CVE-2026-22093

Executive Summary

CVE-2026-22093 is a critical (CVSS 9.5) Adversary-in-the-Middle (AitM) vulnerability in the EVbee Service Android application, version v1.4.101.00. The application fails to validate TLS certificates presented by its backend server and uses weakly encrypted RC4 communication with a hardcoded key, enabling a network-path attacker to fully intercept, decrypt, and manipulate traffic between the app and EVbee servers. This includes access codes to charging stations, meaning a successful attack could result in unauthorized access to EV charging infrastructure, credential theft, and manipulation of charging sessions. All enterprises and individuals using the affected EVbee Service app for electric vehicle charging management are at risk.

Technical Analysis

The vulnerability resides in the TLS certificate validation logic (or lack thereof) of the EVbee Service Android application. When the app initiates an HTTPS connection to the EVbee backend server, it accepts any certificate presented by the remote endpoint without verifying its authenticity against a trusted certificate authority (CA) chain. This is a classic implementation flaw — likely the result of an overridden X509TrustManager in the Android networking stack (e.g., checkServerTrusted() returning without any validation) or the use of a custom HostnameVerifier that always returns true.

The secondary weakness is cryptographic: after the (effectively unauthenticated) TLS channel is established, application-layer traffic between the client and server is additionally encrypted using RC4 with a hardcoded symmetric key embedded within the APK. RC4 is a deprecated stream cipher with known biases and is trivially decryptable when the key is known — which it is, since the key is statically compiled into the client binary. An attacker who extracts the APK, decompiles it, and pulls the hardcoded key can decrypt any captured RC4 payload without needing the TLS session key at all.

The attack surface is the network path between the EVbee Service app and the EVbee backend infrastructure. This includes:

• Public Wi-Fi networks (cafés, airports, hotels) used by EV drivers to manage charging sessions.
• Malicious DNS responses / ARP spoofing on local networks redirecting app traffic to an attacker-controlled server.
• Compromised ISP or upstream routers, or any on-path network equipment.

Since the traffic is not truly end-to-end encrypted (cert validation bypassed, weak symmetric encryption with a public key), every interaction — authentication credentials, session tokens, charging station selection, and the actual access codes to unlock/operate charging stations — is exposed to an attacker on the network path.

Affected components:

• EVbee Service Android app (all versions up to and including v1.4.101.00)
• Backend API endpoints that the app communicates with (HTTPS endpoints accepting unvalidated certificates)

Exploitation Scenarios

Scenario 1: Pre-authentication credential theft via ARP spoofing

1. Reconnaissance: Attacker uses nmap (nmap -sn 192.168.1.0/24) to map the local network and identify mobile devices running the EVbee Service app (detectable via TLS handshake fingerprints or app-specific traffic patterns using tcpdump for port 443 connections to known EVbee domains).
2. Weaponization: Attacker runs ettercap -T -M arp:remote /target-IP/ /gateway-IP/ to become the man-in-the-middle, or uses bettercap with net.probe on and net.sniff on to intercept traffic. Simultaneously, attacker sets up tinyproxy or mitmproxy in transparent mode on port 443.
3. Trigger/Execution: When the victim launches the EVbee Service app and logs in, the app sends HTTPS POST requests (e.g., /api/v1/auth/login) to the EVbee backend. Since the app does not validate the server certificate, the attacker's mitmproxy presents a self-signed or forged certificate that the app happily accepts. The captured TLS session is then decrypted by the attacker's proxy.
4. Payload/Decryption: The attacker extracts the RC4 hardcoded key from decompiled APK (via jadx or apktool + dex2jar). Attacker uses a Python script with pycryptodome's ARC4 to decrypt the application-layer payload: ARC4.new(key).decrypt(ciphertext), revealing plaintext JSON containing username:password and the EVbee access token.
5. Post-exploitation: The attacker replays the login credentials to access the EVbee backend directly, or uses the stolen access token to enroll a rogue charging session, drain the victim’s EV charging account balance, or alter the victim’s access codes for charging stations.

Scenario 2: Charging station access code hijacking

1. Targeting: Attacker targets a facility with EVbee charging stations (e.g., a corporate parking lot or a public charging hub) by connecting to the same Wi-Fi network used by the EVbee Service app clients.
2. Interception: Attacker launches airmon-ng in monitor mode or uses nmap to discover active clients, then uses iptables + arpspoof to redirect traffic.
3. Manipulation: The attacker intercepts an HTTPS request from the app to the backend /api/v1/station/unlock endpoint. The attacker decrypts the RC4 layer, modifies the JSON payload (e.g., changing the station ID or adding an additional valid access code), re-encrypts with RC4, and forwards it to the backend via the MITM proxy.
4. Impact: The attacker replies with an access code that is also sent to the attacker’s own device, allowing the attacker to unlock the charging station later without authorization. Since the app cannot detect the tampered response (no certificate validation), the victim's app shows a successful unlock while the attacker has also captured the valid code.

Impact Assessment

The CVSS score of 9.5 (Critical) reflects a high confidentiality and integrity impact with no privileges required and no user interaction beyond launching the app. The attack vector is Network, meaning the attacker only needs to be on the same network path as the victim — no physical access or special privileges are required.

Business impact:

• Financial fraud: Stolen charging session access codes can be resold or used to obtain free charging, causing direct revenue loss.
• Credential compromise: EVbee account credentials (email/password) are exposed, potentially reused across other enterprise services by the user.
• Operational disruption: An attacker could manipulate charging sessions, causing service denial or equipment misconfiguration.
• Regulatory/compliance: For enterprises managing EV fleets, this may constitute a data breach involving PII (user accounts) and operational data, triggering GDPR or industry-specific incident reporting.

Blast radius: Any environment where the EVbee Service app is in use — corporate fleet management, public charging networks, residential EV owners. The vulnerable app version v1.4.101.00 is the only confirmed affected version, but earlier versions remain unverified.

CVSS subscores referenced: Confidentiality (High) and Integrity (High) are the dominant contributors; Availability likely low (a single-user session disruption). The 9.5 score is achieved via the network-adjacent attack vector and the trivial exploitability (hardcoded key).

Detection Guidance

Sigma Rule

title: EVbee Service App - RC4 Encrypted Traffic with Unvalidated Certificate
status: experimental
description: Detects network patterns associated with exploitation of CVE-2026-22093 where an EC2 or mobile app communicates over an RC4-encrypted channel without TLS cert validation.
logsource:
    category: network_connection
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        DestinationPort: '443'
        Image|endswith: '\\evbee_service.exe'
        Initiated: 'true'
    condition: selection
level: critical
tags:
    - attack.command_and_control
    - cve.2026-22093

YARA Rule

rule EVbee_Service_Hardcoded_RC4_Key {
    meta:
        author = "Valter's Threat Intel"
        description = "Detects strings in decompiled EVbee Service APK indicative of hardcoded RC4 key usage"
        cve = "CVE-2026-22093"
    strings:
        $rc4_key = { 4B 45 59 5F 45 56 42 45 45 } // "KEY_EVBEE" (example)
        $trust_all = "checkServerTrusted" wide ascii
        $hostname_verifier = "verify" wide ascii
        $invalid_cert = "org.apache.http.conn.ssl.AllowAllHostnameVerifier" ascii
    condition:
        any of ($rc4_key*) and any of ($trust_all, $hostname_verifier, $invalid_cert)
}

Suricata IDS Rule

alert tls any any -> any any (msg:"ET TROJAN EVbee Service App - TLS Certificate Validation Bypass (CVE-2026-22093)"; flow:to_server,established; tls.cert_subject; content:"CN="; pcre:"/CN=.*/"; tls.cert_issuer; content:"CN="; pcre:"/CN=.*/"; tls.cert_san; content:"DNS"; pcre:"/DNS:.*/"; tls.cert_serial; content:"!"; classtype:policy-violation; sid:2209301; rev:1;)

Elastic Detection

network where process.name == "evbee_service.exe" and destination.port == 443
    and event.action == "connection_attempt"

Splunk SPL Query

index=network sourcetype="cisco:asa" dest_port=443 | stats count by src_ip, dest_ip, dest_port
    | where count > 5

Wazuh OSSEC Rule

<group name="evbee,">
  <rule id="220930" level="12">
    <decoded_as>syslog</decoded_as>
    <description>CVE-2026-22093: EVbee Service app TLS cert validation bypass detected</description>
    <field name="srcip">.*</field>
    <group>vulnerability,</group>
  </rule>
</group>

Mitigation & Patch Guidance

Patch confidence: 0/4 (UNPATCHED — no patch evidence from any tracked source).

As of this report, there is no official patch available from the vendor (DIVD) for CVE-2026-22093 in EVbee Service v1.4.101.00. The vendor has not released a fixed version, and no workarounds have been provided.

1. Immediate mitigations:

   • Network isolation: Do not use the EVbee Service app on untrusted or shared Wi-Fi networks. Use a cellular VPN or a dedicated secure hotspot when operating the app.
   • Certificate pinning proxy: Place a corporate TLS inspection proxy in front of EVbee backend traffic that enforces certificate pinning (e.g., via mitmproxy or a commercial WAF) to override the app’s lack of validation at the network edge.
   • Disable auto-connect: Ensure the device does not auto-join public Wi-Fi (disable Wi-Fi auto-join) to reduce AitM exposure.
   • Firewall rule: Block outbound traffic from the EVbee app to non-standard ports; allow only 443 but with deep packet inspection.

2. Patch/upgrade steps:

   • Monitor the EVbee official app store listing and vendor advisories for a patched version. When released (e.g., v1.5.0), update immediately.
   • As a temporary measure, use the EVbee web portal (if available) instead of the Android app, as the web portal may have proper TLS validation.

3. Long-term hardening:

   • Vendor must implement proper certificate validation (X509TrustManager override removed) and replace RC4 with a modern cipher (AES-GCM) using TLS 1.3 end-to-end.
   • Enterprises should deploy a mobile device management (MDM) policy that restricts the use of vulnerable app versions and forces updates.
   • Consider discontinuing use of the affected app until a vendor fix is confirmed; evaluate alternative EV charging management platforms.

References

1. NVD Entry: https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-22093
2. CVE Program (CNA: DIVD): https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-22093
3. Vendor Advisory (DIVD): No public advisory released at time of writing.
4. MITRE ATT&CK: T1557 (Adversary-in-the-Middle) — https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1557/
5. CISA KEV: Not listed (no known exploitation in the wild per EPSS 0.00160 at 5.7% percentile).

Threat actor campaigns / exploit-in-the-wild: No known public exploit code or active campaigns have been reported. The EPSS score of 0.00160 indicates a low probability of exploitation in the wild at present, but the high CVSS and trivial exploitability (hardcoded key extraction via APK decompilation) make this a high-risk target for opportunistic network attackers. Security teams should treat this as a latent critical vulnerability that will likely be weaponized once public proof-of-concept code emerges.