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CVE-2025-8857

CVE-2025-8857 — Changing|Clinic Image System - Use of Hard-coded Credentials
📅 PUBLISHED: 2025-08-29 00:00 UTC 🔄 UPDATED: 2026-10-09 05:41 UTC
[ PATCH UNDER REVIEW ↓ ] Remains UNDER REVIEW until an independent source confirms the fix
[ DEFENSE PATCH ↓ ]
💣 PoC: None
👁️
Proof of Concept - Indicates if functional exploit code is publicly available, drastically increasing the risk of immediate attacks.
🎯 EPSS: 0.53%
👁️
0.53% probability
13.2× above the median CVE
Tier: ELEVATED
30-day exploitation window · FIRST.org · updated daily
🥷 MITRE: T1078
👁️
MITRE ATT&CK Tactic - Describes the strategy hackers use to execute this attack.
VULNERABLE: version not auto-detected — verify your deployed version locally
CVSS SEVERITY SCALE
9.0–10.0 CRITICAL
7.0–8.9 HIGH
4.0–6.9 MEDIUM
0.1–3.9 LOW
0.0 NONE
9.3
THREAT LEVEL
■ tracking this CVE ✓ independent patch confirmation ⧗ same-origin mirror (GHSA) ⚠ active exploitation verification policy →

Executive Summary

CVE-2025-8857 is a critical severity vulnerability affecting the Clinic Image System developed by Changing. The CNA has classified this issue as "Use of Hard-coded Credentials," with the NVD description confirming that administrator credentials are embedded directly in the source code. This allows any unauthenticated remote attacker to log into the system using these hardcoded credentials, effectively bypassing all authentication mechanisms. The vulnerability carries a CVSS score of 9.3, placing it in the critical severity band. Any organization deploying the Clinic Image System in an internet-facing or network-accessible capacity is at risk of full system compromise, including unauthorized access to patient imaging data. The vendor has claimed a patch exists in version 2.4.23.2131, but this is based on a single source and is not independently confirmed.

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Technical Analysis

The vulnerability class identified for CVE-2025-8857 is CWE-798 (Use of Hard-coded Credentials). The NVD description explicitly states: "Clinic Image System developed by Changing contains hard-coded Credentials, allowing unauthenticated remote attackers to log into the system using administrator credentials embedded in the source code."

Vulnerability Mechanism: The application contains an embedded set of administrator credentials within its distributed source code or compiled binaries. These credentials are static and identical across all installations of the product. Because the credentials are hardcoded, they are discoverable through:

  1. Source code review of the application's public or leaked repositories
  2. Binary analysis and string extraction from the compiled application
  3. Extraction from firmware, mobile applications, or web application JavaScript bundles
  4. Public disclosure from security researchers who have identified the credentials during testing

Attack Surface: The vulnerability is remotely exploitable without authentication. The account with embedded credentials is assigned administrator privileges, meaning an attacker who successfully authenticates receives full administrative control over the Clinic Image System. The attack vector is network-based; the system's authentication interface is the point of exploitation. The attack complexity is low — once the hardcoded credentials are known (which can be obtained through static analysis of the application), the attacker simply submits the embedded username/password pair to the login interface.

Technical Restrictions: The NVD description and CNA title do not provide specific technical details such as the affected endpoint paths, the exact credentialed account name, the authentication mechanism (form-based, API token, basic auth, etc.), or the underlying operating system. Therefore, the analysis above is limited to the vulnerability class level, and specific implementation details cannot be confirmed.

CVSS Analysis: The reported CVSS score of 9.3 (vector not provided by the CNA) is consistent with a remotely exploitable, unauthenticated vulnerability that results in administrative access with no user interaction required. The score reflects the high confidentiality and integrity impact — an attacker with administrator access can view, modify, or exfiltrate sensitive patient imaging data.

EPSS Consideration: The EPSS score of 0.00527 (41.8% percentile) suggests a relatively low probability of exploitation in the wild within the next 30 days. However, this metric reflects current active exploitation and does not diminish the individual risk to exposed deployments, particularly given the trivial nature of the attack and the sensitive data handled by the product.

Exploitation Scenarios

Attack Chain Scenario — Remote Administrative Takeover:

Step 1 — Reconnaissance and Target Identification: An attacker scans the internet or local network for systems running the Clinic Image System by Changing. Target identification can be performed by:

  • Shodan/Censys searches for the service signature or web interface banners
  • Port scanning for the application's default web service ports
  • Identifying the Clinic Image System's login page via HTTP fingerprinting, JavaScript file characteristics, or page titles matching the application's known interface patterns ("Clinic Image System", "Changing — Imaging", etc.)
  • Searching public documentation for default installation identifiers

Step 2 — Credential Harvesting: The attacker obtains the embedded administrator credentials. This does not require interacting with the target. The credentials are obtained through:

  • Static analysis of the application's source code, which may have been obtained from legitimate or leaked distribution channels
  • Extracting strings from the compiled binaries, JavaScript bundles, configuration files, or installation packages of the Clinic Image System
  • Reviewing vendor documentation or community forums where the hardcoded credentials may have been inadvertently disclosed

Step 3 — Authentication Bypass: The attacker navigates to the Clinic Image System's login interface and submits the hardcoded administrator credentials. Because the application accepts these static credentials, the authentication check is bypassed entirely. The attacker gains a fully authenticated session with administrator privileges. No vulnerability scanning or exploitation tooling is required — this step is equivalent to logging in with a valid password.

Step 4 — Post-Exploitation Impact: With administrator access, the attacker can:

  • View and export patient imaging data — the "Clinic Image System" moniker implies handling of medical imaging, a highly sensitive data category under patient privacy regulations (HIPAA, GDPR, etc.)
  • Modify system configuration, potentially disabling security controls or exfiltrating credentials for connected systems
  • Escalate to lateral movement by leveraging access to the imaging system to pivot into the clinical network
  • Plant ransomware or other malware on the affected server, leveraging legitimate admin sessions to evade detection

Insufficient Technical Detail Note: No public PoC is available for this vulnerability. The attack chain described above is inferred from the vulnerability class (hardcoded credentials) and the NVD description. The specific step-by-step exploitation methodology cannot be confirmed without additional technical disclosure from the vendor or researcher.

Impact Assessment

CVSS & Severity: With a CVSS base score of 9.3, CVE-2025-8857 is rated as Critical. While the full CVSS vector is not provided, the score contextually implies:

  • Attack Vector: Network — remotely exploitable
  • Attack Complexity: Low — no special conditions required
  • Privileges Required: None — unauthenticated exploitation
  • User Interaction: None — no victim action needed
  • Confidentiality/Integrity/Availability Impact: High — consistent with full administrative control

Business Impact: This vulnerability poses an existential risk to data confidentiality in medical environments. The Clinic Image System by its name processes medical imaging data. Unauthorized administrative access directly translates to potential exposure of Protected Health Information (PHI). For healthcare providers operating in jurisdictions with strict data-protection legislation (HIPAA in the United States, GDPR in Europe, PDPA in various Asia-Pacific regions), a breach facilitated by this vulnerability may result in mandatory breach notification, regulatory fines, litigation, and reputational damage.

Blast Radius: Affected deployments are those running the Clinic Image System at any version prior to the claimed fix in version 2.4.23.2131. Because the hardcoded credentials are shared across all installations, every unpatched deployment is equally vulnerable regardless of its configuration. The blast radius is therefore broad for organizations running this product. The clinical network positioning of imaging systems (often connected to PACS/RIS and possibly the hospital network backbone) expands the impact: a compromised imaging server may serve as a pivot point into the wider clinical IT infrastructure.

Threat Landscape Context: The EPSS score of 0.00527 and the fact that the CVE is not listed on the CISA KEV catalog indicate that no known exploitation in the wild has been observed or documented. The patch confirmation is weak (2/4 — single source claim), and there is no evidence of public PoC development. However, the technical simplicity of exploiting hardcoded credentials means that once the embedded credentials are publicly disclosed, mass exploitation is likely to follow without requiring sophisticated attacker skill. The presence of this CVE in the NVD also means the information is publicly available for research purposes, which historically accelerates the creation of automated exploitation tooling.

Detection Guidance

The following detection content is designed to identify both active exploitation attempts (authentication using hardcoded credentials) and post-exploitation activity (suspicious administrator sessions on the Clinic Image System).

Sigma Rule

title: Suspicious Login Activity on Changing Clinic Image System
id: 24f9a301-d5b4-4edd-9142-8f5b77a5c9c2
status: experimental
description: Detects successful or failed login attempts to the Clinic Image System using hardcoded credentials or from unexpected source IP addresses. Requires application-level audit logging to be enabled.
author: Valtersit Threat Intelligence
date: 2025
logsource:
    product: application
    service: webserver
detection:
    selection_success:
        cs-method: 'POST'
        c-uri|contains:
            - 'login'
            - 'authenticate'
        sc-status: 200
        cs-user-agent|contains: 'ClinicImage'
    selection_hardcoded_user:
        cs-username|contains:
            - 'admin'
            - 'administrator'
    selection_unusual_source:
        src_ip|not_cidr:
            - '10.0.0.0/8'
            - '172.16.0.0/12'
            - '192.168.0.0/16'
    condition: selection_success and (selection_hardcoded_user or selection_unusual_source)
    timeframe: 5m
level: high
tags:
    - attack.initial_access
    - attack.t1078
    - attack.t1078.001
    - cve.2025.8857
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate remote administrators logging in from external networks
    - If the default admin account has been renamed, usernames will differ

YARA Rule

rule CVE_2025_8857_ClinicImage_Hardcoded_Creds
{
    meta:
        author = "Valtersit Threat Intelligence"
        description = "Detects strings or binary patterns associated with hardcoded credentials in the Clinic Image System by Changing"
        reference = "CVE-2025-8857"
        date = "2025"
        severity = "critical"
    strings:
        // Generic hardcoded credential patterns that may be present in the distributed binaries
        $cred_string = "password" ascii wide
        $admin_string = "admin" ascii wide
        $auth_endpoint = "login" ascii wide nocase
        $app_banner = "ClinicImage" ascii wide nocase
        $app_banner2 = "Clinic Image" ascii wide nocase
        $auth_realm = "Authentication" ascii wide
    condition:
        uint16(0) == 0x5A4D  // MZ header — Windows executable
        or uint32(0) == 0x464c457f  // ELF header — Linux binary
        and any of ($cred_string*) and any of ($admin_string*) and any of ($auth*)
}

Suricata IDS Rule

alert http any any -> any any (msg:"CVE-2025-8857 Changing Clinic Image System - Suspicious Login Attempt"; flow:to_server,established; http.method; content:"POST"; http.uri; content:"login"; nocase; content:"password"; http.client_body; content:"admin"; http.client_body; threshold:type both, track by_src, count 5, seconds 60; metadata:created_at 2025, updated_at 2025, cve CVE-2025-8857; reference:url https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-8857; classtype:attempted-admin; sid:2008857; rev:1;)

Elastic Detection

// Detect multiple authentication failures or successes targeting the Clinic Image System login endpoint
// from a single source, or any successful login using the admin account from a new/unusual source.
sequence by source.ip with maxspan=5m
  [authentication where host.name == "*clinicimage*" and event.category == "authentication" and outcome == "failure"]
  [authentication where host.name == "*clinicimage*" and event.category == "authentication" and outcome == "success" and user.name in ("admin", "administrator")]

Splunk SPL Query

index=main sourcetype=cis_access_log OR sourcetype=clinicimage_audit
| earliest=-30d
| where like(uri,"%login%") OR like(uri,"%authenticate%")
| eval is_external = if(match(src_ip,"^(10\.|192\.168\.|172\.(1[6-9]|2[0-9]|3[0-1])\.)"),"internal","external")
| stats count, values(user) as attempted_users, values(action) as actions by src_ip, is_external, uri
| where (is_external=="external" AND count >= 3) OR values(user) IN ("admin","administrator")
| sort - count
| table _time, src_ip, is_external, user, uri, count, actions

Wazuh OSSEC Rule

<group name="web, clinicimage, cve_2025_8857,">
  <!-- Detect repeated failed or successful login attempts on the Clinic Image System login page -->
  <rule id="100857" level="12">
    <if_sid>100856</if_sid>
    <match>login|authenticate|login_action</match>
    <regex>success|failure|denied</regex>
    <description>CVE-2025-8857: Suspicious login activity on Clinic Image System detected.</description>
    <group>authentication_failures,</group>
    <mitre>
      <id>T1078</id>
    </mitre>
    <field name="cve">CVE-2025-8857</field>
    <info>Potential hardcoded credential abuse — verify source IP and account used.</info>
  </rule>
  
  <!-- Parent rule: generic web login event tracking -->
  <rule id="100856" level="1">
    <if_sid>100000</if_sid>
    <match>clinicimage|ClinicImage</match>
    <description>Login events logged by the Clinic Image System web interface.</description>
    <group>web_application,</group>
  </rule>
</group>

Mitigation & Patch Guidance

Patch Confidence Assessment: The patch claim for CVE-2025-8857 is rated 2/4 (CLAIMED) by the CNA. This rating means a single source (the CNA itself) claims that a patch exists, but the fix has not been independently confirmed by third-party analysis. There is no public advisory from independent researchers confirming the fix is complete or that it addresses the root cause (as opposed to merely rotating the hardcoded credentials to a new set that would still be embedded in updated source code).

Immediate Mitigations (Implement Today):

  1. Network isolation: Remove the Clinic Image System from any internet-facing network. Place it behind a strict firewall or in a segmented network zone with egress filtering.
  2. Access control: Restrict access to the application's web interface by source IP. Allow only trusted clinical workstations and administration subnets.
  3. Monitor authentication logs: If application audit logging is available, enable it and review all login events for the administrative account. Pay special attention to logins originating from unexpected source IPs or occurring at off-hours.
  4. Change the embedded credentials if technically feasible: If system configuration allows overriding the hardcoded credentials (e.g., via a database, configuration file, or environment variable), change them to unique, strong credentials. Note: If the code hardcodes credentials at the application layer without a configuration override, this mitigation is ineffective.

Patch/Upgrade Steps:

  1. Contact Changing (the vendor) to confirm the availability and integrity of the patched version 2.4.23.2131.
  2. Validate the patch independently — before deployment, obtain the fixed version and verify that the hardcoded credentials have been removed or replaced with a configuration-based approach (e.g., initial setup wizard, randomized per-installation credentials, or mandatory password change on first login).
  3. Apply version 2.4.23.2131 after validating its integrity (checksum verification against vendor-published hashes).
  4. Retest after patching to confirm that the previously hardcoded credentials no longer authenticate and that the default installation now requires unique credential setup.

Long-Term Hardening:

  1. Establish a credential management policy: Ensure all administrative accounts across clinical systems comply with the principle of least privilege and enforce strong, unique passwords per system.
  2. Implement Configuration Management Database (CMDB) tracking: Record the deployed version of the Clinic Image System in your asset inventory to ensure future CVEs can be correlated quickly.
  3. Practice defense-in-depth: Place medical imaging systems in segmented network zones with monitoring at the zone perimeter. Assume that lateral movement from compromised clinical endpoints will target these systems.
  4. Bug Bounty/Vendor Accountability: If the patch is not verifiable, consider engaging the vendor under your organization's vulnerability disclosure agreement or raise the issue through customer/partner channels to request transparency on the fix.
  5. Periodic credential audits: Regularly audit vendor-supplied products for hardcoded secrets and authentication bypass issues as part of your third-party security assessment program.

References

  1. NVD Entry for CVE-2025-8857: https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-8857 — Official National Vulnerability Database entry containing the description and metadata.
  2. CNA Advisory (Changing): Vendor disclosure via the assigned CNA for the Clinic Image System. No public vendor advisory URL was available in the provided data; contact Changing directly for the official security bulletin.
  3. MITRE ATT&CK — T1078 Valid Accounts: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/ — The MITRE ATT&CK technique most directly applicable to this vulnerability, since hardcoded credentials effectively provide a valid administrative account.
  4. CISA Known Exploited Vulnerabilities Catalog: https://www.cisa.gov/known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog — Confirmed: CVE-2025-8857 is not listed in the KEV catalog as of the report date, indicating no known exploitation in the wild.
  5. CWE-798 — Use of Hard-coded Credentials: https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/798.html — The Common Weakness Enumeration entry for this vulnerability class.

Threat Actor Evidence: No public threat actor campaigns, exploit-in-the-wild evidence, or documented attacks leveraging CVE-2025-8857 were identified in the provided data. The absence from CISA KEV and the low EPSS percentile suggest the vulnerability has not yet been actively exploited in observed campaigns. However, the critical CVSS score, trivial attack mechanics, and similarity to other medical-device credential-disclosure incidents warrant elevated and sustained monitoring until a verified patch is widely deployed.

◈ SOURCE Analysis & enrichment: valtersit.com/cve/CVE-2025-8857/ · CVE data: NVD/MITRE (public domain) · © 2026 ValtersIT Hub
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