CVE-2026-12379
Executive Summary
CVE-2026-12379 is an Open Redirect vulnerability (CWE-601) discovered in the OAuth/OIDC authentication flow of the Axivion Dashboard. The flaw allows an attacker to craft a malicious login link that, after successful authentication against the legitimate Axivion Dashboard, redirects the user to an arbitrary external domain. This bypasses the intended post-authentication redirect restriction, enabling highly convincing phishing attacks where victims believe they are interacting with the genuine Dashboard. The vulnerability requires user interaction (clicking a link and completing authentication) but has a low attack complexity and no privileges required.
Impact: High for phishing and credential theft, especially for second-factor authentication tokens. The attack surface is limited to social engineering, but the trust in the legitimate Axivion Dashboard makes it a potent vector.
Note: This vulnerability is not related to any WordPress plugin or component; it is a standalone application issue.
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Supply Chain & Package Security
This vulnerability is not associated with an open-source package manager (NPM, PyPI, Go, Ruby). It affects a proprietary commercial product (Axivion Dashboard). No supply chain implications are identified.
CVSS Breakdown & Threat Level
CVSS v3.1 Vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N
| Metric | Value | Description |
|---|---|---|
| Attack Vector (AV) | Network | Exploitable remotely over the network. |
| Attack Complexity (AC) | Low | No special conditions required; the redirect parameter is easily manipulated. |
| Privileges Required (PR) | None | No authentication needed to trigger the redirect. |
| User Interaction (UI) | Required | Victim must click the crafted link and complete login. |
| Scope (S) | Changed | The vulnerable component (Dashboard) is compromised, but the impact extends to the user's browser session. |
| Confidentiality (C) | Low | Potential for credential theft. |
| Integrity (I) | Low | Attacker can control the redirect destination. |
| Availability (A) | None | No impact on availability. |
Threat Level: Medium (Score 4.7). The requirement for user interaction reduces the severity, but the potential for credential theft and phishing makes it a significant threat in targeted attacks.
Deep Dive & Mechanics
The vulnerability resides in the OAuth/OIDC callback handler of the Axivion Dashboard. When a user initiates login, the application typically accepts a redirect_uri or state parameter to determine where to send the user after successful authentication. The flaw is that the application does not validate that the redirect target is within the same origin (scheme + host + port) as the Dashboard itself.
Attack Flow:
- Attacker crafts a URL like:
https://dashboard.axivion.com/login?redirect_uri=https://evil.com/phish - Victim clicks the link and is taken to the legitimate Axivion Dashboard login page.
- Victim authenticates (e.g., enters username/password and 2FA code).
- The Dashboard processes the OAuth callback and, due to the missing origin check, redirects the victim's browser to
https://evil.com/phish. - The attacker's site can then display a convincing "Session Expired" or "Re-authenticate" page to capture credentials or tokens.
The vulnerability is particularly dangerous because the initial link points to the legitimate Dashboard, making it difficult for users to detect the attack.
Vulnerable vs. Patched Code
Vulnerable Code (Conceptual):
# OAuth callback handler
def handle_oauth_callback(request):
code = request.GET.get('code')
state = request.GET.get('state')
redirect_uri = request.GET.get('redirect_uri', '/dashboard')
# No origin validation
return redirect(redirect_uri)
Patched Code (Conceptual):
from urllib.parse import urlparse
ALLOWED_HOSTS = ['dashboard.axivion.com']
def handle_oauth_callback(request):
code = request.GET.get('code')
state = request.GET.get('state')
redirect_uri = request.GET.get('redirect_uri', '/dashboard')
parsed = urlparse(redirect_uri)
if parsed.netloc and parsed.netloc not in ALLOWED_HOSTS:
# Fallback to safe default
redirect_uri = '/dashboard'
return redirect(redirect_uri)
The patch adds a whitelist check to ensure the redirect target's hostname matches the application's own domain.
Exploitation & Lab Setup
Red Team (Exploitation)
Prerequisites:
- A publicly accessible Axivion Dashboard instance (or local lab setup).
- A controlled external domain (e.g.,
evil.com).
Exploitation Steps:
- Identify the login endpoint (e.g.,
https://dashboard.axivion.com/login). - Determine the parameter used for post-auth redirect (likely
redirect_uriorstate). - Craft the malicious URL:
https://dashboard.axivion.com/login?redirect_uri=https://evil.com/phish - Send the link to the victim via email, social media, or other channels.
- After the victim authenticates, they will be redirected to
evil.com/phish.
Proof-of-Concept (Python):
import requests
# Replace with actual Dashboard URL
dashboard_url = "https://dashboard.axivion.com/login"
malicious_redirect = "https://evil.com/phish"
# Craft the malicious URL
exploit_url = f"{dashboard_url}?redirect_uri={malicious_redirect}"
print(f"Send this link to the victim: {exploit_url}")
Blue Team (Detection & Prevention)
Detection:
- Monitor for login requests with
redirect_uriparameters pointing to external domains. - Alert on any redirect after authentication that goes to a domain not in the allowed list.
- Use web application firewalls (WAF) to block requests with suspicious redirect parameters.
Prevention:
- Implement strict origin validation for all redirect parameters.
- Use a whitelist of allowed redirect domains.
- Enforce the use of relative paths (e.g.,
/dashboard) instead of absolute URLs. - Add a confirmation step for redirects to external domains.
Indicators of Compromise (IOCs)
| Type | Indicator | Description |
|---|---|---|
| URL | https://dashboard.axivion.com/login?redirect_uri=https://* |
Malicious login link with external redirect |
| Network | Outbound HTTP requests to unknown domains after authentication | Potential phishing redirect |
| Log | redirect_uri parameter containing external domain in access logs |
Suspicious redirect attempt |
| Log | Successful authentication followed by redirect to external domain | Successful exploitation |
Detection Engineering
YARA Rule
rule CVE_2026_12379_Open_Redirect {
meta:
description = "Detects open redirect attempts targeting Axivion Dashboard"
author = "Valters IT"
date = "2025-04-10"
cve = "CVE-2026-12379"
strings:
$redirect_param = /redirect_uri=https?:\/\/[^\/]/
$login_path = "/login"
condition:
$login_path and $redirect_param
}
Sigma Rule
title: Axivion Dashboard Open Redirect Attempt
id: 8f7b3c2a-1e5d-4a9f-8c6b-0d3e7f2a1b4c
status: experimental
description: Detects HTTP requests to Axivion Dashboard login with external redirect_uri parameter
author: Valters IT
date: 2025-04-10
logsource:
category: webserver
product: apache
detection:
selection:
cs-uri-query|contains: "redirect_uri=http"
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Legitimate external redirects if configured by admin
level: high
Suricata Rule
alert http $HOME_NET any -> $EXTERNAL_NET any (
msg:"CVE-2026-12379 - Axivion Dashboard Open Redirect Attempt";
flow:to_server,established;
http.uri; content:"/login"; nocase;
http.uri; content:"redirect_uri"; nocase;
http.uri; pcre:"/redirect_uri=https?:\/\//";
classtype:attempted-recon;
sid:1000001;
rev:1;
)
Remediation & Mitigation
Immediate Actions:
- Disable OAuth/OIDC login if not critical until a patch is applied.
- Implement a WAF rule to block requests with
redirect_uripointing to external domains. - Monitor logs for any suspicious redirect patterns.
Long-term Fix:
- Apply the vendor patch once released.
- If patching is not possible, modify the application code to validate the redirect target against a whitelist of allowed origins.
- Conduct a security review of all authentication flows.
Workaround:
- Configure the application to only accept relative redirect paths (e.g.,
/dashboard). - Add a server-side check that compares the redirect target's hostname with the application's own hostname.
Valters IT