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CVSS: 9.9 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H 🐛 CWE-119
👁️
Common Weakness Enumeration - Identifies the specific category of software weakness or flaw.

CVE-2026-100740

CVE-2026-100740 Buffer Overflow in D-Link
📅 PUBLISHED: 2026-09-27 00:00 UTC 🔄 UPDATED: 2026-09-27 05:00 UTC
[ ZERO-DAY / UNPATCHED ] [ DEFENSE PATCH ↓ ]
💣 PoC: Public
👁️
Proof of Concept - Indicates if functional exploit code is publicly available, drastically increasing the risk of immediate attacks.
🥷 MITRE: T1190
👁️
MITRE ATT&CK Tactic - Describes the strategy hackers use to execute this attack.
VULNERABLE: A1_102b07 (hardware revision A1, firmware 102b07)
CVSS VECTOR BREAKDOWN 9.9
AV: N Attack Vector Network
AC: L Attack Complexity Low
PR: L Privileges Required Low
UI: N User Interaction None
S: C Scope Changed
C: H Confidentiality High
I: H Integrity High
A: H Availability High
9.9
THREAT LEVEL
■ tracking this CVE ✓ independent patch confirmation ⧗ same-origin mirror (GHSA) ⚠ active exploitation verification policy →

Executive Summary

CVE-2026-100740 is a remote out-of-bounds write (CWE-119) in the L2TP Control Channel Parser component of the D-Link DIR-895L wireless router, specifically within the function tunnel_set_params in tunnel.c at firmware revision A1_102b07. The vulnerability carries a CVSS 3.1 base score of 9.9 (Critical) and has been publicly disclosed with exploit code reportedly available, meaning any internet-exposed device at the affected firmware level is at immediate risk of full compromise. Because the flaw is remotely reachable, requires only low privileges, and has a scope-changing impact on confidentiality, integrity, and availability, it should be treated as an emergency remediation item for any organization with DIR-895L hardware in production.

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Technical Analysis

The vulnerability resides in the L2TP Control Channel Parser, an internal code path that processes incoming L2TP control-channel packets. The affected function is tunnel_set_params, implemented in the source file tunnel.c. According to the NVD description, the function performs insufficient bounds validation on input derived from the parsed control channel, resulting in an out-of-bounds write when manipulated data is supplied.

The relevant vulnerability class is CWE-119 (Improper Restriction of Operations within the Bounds of a Memory Buffer). This class of defect occurs when a program writes past the end (or before the beginning) of a buffer that is dynamically sized based on attacker-influenced input. In a C-based embedded network stack such as the L2TP control channel parser, this typically manifests as a memcpy, index assignment, or variable-length array write where the destination buffer is smaller than the attacker-controlled source. The result is heap or stack memory corruption that can redirect control flow, corrupt adjacent data structures, or trigger a denial of service.

Within the CVSS 3.1 vector provided, the attacker is network-positioned (AV:N) and the attack complexity is low (AC:L), which indicates the write primitive is reachable without special race conditions or complex preconditions. The privilege requirement is low (PR:L), suggesting the attacker needs some minimal level of authenticated or session-establishment context — consistent with an L2TP control channel parser that only processes traffic after a tunnel or session handshake is initiated. User interaction is not required (UI:N), so no victim action is needed. Scope is changed (S:C), meaning successful exploitation can impact resources beyond the vulnerable component's own security authority — expected when a router firmware process is corrupted and the attacker gains control over a component that mediates traffic beyond the parser itself. The impact triad is high across confidentiality, integrity, and availability (C:H/I:H/A:H).

The exact byte lengths, buffer sizes, and parsing offsets that trigger the overflow are not specified in the available description, and no root-cause source-level analysis has been published in the data provided. Analysts should avoid assuming specific L2TP Attribute-Value Pair (AVP) fields unless confirmed by the vendor or an independent researcher write-up — the control channel does carry vendor-specific and standard AVPs, and malformed AVP handling is a common overflow vector in this parser class, but the specific malformed field is not documented here.

Exploitation Scenarios

No public proof-of-concept code or exploit script is present in the tracked data sources; however, the NVD description explicitly states that "the exploit is now public and may be used." The following chain is inferred from the vulnerability class and the parser context.

  1. Reconnaissance / target identification. An attacker scans for internet-exposed D-Link DIR-895L devices at firmware revision A1_102b07. Device fingerprinting can be performed through the vendor's default web administration interface, router advertisement responses, or by identifying the distinctive firmware build string via management interfaces. Shodan or Censys dorks such as product:"D-Link DIR-895L" or http.title:"DIR-895L" identify candidate hosts. In an internal network, an attacker with any foothold can identify the router as the default gateway and confirm the model through ARP, DHCP fingerprints, or UPnP/Bonjour fallback queries.

  2. Triggering the flaw. The L2TP Control Channel Parser is reachable over the network. The attacker initiates an L2TP control channel interaction — or injects packets that appear to belong to one — and manipulates the data consumed by tunnel_set_params so that a buffer write exceeds its intended bounds. Because the flaw class is an out-of-bounds write, the manipulation consists of supplying input that causes the parser to calculate a size, offset, or copy length larger than the destination buffer allocated for the tunnel parameter value.

  3. Payload/execution method. No public exploit code is tracked in the supplied sources, so the exact payload mechanics cannot be documented from this data. At the defect-class level, an out-of-bounds write in a network-facing parser enables memory corruption that an attacker can shape with attacker-controlled bytes. Depending on memory layout, this can produce a denial of service (crash/reboot), information disclosure (overwrite of adjacent pointers leading to read of unintended memory), or control-flow hijack if the corrupted memory includes function pointers, return addresses, or heap metadata. On an embedded MIPS/ARM device with limited or absent protections such as stack canaries, ASLR entropy, or NX/PIE, achieving code execution from a heap or stack overflow is a well-understood methodology. No confirmation of which memory region is affected is available in the provided description.

  4. Post-exploitation impact. With code execution on the router firmware, the attacker can modify DNS settings to hijack name resolution, intercept or redirect client traffic, establish a persistent foothold in the device's flash or NVRAM, pivot into the internal network, and capture credentials or session data traversing the device. The scope-changed rating in the CVSS vector reflects that compromise of this component affects assets outside the vulnerable parser — i.e., anything behind the router.

Impact Assessment

The CVSS base score of 9.9 is derived from an all-network, low-complexity, no-user-interaction exploit path that requires only low privileges and delivers high confidentiality, integrity, and availability impact with scope change. In practice, this means a single crafted L2TP control-channel interaction can fully compromise the router.

Blast radius. All D-Link DIR-895L units running firmware A1_102b07 are presumed affected. Because the router is a boundary device, the blast radius extends to every host behind it: servers, endpoints, and IoT devices that rely on the router for DNS, NAT, VPN termination, or routing. Compromise of DNS alone enables credential phishing and traffic interception at scale.

Business impact. For enterprises, an unpatched router at the network edge represents lateral-movement and traffic-interception risk against the entire site. For service providers and branch offices using this hardware, customer traffic confidentiality is at risk. Because the vendor has issued no fix and no tracked source shows a patch, any remediation that depends on vendor firmware will fail — hardware replacement or compensating network controls are required. The public-availability statement in the description raises the urgency: opportunistic scanning for exposed DIR-895L devices and automated exploitation are reasonable expectations even without a confirmed in-the-wild campaign.

Detection Guidance

Detection for this vulnerability is challenging because the trigger traffic is a legitimate L2TP control channel exchange with manipulated parameters. Multiple layers are required.

Sigma Rule

title: Potential D-Link DIR-895L L2TP Control Channel Parser Exploitation (CVE-2026-100740)
id: 7f3c1a2e-9b4d-4e7a-8c11-2b6d5f0a9e31
status: experimental
description: Detects network-facing L2TP control channel activity followed by abnormal router crash, reboot, or process termination events that may indicate exploitation of the out-of-bounds write in tunnel_set_params (tunnel.c) on D-Link DIR-895L A1_102b07.
references:
  - https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-100740
author: valtersit.com Threat Intelligence
date: 2026/01/01
logsource:
  category: network_connection
  product: suricata
detection:
  selection_l2tp_ports:
    dst_port:
      - 1701
      - 500
      - 4500
  selection_parser_alert:
    alert.signature_id:
      - 1007401
  condition: selection_l2tp_ports or selection_parser_alert
falsepositives:
  - Legitimate L2TP/IPsec VPN traffic to and from approved gateways
level: high
tags:
  - attack.t1190
  - cve.2026.100740

YARA Rule

rule CVE_2026_100740_DLink_DIR895L_L2TP_Exploit
{
    meta:
        description = "Detects L2TP control channel exploit payloads targeting the out-of-bounds write in tunnel_set_params of tunnel.c on D-Link DIR-895L A1_102b07 (CVE-2026-100740)"
        author = "valtersit.com Threat Intelligence"
        reference = "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-100740"
        date = "2026-01-01"
        severity = "critical"

    strings:
        $l2tp_ccr = { C8 02 ?? ?? }          // L2TP control message header (control, T-bit set)
        $avp_start = { 80 00 ?? ?? ?? ?? }   // Mandatory AVP header marker
        $fw_build  = "A1_102b07" ascii
        $parser_fn = "tunnel_set_params" ascii
        $src_file  = "tunnel.c" ascii

    condition:
        (uint16(0) == 0x02C8 or $l2tp_ccr at 0) or
        (any of ($parser_fn, $src_file, $fw_build))
}

Suricata IDS Rule

alert udp any any -> any 1701 ( \
  msg:"CVE-2026-100740 D-Link DIR-895L L2TP Control Channel Parser overflow attempt (tunnel_set_params/tunnel.c)"; \
  content:"|C8 02|"; depth:2; \
  content:"|80 00|"; within:64; \
  dsize:>1200; \
  threshold: type both, track by_src, count 5, seconds 60; \
  classtype:attempted-admin; \
  sid:1007401; rev:1; \
  reference:cve,2026-100740; )

Elastic Detection

sequence by source.ip with maxspan=30s
  [network where network.transport == "udp" and destination.port == 1701]
  [network where network.transport == "udp" and destination.port == 1701 and network.bytes > 1200]

Splunk SPL Query

index=network sourcetype=suricata OR sourcetype=pan:traffic
(dest_port=1701 OR dest_port=500 OR dest_port=4500)
| stats count AS l2tp_sessions, sum(bytes_out) AS bytes_out, values(src_ip) AS sources BY dest_ip
| where l2tp_sessions > 5 OR bytes_out > 100000
| lookup dlink_dir895l_assets dest_ip OUTPUT asset_owner
| sort - bytes_out

Wazuh OSSEC Rule

<group name="dlink,l2tp,cve-2026-100740,">
  <rule id="100740" level="12">
    <decoded_as>json</decoded_as>
    <field name="event_type">l2tp_control_parse_failure</field>
    <description>CVE-2026-100740: D-Link DIR-895L L2TP control channel parser anomaly (possible out-of-bounds write in tunnel_set_params)</description>
    <mitre>
      <id>T1190</id>
    </mitre>
    <group>cve_2026_100740,pci_dss_6.2,</group>
  </rule>
  <rule id="100741" level="14">
    <if_sid>100740</if_sid>
    <field name="process_name">tunnel_parser</field>
    <match>crash|reboot|segfault|oops</match>
    <description>CVE-2026-100740: Router process crash following L2TP parser activity - possible successful exploitation</description>
    <group>cve_2026_100740,</group>
  </rule>
</group>

Mitigation & Patch Guidance

Patch confidence: 0/4 — UNPATCHED. No vendor fix, advisory, workaround, or tracked patch source exists for CVE-2026-100740. The vendor/product attribution and version evidence come solely from the NVD description; no affected-version range has been published beyond the single firmware build identified.

1) Immediate mitigations

  • Retire or replace DIR-895L units on network boundaries. Because no firmware fix is available, software-based remediation is not possible; hardware substitution is the only durable fix.
  • If replacement is not immediately feasible, remove the device from any internet-facing role. Block inbound L2TP (UDP 1701) and related control traffic (ISAKMP/NAT-T on UDP 500/4500 if L2TP/IPsec is in use) at upstream firewalls and carrier edge ACLs.
  • Disable L2TP server functionality on the device if it is not operationally required. This removes the vulnerable parser from the reachable attack surface.
  • Segment the router's management plane on a dedicated VLAN, restrict administrative access to a small set of trusted management hosts, and disable WAN-side administrative interfaces.
  • Deploy the Suricata and EQL detections above at the network perimeter to log and block L2TP control channel anomalies.

2) Patch/upgrade steps

  • There is no patch to apply. Contact D-Link support directly to request an affected-product status and remediation timeline, and reference CVE-2026-100740. Monitor the NVD entry and D-Link security advisories for the first published firmware update or end-of-support statement.
  • If the vendor confirms end-of-life status for the DIR-895L, treat the device as permanently non-remediable and complete replacement on a defined schedule.

3) Long-term hardening

  • Maintain an inventory of all edge devices with firmware build tracking so that any device reporting an unpatchable build (such as A1_102b07) is flagged automatically.
  • Eliminate single-layer perimeter dependence: do not rely solely on a consumer/SMB router for VPN termination, DNS, or firewall function in environments handling sensitive data. Use separately maintained, supported security appliances for these roles.
  • Adopt a vulnerability-management workflow that distinguishes "patched" from "vendor unresponsive," and escalate unpatchable internet-facing devices to risk acceptance or immediate decommissioning.
  • Continuously monitor for L2TP parser anomalies and unexpected device reboots as an early indicator of attempted exploitation.

References

No threat actor campaign, in-the-wild exploitation report, or vendor advisory is present in the tracked data for this CVE. The public-exploit statement in the NVD description is the only exploit-availability evidence, and no PoC repository, Nuclei template, or exploit code was identified by the tracked sources.

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product:"D-Link"
title:"D-Link"

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