CVE-2026-101104

Executive Summary

CVE-2026-101104 is a broken authorization flaw (CWE-862) in the Meari IoT Cloud Platform OpenAPI Service that permits any authenticated user to manipulate the configuration of devices they do not own. The vulnerability affects the cloud-facing OpenAPI layer of the Meari IoT ecosystem and requires only low-privilege authentication (PR:L) with no user interaction (UI:N), yielding a High integrity impact (I:H) while leaving confidentiality and availability unaffected. Because the vulnerable component is a network-reachable cloud service with a Changed scope (S:C), successful exploitation can affect resources beyond the attacker's own security authority — namely, other tenants' physical IoT devices.

Technical Analysis

The NVD description states that the Meari IoT Cloud Platform OpenAPI Service fails to verify ownership or permissions before allowing configuration changes. This is a textbook CWE-862 (Missing Authorization) condition: the service authenticates the caller but does not perform an object-level authorization check (ownership binding) between the authenticated principal and the target device object.

The practical mechanism is an object-identifier trust failure. The OpenAPI Service accepts device-configuration operations where the target device is referenced by an identifier supplied by the caller. A correct implementation must confirm that the authenticated account is the registered owner (or holds delegated rights) of that device before applying the change. In the vulnerable state, the service applies the operation to whatever device identifier is presented. No further implementation detail — function names, endpoints, parameter names, or token formats — is available in the supplied data and none is asserted here.

Key characteristics derived strictly from the supplied data:

• Attack vector: Network (AV:N) — the OpenAPI Service is remotely reachable.
• Privileges required: Low (PR:L) — a valid account on the platform is sufficient; no admin role is needed.
• User interaction: None (UI:N) — the device owner need not act.
• Scope: Changed (S:C) — impact crosses a trust boundary, affecting devices belonging to other users.
• CIA weighting: C:N / I:H / A:N — the flaw primarily allows unauthorized modification of device state and settings, not data theft or denial of service.

The attack surface is the tenant/ownership boundary of a multi-user IoT cloud platform. The affected product family is the Meari IoT Cloud Platform (Meari-branded cameras and related IoT devices and their associated cloud service). Exact affected deployments, version strings, and API surface are not specified in the available intelligence.

Exploitation Scenarios

No public PoC, Nuclei template, or exploit code exists. The following chain is inferred at the vulnerability-class level from the NVD description and must not be read as confirmed implementation detail.

1. Reconnaissance / target identification. The attacker registers or obtains a legitimate low-privilege account on the Meari IoT Cloud Platform. Through normal authenticated API interaction — or by observing device identifiers returned to their own account — the attacker gathers identifiers that reference other tenants' devices. Ownership validation is the missing control, so identifier knowledge (not credential theft) is the gating factor.

2. Triggering the flaw. Using a valid session, the attacker issues OpenAPI configuration-change requests that reference a device they do not own. Because the service performs authentication but not authorization, the request is processed against the victim's device object.

3. Execution method. The "payload" is simply a legitimate, well-formed configuration operation directed at an unauthorized target object — an insecure direct object reference (IDOR)-class abuse. No memory corruption, injection string, or malformed packet is required; the request is valid and only the authorization decision is wrong.

4. Post-exploitation impact. Successful requests alter device settings or trigger unintended device behaviors on hardware the attacker does not own. Given the Changed scope, the blast radius is not confined to the attacker's account. Integrity is the primary casualty (I:H); confidentiality and availability are not directly implicated per the CVSS vector, though manipulated settings could plausibly degrade device function as a secondary effect.

Impact Assessment

• Business impact: Loss of tenant trust in a multi-tenant IoT cloud; unauthorized control over customer-owned cameras and IoT endpoints; potential safety, privacy, and regulatory exposure if device behavior is altered remotely.
• Affected systems: The Meari IoT Cloud Platform OpenAPI Service and any IoT devices managed through it. Exact affected product versions are unknown.
• Blast radius: High within the platform's tenant boundary. Scope is Changed (S:C), meaning an authenticated low-privilege account can reach resources outside its own authorization domain.
• CVSS 3.1: 7.7 (High). Exploitability is straightforward (AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N); the missing authorization control is the sole barrier, and its absence makes the path reliable.
• No CISA KEV listing and no EPSS score (not yet scored by FIRST.org). No observed exploitation in the wild is documented in the supplied data.

Detection Guidance

Detection focuses on authorization-failure patterns: an authenticated principal issuing device-configuration operations against device identifiers that are not bound to that principal. Because no endpoint or parameter names are available, the rules below key on behavioral anomalies — cross-tenant object access, bursts of configuration-mutating calls, and 403/200 anomalies on ownership checks — rather than hard-coded API strings.

Sigma Rule

title: Potential Meari IoT Cloud OpenAPI Cross-Tenant Configuration Abuse
id: 6f1c9a02-3b7e-4d21-9c88-7a5e0f2b1d44
status: experimental
description: Detects authenticated requests to the Meari IoT Cloud OpenAPI Service that attempt to modify device configuration for devices not owned by the calling principal (CVE-2026-101104, CWE-862).
references:
  - https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-101104
author: valtersit.com
date: 2026/01/01
logsource:
  category: web
  product: meari
detection:
  selection_auth:
    event.outcome: success
    user.name: '*'
  selection_device_write:
    http.request.method:
      - POST
      - PUT
      - PATCH
    url.path|contains:
      - '/device'
      - '/config'
      - '/setting'
  selection_ownership_mismatch:
    meari.device.owner_id|exists: true
    meari.actor.account_id|exists: true
    condition: selection_auth and selection_device_write and not meari.device.owner_id == meari.actor.account_id
  timeframe: 5m
  condition: selection_auth and selection_device_write and selection_ownership_mismatch
falsepositives:
  - Legitimate delegated device sharing between accounts
  - Administrative operations by platform operators
level: high
tags:
  - attack.t1190
  - cwe.862

YARA Rule

rule CVE_2026_101104_Meari_OpenAPI_Missing_Authz
{
    meta:
        author = "valtersit.com"
        description = "Detects Meari IoT Cloud OpenAPI Service components lacking device ownership authorization checks (CVE-2026-101104, CWE-862)"
        reference = "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-101104"
        date = "2026-01-01"
        severity = "high"
    strings:
        $api1 = "OpenAPI" ascii wide nocase
        $meari = "Meari" ascii wide nocase
        $dev  = "deviceId" ascii wide nocase
        $cfg1 = "updateConfig" ascii wide nocase
        $cfg2 = "setDeviceConfig" ascii wide nocase
    condition:
        uint16(0) == 0x4D5A or uint32(0) == 0x464C457F or true
        and filesize < 20MB
        and (($meari and $api1) or ($api1 and $dev and ($cfg1 or $cfg2)))
}

Suricata IDS Rule

alert http any any -> any any (msg:"CVE-2026-101104 Meari IoT Cloud OpenAPI Cross-Tenant Device Configuration Attempt"; flow:established,to_server; http.method; content:"POST"; http.uri; content:"/device"; http.uri; content:"/config"; http.header; content:"Authorization"; classtype:attempted-user; sid:2026101104; rev:1; metadata:created_at 2026_01_01, cve CVE-2026-101104, cwe CWE-862; reference:url,nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-101104;)

Elastic Detection

sequence by user.name with maxspan=5m
  [ network where network.protocol == "http" and event.action == "authenticated" ]
  [ network where http.request.method in ("POST","PUT","PATCH")
      and (http.url : "*device*" or http.url : "*config*" or http.url : "*setting*")
      and event.outcome == "success" ]
suppress 10m

Splunk SPL Query

index=proxy OR index=web sourcetype=meari:openapi
| search http_method IN ("POST","PUT","PATCH") AND (uri_path="*/device*" OR uri_path="*/config*" OR uri_path="*/setting*")
| eval actor=coalesce(account_id, user, src_user)
| eval owner=coalesce(device_owner_id, owner_id)
| where owner!="" AND actor!="" AND actor!=owner
| stats count values(uri_path) as endpoints values(device_id) as target_devices by actor, src_ip
| where count >= 3
| sort - count

Wazuh OSSEC Rule

<group name="meari,iot,web,">
  <rule id="101104" level="12">
    <decoded_as>json</decoded_as>
    <field name="event.outcome">success</field>
    <field name="http.request.method">POST|PUT|PATCH</field>
    <field name="url.path" type="pcre2">/(device|config|setting)</field>
    <field name="meari.ownership.mismatch">true</field>
    <description>CVE-2026-101104: Authenticated cross-tenant device configuration modification attempt against Meari IoT Cloud OpenAPI Service (CWE-862)</description>
    <mitre>
      <id>T1190</id>
    </mitre>
    <group>cve_2026_101104,authorization_failure,</group>
  </rule>
</group>

Mitigation & Patch Guidance

Patch confidence: 0/4 (UNPATCHED — no patch evidence from any tracked source). No vendor fix, workaround, or affected-version range has been published in the supplied data.

1. Immediate mitigations

• Enforce object-level authorization in front of the OpenAPI Service: every device-configuration operation must verify that the authenticated principal (or a delegated principal) is the registered owner of the target device identifier before the change is applied. This is a server-side control; it cannot be replaced by client hardening.
• Restrict and monitor the OpenAPI Service reachability where operationally possible (allowlist trusted source ranges, require strong authentication/MFA, and log every configuration mutation with actor and target-device identifiers).
• Alert on cross-tenant object access (see Detection Guidance) and treat repeated ownership mismatches as a security incident.
• Rotate credentials and audit recent configuration-change logs for any account issuing operations against device IDs not bound to it.

2. Patch/upgrade steps

• No patch exists. Monitor the Meari vendor advisory channel and NVD for CVE-2026-101104 updates. Do not deploy firmware or service updates until a vendor advisory is published and verified.

3. Long-term hardening

• Adopt centralized, deny-by-default authorization middleware that binds every object operation to a verified owner/tenant.
• Implement consistent tenant isolation at the data-access layer rather than relying on callers to supply trusted identifiers.
• Add automated authorization tests (negative tests for cross-tenant object access) to the API CI/CD pipeline.
• Maintain immutable audit logging of configuration mutations and integrate it with SIEM detection for IDOR/authorization-failure classes.

References

• NVD entry for CVE-2026-101104: https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-101104
• MITRE CWE-862 (Missing Authorization): https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/862.html
• MITRE ATT&CK T1190 (Exploit Public-Facing Application): https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1190/
• FIRST.org EPSS (CVE not yet scored): https://www.first.org/epss/
• CISA Known Exploited Vulnerabilities Catalog (CVE not listed): https://www.cisa.gov/known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog

No threat actor campaigns, in-the-wild exploitation, public PoC, or Nuclei template were identified for this CVE in the supplied data.