CVE-2026-103007

Executive Summary

CVE-2026-103007 is an Incorrect Authorization vulnerability (CWE-863) in Elasticsearch affecting a configurable, non-default administrative privilege that allows delegating limited role-management capability scoped to specific indices. A user holding this delegated privilege with a broadly-scoped index pattern can exploit an inconsistency in the authorization check to update their own assigned role, gaining access to indices that should remain restricted — including internal security data — and potentially escalating to full administrative control of the cluster. The vulnerability requires high privileges (PR:H) and network access (AV:N), yielding a CVSS 3.1 base score of 7.2.

Technical Analysis

The vulnerability resides in Elasticsearch's authorization enforcement logic for a configurable, non-default privilege that permits an administrator to delegate limited role-management capability to another user, scoped to specific indices. The core weakness is CWE-863 (Incorrect Authorization): the authorization check that enforces index scoping during role-management operations does not correctly account for a role-definition setting that can expand the matched index set.

In practical terms, the scoping mechanism is intended to constrain a delegated user's role-management capability to a defined subset of indices. However, a role-definition setting — one that broadens the set of indices matched by a given pattern — is not properly factored into the authorization decision. This creates a mismatch between the index set the administrator believed they were delegating (narrow) and the index set the authorization layer actually permits (broad). A user holding the delegated privilege can supply a broadly-scoped index pattern and then update their own assigned role to reference indices outside the intended scope.

Because the authorization check fails to reconcile the role-definition setting against the delegate's actual privilege boundary, the user can grant themselves access to restricted indices, including internal security data. Access to internal security data is particularly significant, since it enables discovery of further privileged roles, credentials, or configuration that supports escalation to full administrative control of the cluster.

The attack surface is the role-management API surface exposed to a user who already holds the delegated privilege. The vulnerability is network-reachable (AV:N), requires high privileges to initiate (PR:H), and needs no user interaction (UI:N). The scope is unchanged (S:U), while confidentiality, integrity, and availability impacts are all rated High (C:H/I:H/A:H), reflecting that full administrative control of the cluster exposes all indexed data, allows destructive configuration changes, and can disrupt availability.

No CVE record details, CNA title, affected version list, OSV package data, or vendor advisory were available in the supplied intelligence. As a result, no specific function names, class names, API endpoints, file paths, or parameter names can be asserted beyond those concepts explicitly present in the NVD description. The technical analysis above is bounded strictly by that description.

Exploitation Scenarios

No public proof-of-concept, exploit code, or Nuclei template is available. The attack chain below is inferred at the vulnerability-class level from the NVD description. No specific implementation details (function names, endpoints, parameters) are fabricated.

1. Reconnaissance / target identification. The attacker must already possess a valid Elasticsearch account that has been granted the configurable, non-default delegated role-management privilege. Because the vulnerability is non-default and requires an administrator to have delegated this privilege, the attacker either is a legitimate low-privilege user who received the delegation, or has obtained such an account. The attacker identifies that they hold the delegated privilege scoped to specific indices.

2. Triggering the flaw class. Incorrect authorization (CWE-863). The attacker invokes the role-management capability available to them under the delegated privilege — an operation they are legitimately permitted to perform within their intended scope. The authorization check enforcing index scoping does not correctly account for a role-definition setting that expands the matched index set. By leveraging this inconsistency, the attacker uses a broadly-scoped index pattern so that the effective matched index set exceeds the intended delegation boundary.

3. Payload / execution method (vulnerability-class level). The attacker updates their own assigned role so that it references indices outside the intended scope. Because the authorization check fails to enforce the delegation boundary correctly, the role update succeeds, granting the attacker access to indices that should remain restricted. No specific request format, endpoint path, or parameter is asserted here, as none is provided in the source description.

4. Post-exploitation impact. The attacker gains read (and potentially write) access to restricted indices, including internal security data. This access can be used to enumerate further privileged roles, tokens, or configuration, enabling escalation up to full administrative control of the cluster. At full administrative control, the attacker can read all indexed data, alter cluster configuration and security settings, and take actions that affect availability — consistent with the High ratings across confidentiality, integrity, and availability.

Impact Assessment

The vulnerability carries a CVSS 3.1 base score of 7.2 (High). The vector components indicate network exploitability (AV:N), low attack complexity (AC:L), high privileges required (PR:H), no user interaction (UI:N), unchanged scope (S:U), and High impact to confidentiality, integrity, and availability.

Business impact is severe where the delegated privilege has been configured. Because successful exploitation can lead to full administrative control of the Elasticsearch cluster, the blast radius includes all data indexed in the cluster — not only the restricted security indices first accessed, but any business, application, log, or telemetry data stored there. Clusters commonly hold sensitive operational telemetry, authentication logs, and application data, so exposure can cascade into secondary compromises.

Integrity impact is High: an attacker with administrative control can modify roles, users, index settings, and stored data. Availability impact is High: administrative control permits actions that can disable security features, delete indices, or destabilize the cluster. Confidentiality impact is High via access to internal security data and subsequent cluster-wide read access.

The key risk factors that determine real-world exposure are: (1) whether the non-default delegated privilege has been configured, and (2) whether it was granted with broadly-scoped index patterns. Environments that never enabled the delegated role-management privilege are not exposed to this specific weakness. Because PR:H is required, this is a post-authentication, privilege-escalation issue rather than an unauthenticated remote compromise. No EPSS score has been published by FIRST.org and the CVE is not listed in CISA KEV, so there is currently no evidence of active exploitation.

Detection Guidance

Sigma Rule

title: Elasticsearch Delegated Role Privilege Escalation Attempt
id: 7f3c9a21-4b6e-4d2f-9c1a-elastic-esc-001
status: experimental
description: Detects role-management activity consistent with exploitation of CVE-2026-103007 via a delegated role-management privilege used to update a user's own role beyond intended index scope.
references:
  - https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-103007
author: Threat Intelligence
date: 2026/01/01
tags:
  - attack.privilege_escalation
  - attack.t1068
  - cve.2026.103007
logsource:
  product: elasticsearch
  service: audit
detection:
  selection_event:
    event.action:
      - 'put_role'
      - 'update_role'
      - 'role_change'
  selection_selfupdate:
    user.name: '*'
    role.name: '*'
  selection_broad_pattern:
    role.index_pattern|contains:
      - '*'
      - '_security'
      - '.security'
      - 'internal*'
  condition: selection_event and selection_selfupdate and selection_broad_pattern
falsepositives:
  - Legitimate administrators performing authorized role changes
  - Automated role provisioning tooling
level: high

YARA Rule

rule CVE_2026_103007_Elasticsearch_Role_Escalation
{
    meta:
        description = "Detects Elasticsearch audit/payload artifacts referencing delegated role updates with broad index patterns tied to CVE-2026-103007"
        author = "Threat Intelligence"
        reference = "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-103007"
        date = "2026-01-01"
        severity = "high"

    strings:
        $s1 = "put_role" ascii nocase
        $s2 = "update_role" ascii nocase
        $s3 = "role_management" ascii nocase
        $s4 = "_security" ascii nocase
        $s5 = ".security" ascii nocase
        $s6 = "index_pattern" ascii nocase
        $s7 = "cluster_permissions" ascii nocase
        $s8 = "indices_privileges" ascii nocase

    condition:
        uint32(0) != 0x504b0304 and
        (
            (2 of ($s1, $s2, $s3)) and (1 of ($s4, $s5))
        ) or
        (
            (1 of ($s1, $s2)) and (1 of ($s6, $s7, $s8))
        )
}

Suricata IDS Rule

alert http any any -> any any (msg:"CVE-2026-103007 Elasticsearch Delegated Role Privilege Escalation Attempt"; flow:established,to_server; http.method; content:"PUT"; http.uri; content:"/_security/role/"; nocase; http.request_body; content:"index"; nocase; content:"*"; nocase; classtype:attempted-admin; reference:cve,2026-103007; reference:url,nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-103007; sid:2026103007; rev:1;)

Elastic Detection

sequence by user.name with maxspan=5m
  [ authentication where event.action == "authentication_success" ]
  [ any where event.action in ("put_role", "update_role", "role_change")
      and user.name == user.name
      and wildcard(role.index_pattern, "*") ]

Splunk SPL Query

index=elasticsearch sourcetype=elasticsearch:audit event.action IN ("put_role","update_role","role_change")
| rex field=message "user[\.\"]*name[\.\"]*[:=]\s*\"?(?<actor>[^\",]+)"
| where match(role_index_pattern, "\*") OR match(role_index_pattern, "(?i)(_security|internal)")
| stats count min(_time) as first_seen max(_time) as last_seen values(event.action) as actions values(role_index_pattern) as patterns by actor, role.name
| where count > 0
| convert ctime(first_seen) ctime(last_seen)
| sort - count

Wazuh OSSEC Rule

<group name="elasticsearch,cve-2026-103007,">
  <rule id="103007" level="12">
    <decoded_as>json</decoded_as>
    <field name="event.action">put_role|update_role|role_change</field>
    <field name="user.name">\.+</field>
    <description>CVE-2026-103007 - Elasticsearch delegated role-management privilege may have been used to update a role with a broad index pattern (possible privilege escalation)</description>
    <mitre>
      <id>T1068</id>
    </mitre>
    <group>privilege_escalation,gdpr_IV_35.7.d,</group>
  </rule>

  <rule id="103008" level="14">
    <if_sid>103007</if_sid>
    <field name="role.index_pattern" type="pcre2">(?i)(\*|_security|internal)</field>
    <description>CVE-2026-103007 - Suspicious broad index pattern in delegated role update; potential access to internal security data</description>
    <mitre>
      <id>T1068</id>
    </mitre>
    <group>privilege_escalation,critical,</group>
  </rule>
</group>

Mitigation & Patch Guidance

Patch confidence: 0/4 (UNPATCHED — no patch evidence from any tracked source). No vendor fix, workaround, or affected version data was provided in the available intelligence. The following guidance is therefore preventive and detective in nature and must be validated against Elastic's official advisories once published.

1. Immediate mitigations

   • Audit which users hold the configurable, non-default delegated role-management privilege. Given the descriptor "non-default," the privilege must be explicitly configured — identify every instance.
   • For any user holding this privilege, verify the granted index scope is narrowly defined. Broadly-scoped index patterns are the enabling condition for exploitation; tighten or revoke them.
   • Where the delegated privilege is not strictly required, revoke it. Removing the delegated privilege eliminates the attack path for this specific weakness.
   • Enforce least privilege across all role-management operations, and review any role grants that reference internal security indices.
   • Monitor role-management audit events for self-updates in which a user expands their own role's index scope.

2. Patch / upgrade steps

   • No patch reference is available from any tracked source. Consult the official Elastic security advisories and release notes for the fixed Elasticsearch version once published.
   • Plan an upgrade to the vendor-designated fixed release as soon as it is available; validate the fix in a staging cluster before production rollout.
   • Track the NVD record for CVE-2026-103007 for updated affected-version and patch references.

3. Long-term hardening

   • Adopt a least-privilege model for delegated administration: delegate the narrowest capability and index scope required, and review delegations periodically.
   • Enable and retain Elasticsearch audit logging, forwarding audit events to a SIEM for alerting on role-management operations.
   • Automate detection (see Detection Guidance) for role self-updates and broad index patterns referencing internal security indices.
   • Maintain strong authentication and credential hygiene to reduce the likelihood of an attacker obtaining an account that holds the delegated privilege.
   • Patch management: subscribe to Elastic security announcements and maintain an inventory of Elasticsearch clusters with their configured privileges.

References

• NVD — CVE-2026-103007: https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-103007
• CWE-863: Incorrect Authorization — https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/863.html
• MITRE ATT&CK T1068 — Exploitation for Privilege Escalation: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1068/
• Elastic Security Advisories (consult for vendor advisory and fixed version): https://discuss.elastic.co/c/announcements/security-announcements/
• CISA Known Exploited Vulnerabilities Catalog (verify current KEV status): https://www.cisa.gov/known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog

Note: No public proof-of-concept, exploit code, or Nuclei template exists for CVE-2026-103007 at the time of writing. The CVE is not listed in CISA KEV, and no EPSS score has been published by FIRST.org. No threat actor campaigns or exploit-in-the-wild activity have been reported.