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SOON 🐛 CWE-787
👁️
Common Weakness Enumeration - Identifies the specific category of software weakness or flaw.

CVE-2026-102730

CVE-2026-102730 Out-of-Bounds Access in Eclipse
📅 PUBLISHED: 2026-09-29 00:00 UTC 🔄 UPDATED: 2026-10-01 05:00 UTC
⏳ SCORE PENDING — ANALYSIS IN PROGRESS [ DEFENSE PATCH ↓ ]
💣 PoC: None
👁️
Proof of Concept - Indicates if functional exploit code is publicly available, drastically increasing the risk of immediate attacks.
🥷 MITRE: T1190
👁️
MITRE ATT&CK Tactic - Describes the strategy hackers use to execute this attack.
VULNERABLE: LevelX (unspecified version, HEAD `9f1cfdc`)
CVSS SEVERITY SCALE
9.0–10.0 CRITICAL
7.0–8.9 HIGH
4.0–6.9 MEDIUM
0.1–3.9 LOW
0.0 NONE
SOON
PENDING NVD
■ tracking this CVE ✓ independent patch confirmation ⧗ same-origin mirror (GHSA) ⚠ active exploitation verification policy →

Executive Summary

CVE-2026-102730 is an unbounded out-of-bounds heap write vulnerability in Eclipse LevelX's NAND flash-translation-layer (FTL) metadata parser. An attacker who can supply a crafted NAND flash image triggers lx_nand_flash_open(), causing an OOB write that overwrites a driver function pointer within the control block and permits hijacking of the instruction pointer (RIP) to an attacker-chosen 8-byte value, alongside two associated OOB reads. The vulnerability remains unpatched, with no public exploit code, Nuclei template, or KEV listing.

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›Detection rules — YARA · Wazuh · Elastic (all plans) · Sigma (Pro)
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Technical Analysis

LevelX is a wear-leveling flash translation layer that provides a block-device abstraction over NAND and NOR flash. The impacted component is the NAND metadata parser, which is invoked when a flash image is mounted via lx_nand_flash_open(). According to the NVD description, the parser relies on an on-flash count field that is not validated (unchecked on-flash count), which yields an unbounded out-of-bounds heap write while processing the metadata.

The write primitive is severe: it overwrites a driver function pointer resident in the control block. Because this function pointer is later dereferenced during driver execution, an attacker who controls the flash image can steer control flow and set RIP to a full 8-byte attacker-chosen value (register-verified). Two additional out-of-bounds reads accompany the write, expanding the information-disclosure and memory-corruption surface. The behavior was reproduced verbatim under AddressSanitizer (ASan) at repository HEAD 9f1cfdc.

Mapping to CWE-787 (Out-of-bounds Write), the root cause is a failure to bound-check the metadata count prior to writing parsed entries into a heap buffer. The description notably flags that the affected metadata-parser header states "Some portions generated by Copilot (Sonnet 4.6)," i.e., an AI-generated parser with an unchecked on-flash count — a supply-chain quality concern independent of the exploit mechanics.

Attack surface: any code path, tooling, or service that mounts an untrusted or attacker-supplied NAND flash image using LevelX's lx_nand_flash_open() is in scope. No CVSS vector or score is assigned in the source data; the EPSS score has not been published, and no affected product version range is specified.

Exploitation Scenarios

No public PoC is available; the attack chain below is inferred from the vulnerability class and the details supplied in the NVD description.

  1. Reconnaissance / target identification. An adversary identifies a target that consumes external NAND flash images through LevelX — for example a device update, firmware flashing, forensic ingestion, or recovery workflow where the attacker can influence the image content. Identification focuses on systems exposing or accepting a flash image as an input artifact.

  2. Trigger. The attacker crafts a NAND flash image whose metadata contains a malicious on-flash count. When the image is mounted through lx_nand_flash_open(), the NAND metadata parser processes the unchecked count, producing an unbounded out-of-bounds heap write (and two OOB reads).

  3. Payload / execution method (class level). The OOB write corrupts the control block, specifically overwriting a driver function pointer. When that pointer is subsequently invoked, control flow is redirected, allowing the attacker to set RIP to a full 8-byte attacker-chosen value (register-verified in the source report). No specific function names, offsets, or gadget details are present in the available data and none are asserted here.

  4. Post-exploitation impact. Successful control-flow hijack enables arbitrary code execution in the context of the mounting process or firmware, with potential for persistence, data exfiltration, or lateral movement depending on platform privileges and deployment context. The associated OOB reads may leak heap memory and aid further exploitation.

Impact Assessment

Impact is high where attacker-supplied flash images are mounted: the write primitive escalates to a demonstrated control-flow hijack with attacker-chosen RIP, which is typically an arbitrary-code-execution outcome. Confidentiality, integrity, and availability are all affected — the OOB reads expose memory (confidentiality), the write corrupts control data (integrity), and control-flow hijack can crash or fully compromise the process/device (availability).

Blast radius depends on where LevelX is embedded — IoT devices, embedded controllers, firmware update pipelines, or any host tooling that opens untrusted flash images. Because the component sits in low-level storage translation, compromise can be persistent across reboots.

No CVSS score or vector is assigned by the source data; the vector modeled in METADATA (AV:L, AC:L, PR:N, UI:N) reflects that exploitation requires the ability to supply a flash image to a mounting operation, i.e., a local/logical adjacency rather than a network-reachable endpoint. EPSS has not yet scored this CVE, CISA KEV does not list it, and no exploit code or Nuclei template exists publicly.

Detection Guidance

Sigma Rule

title: Suspicious LevelX NAND Flash Image Mount (CVE-2026-102730)
id: 7c2f1e0a-4b8d-4e21-9f3a-1d0c2b3a4e5f
status: experimental
description: Detects mounting of attacker-controlled NAND flash images that trigger an out-of-bounds write in the LevelX metadata parser via lx_nand_flash_open().
references:
  - https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-102730
author: valtersit.com
logsource:
  category: process_creation
  product: linux
detection:
  selection_proc:
    Image|endswith:
      - '/lx_nand_flash_open'
      - '/levelx_mount'
  selection_flags:
    CommandLine|contains:
      - 'nand'
      - 'flash'
      - 'levelx'
  condition: selection_proc or selection_flags
falsepositives:
  - Legitimate firmware flashing and recovery operations
level: medium

YARA Rule

rule CVE_2026_102730_LevelX_NAND_Metadata
{
    meta:
        description = "Detects LevelX NAND flash images with suspicious metadata counts potentially triggering CVE-2026-102730"
        author = "valtersit.com"
        reference = "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-102730"
        date = "2026-01-01"
    strings:
        $magic = { 4C 58 4E 41 4E 44 }      // "LXNAND"
        $copilot = "Some portions generated by Copilot" ascii wide
    condition:
        uint32(0) == 0x4E414E4C or $magic or $copilot
}

Suricata IDS Rule

alert tcp any any -> any any (msg:"CVE-2026-102730 LevelX NAND Flash Image Transfer"; flow:established,to_server; content:"LXNAND"; depth:6; sid:2026102730; rev:1;)

Elastic Detection

process where process.name in ("lx_nand_flash_open", "levelx_mount") or
  process.command_line : ("* /dev/mtd*") or
  process.command_line : ("*nand*flash*")

Splunk SPL Query

index=endpoint (process_name=lx_nand_flash_open OR process_name=levelx_mount OR command_line="*nand*flash*") 
| stats count by host, user, process_name, command_line 
| where count > 0

Wazuh OSSEC Rule

<group name="cve,cve-2026-102730,levelx">
  <rule id="102730" level="10">
    <decoded_as>json</decoded_as>
    <field name="event.action">nand_flash_open</field>
    <description>CVE-2026-102730: LevelX NAND flash image mount with attacker-controlled metadata</description>
  </rule>
</group>

Mitigation & Patch Guidance

Patch confidence: 0/4 (UNPATCHED — no patch evidence from any tracked source).

  1. Immediate mitigations

    • Where feasible, do not mount NAND flash images from untrusted or unauthenticated sources.
    • Add strict bounds validation on the on-flash metadata count before processing — reject images whose declared count exceeds the allocated buffer bounds.
    • Run mounting operations in an isolated process or firmware sandbox to limit the impact of control-flow hijack.
    • Treat the affected parser as a security-critical component and replace or re-review any AI-generated code paths lacking bounds checks.
  2. Patch/upgrade steps

    • No vendor fix or updated version is available. Track LevelX upstream for a patched commit and prioritize a fix that validates the on-flash count before any write into the metadata buffer.
    • Until a patch exists, pin to a reviewed/audited LevelX revision if one is available, and avoid the vulnerable parser for untrusted images.
  3. Long-term hardening

    • Adopt strict input validation and fuzzing for all flash-image parsers.
    • Add ASan/panic-on-corrupt instrumentation in build pipelines and validate on-flash data against expected bounds.
    • Enforce code review of AI-generated code, particularly where bounds-checking logic is critical.

References

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product:"Eclipse"
title:"Eclipse"
◈ SOURCE Analysis & enrichment: valtersit.com/cve/CVE-2026-102730/ · CVE data: NVD/MITRE (public domain) · © 2026 ValtersIT Hub
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