pwned.txt).

Network-Based IOCs:

  • Outbound connections from the device to unknown IPs (if the attacker establishes a reverse shell).
  • DNS queries to suspicious domains.

System IOCs:

  • Unusual processes running as root.
  • Modified system binaries or configuration files.

Detection Engineering

YARA Rule

rule CVE_2025_8655_Command_Injection {
    meta:
        description = "Detects command injection attempts via firmware update filenames"
        author = "Valters IT"
        date = "2025-04-10"
        reference = "CVE-2025-8655"
    strings:
        $cmd1 = /firmware\.bin[;&|`$(){}]/
        $cmd2 = /update\.img[;&|`$(){}]/
        $cmd3 = /\.bin;/
        $cmd4 = /\.img;/
    condition:
        any of them
}

Sigma Rule

title: CVE-2025-8655 - Command Injection via Firmware Update
id: 8a9b3c4d-5e6f-7a8b-9c0d-1e2f3a4b5c6d
status: experimental
description: Detects command injection attempts on Kenwood DMX958XR devices
author: Valters IT
date: 2025-04-10
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: linux
detection:
    selection:
        Image|endswith: '/firmware_update_tool'
        CommandLine|contains: 
            - ';'
            - '|'
            - '&&'
            - '`'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate firmware updates with special characters (unlikely)
level: high

Suricata Rule

alert tcp any any -> any any (msg:"CVE-2025-8655 - Command Injection via Firmware Update"; flow:to_server; content:"firmware.bin"; nocase; pcre:"/firmware\.bin[;&|`]/"; sid:1000001; rev:1;)

Remediation & Mitigation

Immediate Actions:

  1. Disable Firmware Update Feature: If possible, disable the firmware update functionality until a patch is available.
  2. Restrict Physical Access: Limit access to the device to authorized personnel only.
  3. Monitor Logs: Enable detailed logging for the firmware update process.

Long-Term Fixes:

  • Vendor Patch: Kenwood must release a firmware update that properly validates input and uses safe system calls.
  • Input Validation: Implement strict whitelisting of allowed characters in filenames.
  • Code Review: Conduct a security audit of the libSystemLib library.

Workarounds:

  • Use a firewall to block outbound connections from the device.
  • Implement file integrity monitoring (FIM) on the device's filesystem.

Valters IT
Securing Digital Frontiers

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Kenwood DMX958XR
Kenwood DMX958XR firmware

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