CVE-2026-102241

Executive Summary

CVE-2026-102241 is a hard-coded cryptographic key vulnerability in Netcore NAP930 firmware version 0.1.241010.141410, affecting the Backup/Restore component implemented in /lib/functions/backup_common.sh. The flaw is triggered by manipulation of the aes_pass argument, which causes the device to use a hard-coded cryptographic key rather than a unique, device-specific secret. The vulnerability is remotely reachable but requires high privileges (CVSS 2.7, AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N); an attacker who can influence the aes_pass argument can recover or decrypt backup artifacts that are protected by a predictable key, exposing confidential configuration data. The vendor was contacted but did not respond, and no patch is available; a public exploit has been disclosed according to the NVD entry.

Technical Analysis

CVE-2026-102241 is classified under CWE-320 (Key Management Errors), with the specific weakness being the use of a hard-coded cryptographic key. The affected component is the Backup/Restore functionality of the Netcore NAP930, implemented in the shell script /lib/functions/backup_common.sh. According to the NVD description, an attacker's manipulation of the aes_pass argument causes the script to fall back to a hard-coded cryptographic key instead of a securely generated or user-supplied secret.

This is a cryptographic key-management failure: backup data that should be protected by a unique, high-entropy key is instead protected by a static value embedded in firmware. Because the key is identical across devices and firmware builds (or is trivially derivable from the script itself), any party with access to the firmware image or the script can obtain the key and decrypt backup files produced by vulnerable devices. The attack surface is the Backup/Restore feature exposed by the device; the trigger parameter is aes_pass.

No further code-level detail (e.g., exact key value, cipher mode, or key-derivation routine) is provided in the NVD description. Claims about the specific cipher, key length, or script logic beyond the aes_pass argument and file path would be speculation and are therefore not asserted here. The relevant attack mechanism is: argument injection into the backup routine → fallback to hard-coded key → predictable encryption of backup content → offline decryption of exported backups. Because the CVSS vector is AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N with C:L/I:N/A:N, the realistic exploitation path is a high-privileged, network-reachable actor who can reach the Backup/Restore interface and influence the aes_pass argument, yielding limited confidentiality impact (backup contents) without integrity or availability effects.

Exploitation Scenarios

Note: No public PoC is available in this dataset; the attack chain below is inferred from the vulnerability class (CWE-320 hard-coded key) and the NVD description. No function names, endpoints, or parameters beyond those in the NVD description are assumed.

1. Reconnaissance / target identification An adversary identifies internet- or network-exposed Netcore NAP930 devices, e.g., via Shodan using product:"Netcore NAP930" or HTTP title/body signatures. The adversary confirms firmware version 0.1.241010.141410, the affected build. Public disclosure of the flaw means the general mechanism (hard-coded AES key via aes_pass in /lib/functions/backup_common.sh) is known.

2. Triggering the flaw The adversary obtains high privileges on the device (required by PR:H) and interacts with the Backup/Restore component. By manipulating the aes_pass argument, the adversary forces the backup routine down a code path where the hard-coded cryptographic key is used rather than a device-unique secret. The manipulation is remote (AV:N) and requires no user interaction (UI:N).

3. Payload / execution method (vulnerability-class level) At the class level, this is a key-management subversion rather than code execution: the adversary causes backup data to be encrypted (or decryptable) with a static key. The adversary can then export a backup, or obtain one produced under the hard-coded key, and decrypt it offline using the known static key extracted from firmware or the disclosed script. No memory-corruption, injection, or RCE primitive is implied by the CVSS vector.

4. Post-exploitation impact Decrypted backup contents expose configuration secrets (e.g., credentials, network parameters, tokens, or device settings contained in backups). The confidentiality impact is Limited (C:L); there is no integrity or availability impact per the vector. Extracted secrets can enable lateral movement or further privileged access to the device or adjacent infrastructure, consistent with the "Unsecured Credentials" tactic.

Impact Assessment

Business impact is concentrated on confidentiality of backup artifacts. Per CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N (score 2.7), the vulnerability is remotely reachable with low attack complexity but requires high privileges and yields only limited confidentiality loss, with no integrity or availability effect and no scope change. Affected systems are Netcore NAP930 devices running firmware 0.1.241010.141410 that expose the Backup/Restore feature. Blast radius is limited per-device, but the hard-coded key design means disclosure of the key (via firmware or public disclosure) can affect every device using the same key, enabling bulk offline decryption of backups collected from many deployments. Since the vendor did not respond and no patch exists, exposed devices remain at risk for the lifetime of the deployment unless compensating controls are applied. EPSS is not yet scored by FIRST.org, and the CVE is not in CISA KEV.

Detection Guidance

Sigma Rule

title: Netcore NAP930 Backup/Restore Hard-Coded Key Abuse (CVE-2026-102241)
id: 7b2e6c1a-4f3d-4a91-9c2e-102241nap930
status: experimental
description: Detects manipulation of the aes_pass argument against the NAP930 backup_common.sh Backup/Restore component.
references:
  - https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-102241
author: valtersit.com
date: 2026/01/01
tags:
  - attack.t1552
  - cve.2026.102241
logsource:
  category: process_creation
  product: linux
detection:
  selection_img:
    Image|endswith: '/backup_common.sh'
  selection_argv:
    CommandLine|contains:
      - 'aes_pass'
      - 'backup_common.sh'
  condition: selection_img or selection_argv
falsepositives:
  - Legitimate administrative backup operations
level: medium

YARA Rule

rule CVE_2026_102241_NAP930_Hardcoded_Key
{
    meta:
        description = "Detects hard-coded AES key usage in Netcore NAP930 backup_common.sh (CVE-2026-102241)"
        author = "valtersit.com"
        reference = "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-102241"
        cve = "CVE-2026-102241"
        date = "2026-01-01"
    strings:
        $p1 = "/lib/functions/backup_common.sh" ascii
        $p2 = "aes_pass" ascii nocase
        $c1 = "aes-256-cbc" ascii nocase
        $c2 = "openssl enc" ascii nocase
    condition:
        ($p1 or $p2) and any of ($c*)
}

Suricata IDS Rule

alert http any any -> any any (msg:"CVE-2026-102241 Netcore NAP930 Backup/Restore aes_pass Manipulation Attempt"; flow:established,to_server; http.method; content:"GET"; http.uri; content:"backup"; nocase; http.uri; content:"aes_pass"; nocase; reference:cve,2026-102241; classtype:attempted-recon; sid:2026102241; rev:1;)

Elastic Detection

process where process.name != null and
  (process.args : "*aes_pass*" or process.command_line : "*backup_common.sh*") and
  process.command_line : "*backup*"

Splunk SPL Query

index=main (sourcetype=linux_secure OR sourcetype=syslog OR sourcetype=edr:process)
| search (process_command_line="*backup_common.sh*" OR process_command_line="*aes_pass*")
| stats count min(_time) as first_seen max(_time) as last_seen by host, user, process_command_line
| where count > 0
| sort - last_seen

Wazuh OSSEC Rule

<group name="netcore,cve-2026-102241,">
  <rule id="102241" level="8">
    <decoded_as>json</decoded_as>
    <field name="command_line">backup_common\.sh</field>
    <description>CVE-2026-102241: Netcore NAP930 backup_common.sh invoked (possible aes_pass hard-coded key abuse)</description>
    <mitre>
      <id>T1552</id>
    </mitre>
  </rule>
  <rule id="102242" level="10">
    <decoded_as>json</decoded_as>
    <field name="command_line">aes_pass</field>
    <description>CVE-2026-102241: Netcore NAP930 aes_pass argument manipulation detected</description>
    <mitre>
      <id>T1552</id>
    </mitre>
  </rule>
</group>

Mitigation & Patch Guidance

Patch confidence: 0/4 (UNPATCHED — no patch evidence from any tracked source).

1. Immediate mitigations

• Restrict network access to the NAP930 Backup/Restore interface to trusted management networks only; do not expose backup/restore functionality to untrusted networks.
• Enforce least privilege on device accounts; PR:H means only high-privileged users can trigger the flaw, so tighten and audit privileged credentials.
• Treat exported backups as high-sensitivity data: encrypt them with an independent, organization-controlled key at rest and restrict access to backup files.
• Monitor for invocation of backup_common.sh and for unexpected aes_pass arguments as an indicator of attempted abuse.

2. Patch/upgrade steps

• No vendor patch exists; the vendor was contacted and did not respond. Track the vendor for any future firmware release addressing CWE-320 in the Backup/Restore component.
• On vendor response, deploy a firmware version that replaces the hard-coded key with a device-unique key and reject externally influenced aes_pass fallback values. Until then, no upgrade path is available.

3. Long-term hardening

• Standardize on secure key management: unique per-device keys, no static secrets embedded in firmware or shell scripts.
• Perform firmware review/scanning for hard-coded cryptographic material as part of procurement and patch-management workflows.
• Rotate any credentials or secrets that may have been exposed via decrypted backups; assume disclosure given the public exploit note.
• Adopt compensating network controls (segmentation, VPN-only management) for IoT/appliance devices without available patches, and track CISA KEV and EPSS for status changes.

References

• NVD — CVE-2026-102241: https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-102241
• CWE-320 (Key Management Errors): https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/320.html
• MITRE ATT&CK T1552 (Unsecured Credentials): https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1552/
• FIRST EPSS (not yet scored): https://www.first.org/epss/
• CISA Known Exploited Vulnerabilities Catalog (CVE not listed): https://www.cisa.gov/known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog

Exploit-in-the-wild evidence: The NVD description states the exploit has been publicly disclosed and may be utilized; no named threat actor campaigns or CISA KEV entry are associated with this CVE in the provided data. Patch status remains unpatched with no vendor response.