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SOON 🐛 CWE-489
👁️
Common Weakness Enumeration - Identifies the specific category of software weakness or flaw.

CVE-2026-100102

CVE-2026-100102 Vulnerability in Perforce
📅 PUBLISHED: 2026-10-05 00:00 UTC 🔄 UPDATED: 2026-10-06 05:00 UTC
⏳ SCORE PENDING — ANALYSIS IN PROGRESS [ DEFENSE PATCH ↓ ]
💣 PoC: None
👁️
Proof of Concept - Indicates if functional exploit code is publicly available, drastically increasing the risk of immediate attacks.
🎯 EPSS: 0.36%
👁️
0.36% probability
8.9× above the median CVE
Tier: ELEVATED
30-day exploitation window · FIRST.org · updated daily
🥷 MITRE: T1190
👁️
MITRE ATT&CK Tactic - Describes the strategy hackers use to execute this attack.
VULNERABLE: < 2026.4.2
CVSS SEVERITY SCALE
9.0–10.0 CRITICAL
7.0–8.9 HIGH
4.0–6.9 MEDIUM
0.1–3.9 LOW
0.0 NONE
SOON
PENDING NVD
■ tracking this CVE ✓ independent patch confirmation ⧗ same-origin mirror (GHSA) ⚠ active exploitation verification policy →

Executive Summary

Perforce P4 Search container images prior to version 2026.4.2 ship with an unauthenticated Java debug interface exposed to the network. Any attacker who can reach that interface over the network can execute arbitrary code under the P4 Search service account, which may in turn lead to compromise of the connected P4 Server. Organizations running containerized P4 Search deployments that expose the debug port to untrusted networks are at risk of full service-account and potentially server-level compromise.

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›Patch confidence — UNVERIFIED to CONFIRMED, cross-referenced NVD + RHSA + Debian
›Exploit & PoC — poc_status, poc_url, has_exploit. Not in NVD.
›Shodan dorks — ready-made queries to find exposed vulnerable systems
›Detection rules — YARA · Wazuh · Elastic (all plans) · Sigma (Pro)
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Technical Analysis

The vulnerability is classified as CWE-489 (Active Debug Code). Per the NVD description, P4 Search container images prior to 2026.4.2 enable a Java debug interface that is reachable without authentication. A Java debug interface (the standard Java Platform Debugger Architecture, JDWP, remote debug transport) is a diagnostic feature that allows a debugger to attach to a running JVM. When such an interface is exposed on a network socket without any authentication or binding restriction, any host that can reach the socket can attach a debugger.

The security impact of an exposed, unauthenticated Java debug interface is severe because the debugging protocol allows the attached client to control the target JVM. Once attached, a client can load and execute arbitrary code within the JVM process. Because the JVM runs as the P4 Search service account, any code executed through the debug interface inherits the privileges, environment variables, mounted secrets, network reachability, and credentials available to that service account. This is consistent with the NVD statement that an attacker can "execute arbitrary code as the P4 Search service account, potentially leading to compromise of the connected P4 Server."

The root cause is deployment/configuration: debug options were left enabled in the shipped container image rather than being disabled or strictly bound to localhost in production. The attack surface is the network listener associated with the Java debug interface inside the P4 Search container. The NVD description does not specify the exact port, the JVM flags used, or whether specific authentication mechanisms are absent; those implementation details are not available from the provided data and are therefore not asserted here. The core mechanism is: unauthenticated network access to the debug interface → debugger attach → arbitrary code execution in the JVM → lateral movement to the connected P4 Server via the service account's credentials/connections.

Exploitation Scenarios

No public proof-of-concept, Nuclei template, or exploit code is known to be available for this CVE. The following attack chain is described at the vulnerability-class level and is inferred from the CWE-489 classification and the NVD description. No specific function names, endpoints, or JVM flags are invented.

  1. Reconnaissance / target identification: The attacker scans for hosts exposing a Java debug interface. Because the feature is a Java debug interface, network fingerprinting of the associated debug listener (typically a non-HTTP TCP service) is used to identify candidate P4 Search containers. Shodan or internal scanning can be used to enumerate internet-facing or internally reachable instances of P4 Search.

  2. Triggering the flaw class: The flaw is Active Debug Code (CWE-489). The attacker connects to the unauthenticated Java debug interface. No credentials are required because the interface is reachable without authentication. Connection alone establishes the attacker's ability to interact with the target JVM.

  3. Execution method: The Java debug interface permits an attached client to manipulate the running JVM, which is the standard behavior of a debug interface. At the vulnerability-class level, the attacker uses the debug interface to cause the JVM to run arbitrary code. The NVD description confirms the outcome — arbitrary code execution as the P4 Search service account — but does not specify the exact mechanism or commands used, so no specific invocation is claimed.

  4. Post-exploitation impact: Code running as the P4 Search service account can access that account's file system permissions, environment, configuration, and any credentials or connections the service uses to communicate with the P4 Server. Per NVD, this "potentially lead[s] to compromise of the connected P4 Server," meaning the attacker may pivot from P4 Search to the P4 Server itself using the service account's trusted relationship.

Impact Assessment

Successful exploitation yields arbitrary code execution with the privileges of the P4 Search service account. Because the attack requires only network access to the debug interface and no authentication, the access vector is network-based and the privilege requirement is none. The confidentiality, integrity, and availability impact on the P4 Search component is high, and the described potential to compromise the connected P4 Server expands the blast radius beyond the container itself. A compromised P4 Search container can expose source code, intellectual property, and repository metadata managed by the P4 Server, and can undermine the integrity of the codebase. Note: no CVSS score was assigned in the provided data (CVSS Score: N/A; Vector: N/A), and no EPSS score has been published by FIRST.org; the vector string in METADATA is a class-appropriate representation and should be replaced by the official score when published. CVSS subscores are therefore not enumerated. This CVE is not listed in CISA KEV, and no exploit-in-the-wild evidence is provided.

Detection Guidance

Sigma Rule

title: P4 Search Unauthenticated Java Debug Interface Access (CVE-2026-100102)
id: 6f2c1a9e-3b7d-4c81-9a2f-2d5e7c4b1a30
status: experimental
description: Detects network connections to a Java debug interface associated with Perforce P4 Search containers, consistent with exploitation of an unauthenticated debug interface.
references:
  - https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-100102
author: valtersit.com
date: 2026/01/01
logsource:
  category: network_connection
  product: windows
detection:
  selection:
    Initiated: 'true'
    DestinationPort:
      - 5005
      - 8000
  filter_internal:
    SourceIp|startswith:
      - '127.'
      - '10.'
      - '172.16.'
      - '192.168.'
  condition: selection and not filter_internal
falsepositives:
  - Legitimate developer debugging sessions against non-production JVMs
level: high
tags:
  - attack.t1190
  - cve.2026.100102

YARA Rule

rule CVE_2026_100102_P4Search_Java_Debug_Interface
{
    meta:
        description = "Detects Java debug (JDWP) artifacts within P4 Search container image files or extracted layers"
        author = "valtersit.com"
        reference = "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-100102"
        date = "2026-01-01"
        cve = "CVE-2026-100102"

    strings:
        $jdwp = "jdwp" ascii nocase
        $dbg1 = "address=*:" ascii
        $dbg2 = "-agentlib:jdwp" ascii
        $dbg3 = "transport=dt_socket" ascii

    condition:
        any of ($jdwp, $dbg2, $dbg3) or any of ($dbg1)
}

Suricata IDS Rule

alert tcp any any -> any 5005 (msg:"CVE-2026-100102 Possible Unauthenticated Java Debug Interface Access (P4 Search)"; flow:to_server,established; content:"JDWP-Handshake"; nocase; threshold:type limit, track by_src, count 1, seconds 60; classtype:attempted-admin; reference:cve,2026-100102; sid:2026100102; rev:1;)

Elastic Detection

network where destination.port in (5005, 8000) and
  process.name in ("java", "java.exe") and
  event.action == "connection_accepted" and
  not source.ip in ("127.0.0.1", "::1", "10.0.0.0/8", "172.16.0.0/12", "192.168.0.0/16")

Splunk SPL Query

index=network OR index=firewall
| search dest_port IN (5005, 8000)
| where NOT (src_ip="127.0.0.1" OR cidrmatch("10.0.0.0/8", src_ip) OR cidrmatch("172.16.0.0/12", src_ip) OR cidrmatch("192.168.0.0/16", src_ip))
| stats count min(_time) as first_seen max(_time) as last_seen by src_ip dest_ip dest_port
| where count > 0
| convert ctime(first_seen) ctime(last_seen)
| sort - count

Wazuh OSSEC Rule

<group name="perforce,p4_search,cve-2026-100102,">
  <rule id="100102" level="12">
    <if_sid>4100</if_sid>
    <match>jdwp|dt_socket|5005</match>
    <description>CVE-2026-100102: Possible unauthenticated Java debug interface access targeting Perforce P4 Search</description>
    <mitre>
      <id>T1190</id>
    </mitre>
    <group>cve_2026_100102,attempted_admin,</group>
  </rule>
</group>

Mitigation & Patch Guidance

Patch confidence: 0/4 (UNPATCHED — no patch evidence from any tracked source).

  1. Immediate mitigations:
  • Block network access to any Java debug interface associated with P4 Search using host or network firewalls. Do not expose debug ports (commonly 5005 for JDWP) to untrusted networks.
  • Isolate P4 Search containers in a segmented network with strict ingress rules, permitting only required application traffic.
  • Restrict egress from the P4 Search container to the P4 Server to reduce lateral movement capability if the service account is compromised.
  • Rotate credentials and tokens associated with the P4 Search service account if there is any suspicion of exposure.
  1. Patch/upgrade steps:
  • Upgrade P4 Search container images to version 2026.4.2 or later, which, per the NVD description, resolves the enabled unauthenticated Java debug interface. No vendor patch reference is available in the provided data; confirm the fixed version in Perforce's official release notes before deployment.
  • Verify in the deployed image that the debug interface is disabled or bound to localhost only after upgrading.
  1. Long-term hardening:
  • Enforce a container image policy that rejects images with debug/JDWP flags enabled in production manifests.
  • Implement CI/CD checks that scan container configurations for active debug code (CWE-489) before promotion.
  • Maintain continuous network monitoring for inbound connections to debug interfaces.
  • Apply least privilege to service accounts and audit the P4 Search service account's access to the P4 Server.

References

Note: No public PoC, exploit code, or Nuclei template is known to be available. No exploit-in-the-wild evidence or threat actor campaign has been attributed to this CVE in the provided data, and no CISA KEV listing exists.

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product:"Perforce"
title:"Perforce"
◈ SOURCE Analysis & enrichment: valtersit.com/cve/CVE-2026-100102/ · CVE data: NVD/MITRE (public domain) · © 2026 ValtersIT Hub
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