CVE-2026-24346

Executive Summary

CVE-2026-24346 exposes a critical security flaw in the EZCast Pro II device, specifically version 1.17478.146. The vulnerability is the use of well-known default credentials in the Admin UI, allowing any unauthenticated attacker with network access to gain administrative control over the device. This is a classic case of hardcoded or default credentials (CWE-798) that have not been changed by the user or the vendor. The impact is severe: an attacker can access protected areas of the web application, potentially leading to full device compromise, data exfiltration, or use of the device as a pivot point within the network.

The EPSS score of 0.0% suggests low exploitation likelihood in the wild at this time, but the simplicity of the attack and the public nature of the default credentials make this a high-priority issue for asset owners. No official patch or advisory has been released by EZCast, leaving users in a vulnerable state.

Supply Chain & Package Security

This vulnerability is not related to an open-source package (NPM, PyPI, Go, Ruby) but rather to a hardware device's embedded web application. The supply chain risk is limited to the device itself and its firmware distribution.

CVSS Breakdown & Threat Level

CVSS Score: 10.0 (Critical) Vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

• Attack Vector (AV): Network – The vulnerability can be exploited remotely over the network.
• Attack Complexity (AC): Low – No special conditions or complex steps are required.
• Privileges Required (PR): None – The attacker does not need any prior authentication.
• User Interaction (UI): None – No user action is required for exploitation.
• Scope (S): Unchanged – The exploit affects only the vulnerable component.
• Confidentiality (C): High – Full access to device data and configuration.
• Integrity (I): High – Ability to modify device settings and firmware.
• Availability (A): High – Potential to disrupt device operation.

Threat Level: Critical. The combination of network accessibility, low complexity, and no required privileges makes this a trivial attack for any threat actor.

Deep Dive & Mechanics

The EZCast Pro II is a wireless display receiver/sender device used in conference rooms and educational settings. Its Admin UI is a web-based interface for configuration. The vulnerability stems from the use of well-known default credentials (e.g., admin:admin or admin:password) that are not changed during initial setup.

Attack Flow:

1. Discovery: An attacker scans the network for devices with open HTTP/HTTPS ports (typically 80/443) and identifies the EZCast Pro II login page.
2. Authentication Bypass: The attacker attempts to log in using common default credential pairs (e.g., admin:admin, admin:password, root:root).
3. Access Granted: Upon successful authentication, the attacker gains full administrative access to the web application.
4. Post-Exploitation: The attacker can modify network settings, exfiltrate data, install malicious firmware, or use the device as a pivot for lateral movement.

The root cause is the absence of a forced password change policy during initial device setup. The vendor has not provided a patch or workaround.

Vulnerable vs. Patched Code

Since no patch is available, we compare the vulnerable state to a hypothetical secure implementation.

Vulnerable Code (Conceptual):

# Example of hardcoded credentials in the web application
DEFAULT_USERNAME = "admin"
DEFAULT_PASSWORD = "admin"

def login(username, password):
    if username == DEFAULT_USERNAME and password == DEFAULT_PASSWORD:
        return True
    # No check for password change
    return False

Patched Code (Hypothetical):

# Example of secure implementation with forced password change
import hashlib, os

def initialize_device():
    # Force user to set a unique password on first login
    if not os.path.exists("/etc/ezcast/password_set"):
        print("Please set a new admin password.")
        new_password = getpass.getpass()
        hashed_password = hashlib.sha256(new_password.encode()).hexdigest()
        with open("/etc/ezcast/password_set", "w") as f:
            f.write(hashed_password)
        print("Password set successfully.")
    else:
        print("Device already initialized.")

def login(username, password):
    with open("/etc/ezcast/password_set", "r") as f:
        stored_hash = f.read().strip()
    if hashlib.sha256(password.encode()).hexdigest() == stored_hash:
        return True
    return False

Exploitation & Lab Setup

Red Team

Prerequisites:

• EZCast Pro II device on the same network (or accessible via the internet if exposed).
• A web browser or HTTP client (e.g., curl).

Exploitation Steps:

1. Identify the target: Use nmap to scan for the device.

   nmap -p 80,443 --open 192.168.1.0/24
   

2. Access the Admin UI: Open a browser and navigate to http://<target-ip>.
3. Login with default credentials: Enter admin for both username and password.
4. Confirm access: The dashboard should load, indicating successful exploitation.

Automated Exploit (using curl):

curl -X POST http://<target-ip>/login -d "username=admin&password=admin" -c cookies.txt
curl -b cookies.txt http://<target-ip>/admin/dashboard

Blue Team

Detection and Response:

1. Network Monitoring: Look for repeated login attempts to the device's web interface, especially with common default credentials.
2. Log Analysis: Check device logs for successful logins from unexpected IP addresses.
3. Honeypot: Deploy a fake EZCast Pro II interface to detect scanning and exploitation attempts.

Mitigation Steps:

• Immediately change the default credentials on all EZCast Pro II devices.
• Restrict network access to the Admin UI using firewall rules (allow only trusted IPs).
• Monitor for unauthorized access and consider isolating the device on a separate VLAN.

Indicators of Compromise (IOCs)

Network IOCs:

• HTTP POST requests to /login with parameters username=admin&password=admin.
• Successful HTTP 200 responses from /admin/dashboard after login.
• Unusual outbound connections from the device (e.g., to command-and-control servers).

Host IOCs:

• Presence of new admin users or modified settings in the device configuration.
• Unauthorized firmware updates or changes to system files.

File IOCs:

• No specific file-based IOCs due to the nature of the vulnerability.

Detection Engineering

YARA Rule

rule EZCast_Default_Credentials_Login {
    meta:
        description = "Detects HTTP POST requests with default credentials to EZCast Pro II Admin UI"
        author = "Valters IT"
        date = "2025-04-10"
        reference = "CVE-2026-24346"
    strings:
        $login_path = "/login"
        $default_creds = "username=admin&password=admin"
    condition:
        $login_path and $default_creds
}

Sigma Rule

title: EZCast Pro II Default Credentials Login Attempt
id: 8a9b7c6d-5e4f-3a2b-1c0d-9e8f7a6b5c4d
status: experimental
description: Detects attempts to log in to EZCast Pro II Admin UI using default credentials
author: Valters IT
date: 2025/04/10
logsource:
    category: webserver
    product: apache
detection:
    selection:
        cs-method: 'POST'
        cs-uri-stem: '/login'
        cs-uri-query|contains: 'username=admin&password=admin'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate admin testing
level: high

Suricata Rule

alert http $HOME_NET any -> $EXTERNAL_NET any (msg:"CVE-2026-24346 EZCast Pro II Default Credentials Login Attempt"; flow:to_server,established; content:"POST"; http_method; content:"/login"; http_uri; content:"username=admin&password=admin"; http_client_body; classtype:attempted-admin; sid:1000001; rev:1;)

Remediation & Mitigation

Immediate Actions:

1. Change Default Credentials: Log into the Admin UI and change the password immediately. Use a strong, unique password.
2. Network Segmentation: Place the EZCast Pro II device on a separate VLAN with strict firewall rules to limit access to the Admin UI.
3. Disable Remote Access: If not required, disable remote access to the Admin UI from the internet.

Long-Term Recommendations:

• Vendor Patch: Monitor EZCast's official website for a firmware update that enforces a password change on first login.
• Device Replacement: If no patch is forthcoming, consider replacing the device with a more secure alternative.
• Continuous Monitoring: Implement network monitoring to detect any exploitation attempts.

Workaround:

• Use a reverse proxy with authentication (e.g., Nginx with basic auth) in front of the device's web interface to add an additional layer of security.

Valters IT