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CVSS: 7.8 CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H 🐛 CWE-120
👁️
Common Weakness Enumeration - Identifies the specific category of software weakness or flaw.

CVE-2026-19568

CVE-2026-19568 Memory Corruption in Autodesk
📅 PUBLISHED: 2026-08-24 00:00 UTC 🔄 UPDATED: 2026-10-02 19:30 UTC
[ PATCH UNDER REVIEW ↓ ] Remains UNDER REVIEW until an independent source confirms the fix
[ DEFENSE PATCH ↓ ]
💣 PoC: None
👁️
Proof of Concept - Indicates if functional exploit code is publicly available, drastically increasing the risk of immediate attacks.
🎯 EPSS: 0.13%
👁️
0.13% probability
3.3× above the median CVE
Tier: ELEVATED
30-day exploitation window · FIRST.org · updated daily
🥷 MITRE: T1203
👁️
MITRE ATT&CK Tactic - Describes the strategy hackers use to execute this attack.
VULNERABLE: version not auto-detected — verify your deployed version locally
CVSS VECTOR BREAKDOWN 7.8
AV: L Attack Vector Local
AC: L Attack Complexity Low
PR: N Privileges Required None
UI: R User Interaction Required
S: U Scope Unchanged
C: H Confidentiality High
I: H Integrity High
A: H Availability High
7.8
THREAT LEVEL
INTEL SOURCES NVD EPSS HOW WE SCORE →
■ tracking this CVE ✓ independent patch confirmation ⧗ same-origin mirror (GHSA) ⚠ active exploitation verification policy →

Executive Summary

CVE-2026-19568 is a memory corruption vulnerability in Autodesk 3ds Max triggered by parsing a maliciously crafted SVG file. Successful exploitation allows an attacker to execute arbitrary code within the context of the current process, achieving full compromise of the affected workstation with high confidentiality, integrity, and availability impact. The vulnerability requires local user interaction — a victim must open a malicious SVG file — and the CVE is currently unpatched with no vendor fix, workaround, or public exploit code available at the time of this report.

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›Exploit & PoC — poc_status, poc_url, has_exploit. Not in NVD.
›Shodan dorks — ready-made queries to find exposed vulnerable systems
›Detection rules — YARA · Wazuh · Elastic (all plans) · Sigma (Pro)
›pending_fields — know exactly which of 7 fields NVD hasn't processed yet
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Technical Analysis

The vulnerability resides in the SVG (Scalable Vector Graphics) parsing component of Autodesk 3ds Max. SVG is a vector image format based on XML that supports complex graphical elements, embedded scripts, gradients, and path definitions. When 3ds Max processes an SVG file as part of its asset import pipeline, the parser reads and interprets the XML structure to reconstruct vector shapes and scene elements.

The NVD description classifies this as CWE-120 — Buffer Copy without Checking Size of Input ('Classic Buffer Overflow'). This weakness class indicates that the parser copies data into a fixed-size buffer without verifying that the source data will fit within the destination's capacity. When an SVG file contains path data, coordinate arrays, or style attribute values that exceed the parser's expected size constraints, the copy operation writes beyond the allocated memory boundary.

The attack mechanism follows the classic buffer overflow pattern:

  1. The SVG parser allocates a fixed-size buffer for a specific data element (e.g., a coordinate value, path string, or attribute field).
  2. A malicious SVG file supplies an oversized input value for that element.
  3. The parser copies the oversize data into the fixed buffer without a length check.
  4. The overflow corrupts adjacent memory regions, potentially overwriting function pointers, return addresses, or other critical data structures.
  5. If the attacker carefully crafts the overflowing payload, they can redirect execution flow to shellcode or ROP (Return-Oriented Programming) chains.

Because the overflow occurs during file parsing — which happens entirely in-process — no network services are exposed, and the attack requires the victim to open the malicious file. The CVSS vector reflects this: AV:L (local attack vector), PR:N (no privileges required), UI:R (user interaction required). The high impact scores (C:H/I:H/A:H) indicate that full code execution with no privilege boundary crossing is achievable.

Insufficient technical detail is available regarding the specific function names, buffer sizes, or exact SVG element types that trigger the overflow. The CNA description does not disclose whether the vulnerability exists in a third-party SVG parsing library embedded in 3ds Max or in Autodesk's proprietary import code. No patch, version range, or vendor advisory information has been published.


Exploitation Scenarios

Based strictly on the NVD description, the following attack chain is inferred at the vulnerability-class level:

1. Reconnaissance / Target Identification: The attacker identifies individuals or organizations that use Autodesk 3ds Max. This includes 3D artists, game developers, architectural visualization firms, and animation studios. Targeting may be opportunistic (mass phishing campaigns with malicious SVG attachments) or surgical (spear-phishing against specific design teams known to use 3ds Max).

2. Triggering the Flaw: The attacker crafts an SVG file containing specially malformed path data, coordinate values, or embedded XML structures designed to overflow fixed-size buffers in the 3ds Max SVG parser. The malicious SVG is delivered via email attachment, a downloaded asset from a compromised website, a shared project file repository, or a 3D asset marketplace. The attack activates when the victim opens the SVG file in 3ds Max, either by double-clicking the file or importing it through the application's asset import interface.

3. Payload / Execution Method (Vulnerability-Class Level): For a CWE-120 buffer overflow, the attacker will typically embed shellcode or ROP chain data within the SVG file's XML content. The overflow proceeds in stages:

  • The malformed data overwrites adjacent heap or stack memory.
  • The attacker-controlled bytes corrupt a critical control-flow structure.
  • When the parser reaches the corrupted instruction pointer or function return address, execution jumps to attacker-controlled code.
  • The payload executes in the context of the 3ds Max process, inheriting all of the user's permissions on the system.

Given the "no privileges required" and "high impact" CVSS scores, the exploit likely executes with the privileges of the currently logged-in user, enabling complete system compromise if that user has administrative rights.

4. Post-Exploitation Impact: Once arbitrary code execution is achieved, the attacker can:

  • Install persistent malware, backdoors, or keyloggers.
  • Exfiltrate sensitive design documents, client data, and intellectual property accessible to the user.
  • Move laterally within the corporate network using the compromised workstation as a foothold.
  • Ransomware deployment or destructive payload delivery.

Note: No public PoC or exploit code is available for this CVE at the time of writing. The attack chain above is inferred from the vulnerability class (CWE-120) and the CVSS vector, not from observed exploit samples.


Impact Assessment

Business Impact:

  • Confidentiality: High — Successful exploitation grants the attacker arbitrary code execution in the context of the current process, allowing full access to files, documents, and credentials on the affected system. For design firms, this includes theft of proprietary 3D models, client assets, and commercial trade secrets.
  • Integrity: High — The attacker can modify, delete, or encrypt project files, plant malicious code in 3D assets that may be redistributed, or alter rendering output and design deliverables.
  • Availability: High — Arbitrary code execution can result in system crashes, data destruction, or ransomware deployment, disrupting production pipelines.

Affected Systems:

  • All versions of Autodesk 3ds Max that include the vulnerable SVG parsing functionality. No specific version range has been disclosed; the CVE data lists affected versions as unknown.

Blast Radius:

  • The direct impact is confined to the local workstation where 3ds Max is installed. However, because 3ds Max is frequently used in collaborative studio environments, the indirect blast radius includes shared file servers, render farms, and network storage containing 3D assets that could be used to propagate malicious files to other users.
  • The CVSS score of 7.8 (High) reflects the significant attacker value of this vulnerability despite the local attack vector and required user interaction. The market for weaponized malicious 3D asset files and design-tool exploits is well established.

Detection Guidance

Sigma Rule

title: Autodesk 3ds Max SVG Memory Corruption Attempt
id: c85e6f31-4e5a-4a2b-9d3c-4f7e1e5a9b10
status: experimental
description: Detects suspicious 3ds Max process behavior indicative of CVE-2026-19568 SVG parsing exploitation
author: valtersit.com Threat Intelligence
date: 2026/01/01
references:
    - https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-19568
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_process:
        Image|endswith: '3dsmax.exe'
    selection_svg:
        CommandLine|contains: '.svg'
    selection_followup:
        # Detect child processes spawned after opening SVG file
        ParentImage|endswith: '3dsmax.exe'
    condition: selection_process and selection_svg
    timeframe: 30s
level: high
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate SVG import workflows in 3ds Max
    - Automated design pipelines that batch-import SVG files
fields:
    - CommandLine
    - User
    - Image
    - ParentImage
tags:
    - cve.2026-19568
    - attack.t1203
    - attack.t1204.002

YARA Rule

rule CVE_2026_19568_Autodesk_3dsmax_SVG_Exploit {
    meta:
        author = "valtersit.com Threat Intelligence"
        description = "Detects malicious SVG files targeting the Autodesk 3ds Max SVG parser"
        cve = "CVE-2026-19568"
        date = "2026-01-01"
        threat_level = "high"
    strings:
        $svg_magic = { 3C 73 76 67 }  // "<svg"
        $xml_header = { 3C 3F 78 6D 6C }  // "<?xml"
        $large_path = /[dD]=\s*["'][MmLlHhVvCcSsQqTtAaZz][^"']{1000,}["']/
        $oversized_coord = /[\-0-9 eE.]{500,}/  // Unusually long coordinate runs
        $nop_sled = { 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 }  // NOP sled pattern
        $shellcode_hint = /[\x2e\x2f][a-zA-Z0-9\/]{20,}\x2e[a-zA-Z]{2,4}/  // Possible embedded URLs/decoy pattern
    condition:
        uint32be(0) == 0xEFBBBF and  // UTF-8 BOM (optional, SVG files often have it)
        $svg_magic or $xml_header
        and (
            $large_path
            or ($oversized_coord and #oversized_coord > 5)
            or ($nop_sled and filesize > 100KB)
            or $shellcode_hint
        )
        and filesize < 10MB
}

Suricata IDS Rule

alert http any any -> $HOME_NET any (msg:"CVE-2026-19568 - Malicious SVG file targeting Autodesk 3ds Max"; flow:established,to_server; file.magic:"SVG"; file.name:"/\.svg$/i"; content:"<svg"; http.file_data; pcre:"/<path\s+[^>]*d\s*=\s*[\x22\x27][^\x22\x27]{1000,}[\x22\x27]/i"; sid:202619568001; rev:1; metadata:cve CVE-2026-19568, attack_target Autodesk_3dsMax, deployment Perimeter, signature_severity Major; classtype:attempted-user-admin; reference:url,https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-19568;)

Note: This rule detects the delivery mechanism (malicious SVG over HTTP). Detection on the endpoint (file parsing) requires host-based monitoring such as the Sigma and YARA rules above.

Elastic Detection

// EQL query for file events associated with 3ds Max SVG parsing
sequence with maxspan=30s
  [ file where event.action == "open" and
    file.extension == "svg" and
    process.name == "3dsmax.exe" ]
  [ process where event.action == "start" and
    parent.process.name == "3dsmax.exe" and
    not process.executable : ("C:\\Program Files\\Autodesk\\*")]
// EQL query for potential memory corruption indicators
any where
  process.name == "3dsmax.exe" and
  (event.category == "memory" or
   event.action in ("access-denied", "malicious-file", "signature-match"))
  and not process.exit_code == 0
// EQL query for crash/abnormal termination following SVG access
sequence with maxspan=5m
  [ file where event.action == "open" and file.extension == "svg" and
    process.name == "3dsmax.exe" ]
  [ process where event.type == "end" and
    event.action == "terminated" and
    exit_code != 0 and process.name == "3dsmax.exe" ]

Splunk SPL Query

index=windows 
  (source="WinEventLog:Security" OR source="WinEventLog:System")
  | search (process_name="*3dsmax.exe" OR Image="*3dsmax.exe")
  | table _time, User, CommandLine, process_name, ParentImage
  | where CommandLine LIKE "%.svg%" OR CommandLine LIKE "%import%svg%"
  | stats count by User, CommandLine
  | sort - count
index=windows source="WinEventLog:Application" EventCode=1000
  | search "3dsmax"
  | table _time, Message, EventCode, User
  | rex field=Message "Faulting application name: (?<app>.*?), version: (?<version>.*?),"
  | where app="3dsmax.exe"
  | stats values(Message) by version
index=endpoint
  | eventstats sparkline(duration) as duration_sparkline by host
  | search process="*3dsmax.exe"
  | where like(command_line, "%.svg%")
  | strcat host command_line " | " user full_context
  | table _time, host, user, full_context
  | lookup cve_lookup cve_id AS cve OUTPUT description
  | where cve_id="CVE-2026-19568"

Wazuh OSSEC Rule

<group name="autodesk_3dsmax,">
    <rule id="101968" level="12">
        <if_sid>100100, 100110</if_sid>  <!-- Process open / new process rules -->
        <field name="process">3dsmax.exe</field>
        <regex>.+\.svg</regex>  <!-- SVG file interaction -->
        <description>Autodesk 3ds Max opened an SVG file — CVE-2026-19568 exploitation attempt/risk</description>
        <group>cve-2026-19568,attack.t1203,</group>
        <mitre>
            <id>T1203</id>
        </mitre>
        <options>no_full_log</options>
    </rule>

    <rule id="101969" level="15" frequency="3" timeframe="120">
        <if_matched_sid>101968</if_matched_sid>
        <description>Multiple SVG file opens by 3ds Max within 2 minutes — possible automated exploit attempt</description>
        <group>cve-2026-19568,attack.t1203,</group>
        <mitre>
            <id>T1203</id>
        </mitre>
    </rule>

    <rule id="101970" level="14">
        <if_matched_sid>101968</if_matched_sid>
        <field name="process_child">cmd.exe|powershell.exe|wscript.exe|cscript.exe</field>
        <description>3ds Max spawned a child process after manually opening an SVG file — potential post-exploitation activity</description>
        <group>cve-2026-19568,attack.t1203,execution</group>
        <mitre>
            <id>T1203</id>
            <id>T1059</id>
        </mitre>
    </rule>

    <rule id="101971" level="10">
        <if_matched_sid>101968</if_matched_sid>
        <field name="syslog">Application</field>
        <regex>Application Error|faulting module|exception</regex>
        <description>3ds Max crashed or raised an error after processing an SVG file — possible memory corruption</description>
        <group>cve-2026-19568,attack.t1203</group>
    </rule>
</group>

Mitigation & Patch Guidance

Patch Status: The CVE is UNPATCHED (patch confidence 0/4). No vendor fix, patch, or update is available from Autodesk at the time of this report. The vendor advisory and affected version information have not been published.

Immediate Mitigations (until a patch is released):

  1. User Awareness: Educate all 3ds Max users about the risks of opening SVG files from untrusted or unsolicited sources. Establish a policy that requires verification of SVG asset provenance before import.
  2. File Upload Filtering: Configure email gateways and file-sharing platforms to block or quarantine SVG attachments.
  3. Sandboxing: Run 3ds Max in a restricted environment (e.g., a virtual machine with minimal host access, or an application sandbox) when processing files from external sources.
  4. Least Privilege: Ensure users run 3ds Max with standard user privileges, not administrator accounts, to limit post-exploitation impact.
  5. Alternative SVG Handling: Where possible, pre-process SVG files with a separate, validated SVG library or converter to normalize/validate content before import into 3ds Max.
  6. Endpoint Monitoring: Deploy the detection rules above in SIEM/EDR platforms to alert on 3ds Max SVG interactions and abnormal process behavior.

Patch / Upgrade Steps:

  • Monitor the NVD entry and Autodesk security advisories regularly for patch availability: https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-19568
  • Subscribe to Autodesk security notification channels to receive immediate alerts when a fix is released.
  • When a patch becomes available, test it in a staging environment that mimics production workflows before full deployment. Roll out through standard patch management processes.

Long-Term Hardening:

  • Maintain current, patched versions of Autodesk 3ds Max whenever available, as the vendor may release cumulative updates addressing multiple vulnerabilities.
  • Implement application allowlisting to restrict which processes can spawn children from 3ds Max.
  • Enforce strict file-type validation across the enterprise: SVG files should only be accepted from trusted internal sources or validated third-party asset providers.
  • Conduct regular security reviews of 3D asset ingestion pipelines, including file parsers, import plugins, and shared network storage used by design teams.
  • Consider network segmentation to isolate design workstations from critical business systems, limiting lateral movement if a workstation is compromised.

References

  1. NVD Entry: https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-19568
  2. CWE-120 (Buffer Copy without Checking Size): https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/120.html
  3. MITRE ATT&CK — T1203 (Exploitation for Client Execution): https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1203/
  4. Autodesk Security Advisory Portal (monitor for future updates): https://www.autodesk.com/trust/security-advisories
  5. FIRST.org EPSS Calculator (check scoring status): https://www.first.org/epss/

No known threat actor campaigns or exploit-in-the-wild activity have been reported for CVE-2026-19568 at the time of writing. The CVE is not listed in the CISA Known Exploited Vulnerabilities (KEV) catalog.

👁️ SHODAN DORKS (THREAT HUNTING)

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product:"3ds Max"
title:"Autodesk 3ds Max"
http.title:"Autodesk"
◈ SOURCE Analysis & enrichment: valtersit.com/cve/CVE-2026-19568/ · CVE data: NVD/MITRE (public domain) · © 2026 ValtersIT Hub
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