☠️
EXFILTRATING
DATA...
01010111 10110010 00101001 11000110 01101100 10011011 00010001 11100101 01000010 10101111
[ <-- BACK_TO_SEARCH ]
[ VENDOR STATS ]
SOON 🐛 CWE-693
👁️
Common Weakness Enumeration - Identifies the specific category of software weakness or flaw.

CVE-2026-20903

CVE-2026-20903 Vulnerability in Intel
📅 PUBLISHED: 2026-08-11 00:00 UTC
⏳ SCORE PENDING — ANALYSIS IN PROGRESS [ DEFENSE PATCH ↓ ]
💣 PoC: Public
👁️
Proof of Concept - Indicates if functional exploit code is publicly available, drastically increasing the risk of immediate attacks.
🎯 EPSS: 0.15%
👁️
0.15% probability
3.8× above the median CVE
Tier: ELEVATED
30-day exploitation window · FIRST.org · updated daily
🥷 MITRE: T1068
👁️
MITRE ATT&CK Tactic - Describes the strategy hackers use to execute this attack.
VULNERABLE: < 0.4.0
CVSS SEVERITY SCALE
9.0–10.0 CRITICAL
7.0–8.9 HIGH
4.0–6.9 MEDIUM
0.1–3.9 LOW
0.0 NONE
SOON
PENDING NVD
■ tracking this CVE ✓ independent patch confirmation ⧗ same-origin mirror (GHSA) ⚠ active exploitation verification policy →

Executive Summary

CVE-2026-20903 is an unpatched protection mechanism failure (CWE-693) affecting Intel(R) AI Containers versions prior to v0.4.0. A local adversary who already holds a privileged user account can exploit the flaw to escalate privileges within Ring 3 (user-space), with high impact to the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of the affected container environment. The attack is low complexity, requires passive user interaction, and there is currently no public proof-of-concept, no CISA KEV listing, and low EPSS exploit probability (0.00154).

⚡ AUTOMATE YOUR CVE INTELLIGENCE

This record — and 170,000+ others — are available via the ValtersIT API. One endpoint replaces five: NVD + GitHub CVE + CISA KEV + EPSS + Nuclei + Exploit-DB, unified.

›Patch confidence — UNVERIFIED to CONFIRMED, cross-referenced NVD + RHSA + Debian
›Exploit & PoC — poc_status, poc_url, has_exploit. Not in NVD.
›Shodan dorks — ready-made queries to find exposed vulnerable systems
›Detection rules — YARA · Wazuh · Elastic (all plans) · Sigma (Pro)
›pending_fields — know exactly which of 7 fields NVD hasn't processed yet
›Free backfill — data incomplete when you paid? Re-check within 30 days = 0 credits
PAYG €0.08/lookup Standard €19/mo (was €29) · 5k credits Pro €65/mo (was €99) · 20k credits FOUNDING PRICE · LOCKED FOR LIFE · ENDS 31 DEC 2026
[ FROM €19/MO ]
Free sandbox key available
No signup required

Technical Analysis

The vulnerability belongs to CWE-693, Protection Mechanism Failure: the product either does not use, or incorrectly uses, a protection mechanism sufficient to defend against directed attacks. In the context of Intel AI Containers — pre-packaged user-space environments used to run AI/ML workloads on Intel platforms — the flawed protection boundary resides within Ring 3, meaning the defect is in application-level or container-runtime-level logic rather than in kernel code.

The NVD description indicates that a "system software adversary with a privileged user combined with a low complexity attack may enable escalation of privilege." This phrasing implies the attacker already possesses a privileged account on the target system (for example, a user with administrative rights inside the container, or membership in a group that controls the container runtime), and the vulnerable protection mechanism fails to prevent that user from gaining further elevated privileges or crossing a trust boundary. Because the impact is confined to the vulnerable system — with "subsequent system confidentiality (none), integrity (none) and availability (none)" — the host operating system/kernel is likely not directly compromised; the escalation is contained within the user-space container abstraction.

Attack requirements specifically state "no special internal knowledge," so the flaw is reachable without deep architectural reverse engineering, and it exhibits "low complexity." "Passive user interaction" is required, suggesting that a legitimate user's routine action — such as launching a containerized workload, opening a crafted image, or interacting with a benign-seeming file — is sufficient to trigger the vulnerable code path. The framework is local: the attack vector is local access, not remote network exploitation.

No public technical detail is available regarding the specific affected component, function, or trigger condition. The description does not name any file paths, APIs, or parameters. Consequently, the precise code-level mechanism cannot be stated with confidence. What can be asserted from authoritative data alone is that a protection mechanism in Intel AI Containers < v0.4.0 fails under low-complexity local conditions, enabling privilege escalation with a pre-existing privileged user.

Exploitation Scenarios

No public PoC or exploit code has been confirmed for CVE-2026-20903. The attack chain below is therefore inferred from the vulnerability class (CWE-693, local privilege escalation in a user-space container environment) and from the constraints explicitly present in the NVD description. No specific function names, endpoints, or payloads are asserted.

  1. Reconnaissance / target identification — The attacker identifies hosts running Intel(R) AI Containers prior to v0.4.0. Since the vector is local, this typically follows initial foothold acquisition (e.g., compromised user account, insider access, or malware already executing with a privileged user context). The attacker enumerates the container images and runtime versions deployed on the host, looking for the vulnerable software line.

  2. Triggering the flawed protection mechanism — The attacker, operating with a privileged user account, interacts with the affected AI container in a way that invokes the vulnerable protection path. The requirement for "passive user interaction" suggests the attacker may need to deliver a crafted container image, workload descriptor, or input file that a legitimate user loads with routine actions; alternatively, the attacker's own privileged session may trigger the flaw directly when specific conditions are satisfied.

  3. Payload / execution method (class-level) — Because the root cause is a protection mechanism failure, the attacker submits input or performs operations that bypass a missing or incorrectly enforced security check within the Ring 3 environment. At the class level, this is equivalent to exploiting absent authorization validation, incorrect permission assignment, or insufficient sandboxing to gain higher privileges than the attacker's current user context should allow. No specific exploit primitive (e.g., a particular syscall or race condition) can be named from the available data.

  4. Post-exploitation impact — Successful exploitation yields full compromise of the vulnerable AI container system: confidentiality, integrity, and availability are each rated high impact. The attacker can read and tamper with AI workloads, models, and training data, interrupt containerized services, and potentially pivot laterally to other containers sharing the same runtime. However, the NVD explicitly rates subsequent host/system impacts as none, indicating that kernel-level or host-level compromise is not an expected outcome of this flaw alone.

Impact Assessment

The business impact centers on environments where Intel AI Containers are used to process sensitive data — including proprietary ML models, training datasets, or inference pipelines. A successful local privilege escalation allows an attacker with an already-privileged account to achieve full control over the container's data and processing capacity (C:H/I:H/A:H). For regulated industries, this translates to potential data integrity violations, IP theft, and denial-of-service against AI infrastructure.

No CVSS vector or score has been officially assigned (CVSS: N/A). The absence of a score complicates risk prioritization; the CISA KEV catalog does not list this CVE, and the EPSS probability of 0.00154 (5.1st percentile of exploited CVEs) indicates low near-term likelihood of mass exploitation. Nonetheless, the combination of "unpatched" status, low attack complexity, and high impacts should place this vulnerability on the watchlist for any organization deploying Intel AI Containers. The attack surface is limited to systems with local access by privileged users, which reduces remote exposure but does not eliminate risk from insiders or from malware that has already achieved a privileged foothold.

Detection Guidance

Sigma Rule

title: Suspicious Namespace Tool Execution on Intel AI Container Hosts
id: 3f8a1c90-2090-4e26-83c0-cve202620903
status: experimental
description: Detects execution of namespace manipulation and container-escape utilities (unshare, nsenter, capsh) from container runtime parent processes, indicative of privilege escalation attempts against containerized environments including Intel AI Containers before v0.4.0.
references:
    - https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-20903
author: Valters IT Threat Intelligence
date: 2026/01/01
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: linux
detection:
    selection_tools:
        Image|endswith:
            - '/unshare'
            - '/nsenter'
            - '/capsh'
    selection_runtime_parent:
        ParentImage|endswith:
            - '/containerd-shim'
            - '/dockerd'
            - '/crio'
    condition: selection_tools and selection_runtime_parent
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate administrative debugging of container namespaces by platform engineers
level: high

YARA Rule

rule CVE_2026_20903_Intel_AI_Container_EoP
{
    meta:
        author = "Valters IT Threat Intelligence"
        description = "Detects strings commonly associated with container escape / privilege escalation tooling potentially targeting Intel AI Containers < v0.4.0"
        date = "2026-01-01"
        reference = "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-20903"
    strings:
        $a = "unshare" ascii wide
        $b = "nsenter" ascii wide
        $c = "/proc/1/root" ascii wide
        $d = "docker.sock" ascii wide
        $e = "CVE-2026-20903" ascii wide
        $f = "privilege escalation" ascii wide
    condition:
        uint16(0) == 0x457f and 2 of them
}

Suricata IDS Rule

# Caveat: CVE-2026-20903 is a local, user-space vulnerability.
# Network-layer detection has limited direct applicability; this rule flags
# exposure/reconnaissance of container management interfaces that could be
# leveraged post-exploitation for lateral movement or data exfiltration.
alert tcp any any -> any 2375 (msg:"CVE-2026-20903 Non-loopback connection to Docker daemon port on potential Intel AI container host"; flow:to_server,established; content:"POST"; nocase; metadata:created_at 2026_01_01, updated_at 2026_01_01, signature_severity Major; sid:202620903; rev:1;)

Elastic Detection

sequence by host.name, process.entity_id with maxspan=5s
  [ process where event.type == "start" and
      process.executable in ("/usr/bin/unshare", "/usr/bin/nsenter", "/usr/bin/capsh") ]
  [ process where event.type == "start" and
      user.name == "root" and
      process.parent.executable in ("/usr/bin/containerd-shim", "/usr/bin/dockerd", "/usr/bin/crio") ]

Additionally, monitor for anomalous process ancestry where a process spawned by a container runtime subsequently manipulates mount namespaces or creates new users, which are hallmarks of the CWE-693 protection failure class.

Splunk SPL Query

index=linux_secure OR index=sysmon sourcetype=linux:audit
| search (command=unshare OR command=nsenter OR command=capsh) OR (process_name=containerd-shim OR process_name=dockerd OR process_name=crio)
| eval hostile_tool=if(match(command, "(?i)(unshare|nsenter|capsh)"), "true", "false")
| search hostile_tool="true"
| stats count, values(command) AS commands, values(parent_process) AS parent_processes BY host, user
| where count >= 1
| table _time, host, user, commands, parent_processes, count

Wazuh OSSEC Rule

<group name="linux, container_security,">
  <rule id="209030" level="12">
    <if_sid>5163</if_sid>
    <match>unshare|nsenter|capsh</match>
    <description>CVE-2026-20903: Possible privilege escalation tooling executed on Intel AI Container host (CWE-693)</description>
    <group>privilege_escalation,</group>
    <mitre>
      <id>T1068</id>
    </mitre>
  </rule>
</group>

Mitigation & Patch Guidance

Patch confidence is 0/4 — no patch evidence exists in any tracked source, and the vulnerability must be treated as unpatched for affected deployments. The NVD version boundary (before v0.4.0) implies that Intel AI Containers v0.4.0 is the intended remediation; however, no vendor advisory ID or download reference was supplied in the intelligence data, and the fix is not independently confirmed.

  1. Immediate mitigations

    • Restrict local access to hosts running Intel AI Containers; enforce strict least-privilege for all user and service accounts, particularly any account with elevated rights inside the container runtime.
    • Isolate AI container infrastructure from general-purpose user environments (separate VLANs, dedicated hosts, jump-host-only administrative access).
    • Deploy or enforce AppArmor/SELinux policies, seccomp profiles, and read-only root filesystems on all containers to limit the blast radius of a protection mechanism failure.
    • Audit and, where possible, disable unnecessary Linux capabilities (CAP_SYS_ADMIN, CAP_SYS_PTRACE, etc.) in container runtime configurations.
  2. Patch / upgrade steps

    • Track Intel Security Center (see References) for the official advisory and coordinate with the vendor for the fixed build.
    • Upon availability, upgrade Intel AI Containers to v0.4.0 or later; until then, remove or quarantine vulnerable container images from production.
    • Validate image signatures and hashes before deployment to prevent the introduction of tampered Intel AI containers.
  3. Long-term hardening

    • Containerize AI workloads with user namespaces enabled to reduce the privilege delta between container users and host users.
    • Maintain an inventory of all Intel AI Container versions in use and correlate with new advisory releases.
    • Deploy endpoint detection and response (EDR/EPP) with Linux process-ancestry telemetry on all container hosts, and feed host logs into SIEM/SOAR for the detection rules above.
    • Given the "passive user interaction" requirement, user awareness should emphasize not loading untrusted container images, workload bundles, or data files into AI environments.

References

No known threat-actor campaigns, exploit-in-the-wild evidence, or public PoC exists for CVE-2026-20903 as of the date of this writing. Exploitation likelihood per EPSS is low (0.00154; 5.1st percentile), which should be weighed against the unpatched status and the high C/I/A impact on AI container environments.

👁️ SHODAN DORKS (THREAT HUNTING)

What is this? Security researchers use these exact search queries on Shodan.io (a search engine for internet-connected devices) to find vulnerable systems globally. You can copy these dorks to see if your organization's IP space is exposed.

http.title:"Intel AI"
"Intel AI Containers"
port:2375 "docker"

💣 PoC CODE AVAILABLE

Exploit code for this CVE is tracked in our database. Access poc_code via API Pro.

[ API_PRO ] →
◈ SOURCE Analysis & enrichment: valtersit.com/cve/CVE-2026-20903/ · CVE data: NVD/MITRE (public domain) · © 2026 ValtersIT Hub
>_ SYSTEM_CORE: INTEL_ACTIVE
90% TEAM-CURATED // 10% AUTOMATED INGESTION.
ALL PATCH REFERENCES AND VERSION DATA SOURCED FROM NVD + OSV OFFICIAL REGISTRIES.