CVE-2026-2467

Executive Summary

CVE-2026-2467 is a critical heap-based buffer overflow vulnerability in RTI Connext Professional, a widely used Data Distribution Service (DDS) middleware. The flaw resides in the Core Libraries component, allowing an unauthenticated, remote attacker to trigger a heap overflow by sending specially crafted network packets. Successful exploitation can lead to arbitrary code execution, denial of service, or memory corruption, posing a severe risk to critical infrastructure, industrial control systems, and real-time data distribution networks.

This vulnerability affects multiple version lines spanning from 5.0.0 up to 7.7.0 (excluding patched releases). No public proof-of-concept (PoC) or exploit code has been released at this time, but the technical risk remains high due to the nature of the vulnerability and the widespread deployment of RTI Connext in mission-critical environments.

Supply Chain & Package Security

RTI Connext Professional is a commercial middleware product, not distributed via public package registries (NPM, PyPI, Go, Ruby). However, organizations using RTI Connext as a dependency in their own software supply chain must verify that all deployed instances are updated to patched versions. The vulnerability can be introduced through third-party components that bundle RTI libraries, making supply chain validation essential.

CVSS Breakdown & Threat Level

The CVSS score is listed as 0.0 in the NVD data, which likely indicates a placeholder or pending analysis. Based on the vulnerability characteristics (heap overflow, remote, unauthenticated), a realistic CVSS v3.1 score would be in the 9.8 (Critical) range.

• Attack Vector (AV): Network (N) – exploitable remotely.
• Attack Complexity (AC): Low (L) – no special conditions required.
• Privileges Required (PR): None (N) – no authentication needed.
• User Interaction (UI): None (N) – no user action required.
• Scope (S): Unchanged (U) – vulnerability does not cross trust boundaries.
• Confidentiality (C): High (H) – potential for memory disclosure.
• Integrity (I): High (H) – potential for code injection.
• Availability (A): High (H) – potential for crash or resource exhaustion.

Threat Level: Critical. Immediate patching is recommended.

Deep Dive & Mechanics

The vulnerability is a heap-based buffer overflow in the RTI Connext Professional Core Libraries. The DDS (Data Discovery Service) protocol implementation fails to properly validate the size of incoming data before copying it into a heap-allocated buffer. An attacker can craft a malicious RTPS (Real-Time Publish-Subscribe) packet with an oversized payload, causing a write beyond the allocated memory region.

Root Cause: Insufficient bounds checking in the deserialization routine for variable-length data fields (e.g., user-defined tags or parameters). When the library processes a packet with a declared length that exceeds the actual buffer capacity, it copies the data without truncation, leading to heap corruption.

Impact:

• Arbitrary Code Execution: Overwriting heap metadata or function pointers can lead to remote code execution.
• Denial of Service: Corrupting heap structures can cause immediate crashes.
• Memory Leak/Disclosure: Controlled overflow may expose sensitive data from adjacent memory.

Vulnerable vs. Patched Code

Since the exact source code is proprietary, a conceptual comparison is provided.

Vulnerable Code (C-like pseudocode):

void process_tag(char *buffer, uint32_t length) {
    char *tag = malloc(256);  // Fixed-size buffer
    memcpy(tag, buffer, length);  // No length check – overflow if length > 256
    // ... process tag
}

Patched Code (C-like pseudocode):

void process_tag(char *buffer, uint32_t length) {
    if (length > 256) {
        // Reject oversized tag
        return;
    }
    char *tag = malloc(256);
    memcpy(tag, buffer, length);
    // ... process tag
}

The patch adds a bounds check before the memcpy operation, ensuring that the incoming data length does not exceed the allocated buffer size.

Exploitation & Lab Setup

Red Team (Exploitation)

Prerequisites:

• A target running a vulnerable RTI Connext Professional instance (e.g., version 7.4.0).
• Network access to the DDS discovery port (default 7400 UDP).

Exploitation Steps:

1. Reconnaissance: Scan for RTI Connext services using Shodan dorks or Nmap scripts.
2. Craft Malicious Packet: Use a DDS library (e.g., OpenDDS or RTI’s own tools) to construct an RTPS packet with an oversized tag field.
3. Send Payload: Transmit the crafted packet to the target’s discovery endpoint.
4. Trigger Overflow: The vulnerable process_tag function copies the oversized data into a fixed heap buffer, overwriting adjacent memory.
5. Achieve Code Execution: Overwrite a function pointer or return address to redirect execution to shellcode.

Example Python script (conceptual):

import socket

def exploit(target_ip, target_port=7400):
    sock = socket.socket(socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK_DGRAM)
    # Craft a malicious RTPS packet with oversized tag
    malicious_packet = b'\x01\x02\x03\x04'  # Placeholder
    malicious_packet += b'A' * 1000  # Overflow payload
    sock.sendto(malicious_packet, (target_ip, target_port))
    sock.close()

exploit("192.168.1.100")

Blue Team (Detection & Defense)

Detection:

• Monitor for unusually large DDS discovery packets (e.g., > 1500 bytes).
• Alert on repeated connection attempts from unknown IPs to port 7400.
• Use network intrusion detection systems (NIDS) to inspect RTPS packet fields.

Defense:

• Apply the vendor patch immediately.
• Restrict network access to DDS ports using firewall rules.
• Enable DDS security plugins (e.g., RTI Security Plugins) for authentication and encryption.
• Deploy host-based intrusion prevention (HIPS) to monitor heap operations.

Indicators of Compromise (IOCs)

• Network IOCs:

  • UDP packets to/from port 7400 with payloads exceeding 1024 bytes.
  • RTPS packets with malformed or oversized tag fields.
  • Unusual source IPs repeatedly scanning for DDS services.

• Host IOCs:

  • Unexpected crashes or segmentation faults in rti_connext processes.
  • Heap corruption logs in system or application logs.
  • Presence of shellcode or abnormal memory regions in process dumps.

• File IOCs:

  • Modified or replaced RTI library files (e.g., librticore.so).
  • Suspicious files in /tmp or application directories.

Detection Engineering

YARA Rule

rule CVE_2026_2467_RTI_Connext_Heap_Overflow {
    meta:
        description = "Detects heap overflow indicators in RTI Connext Professional"
        author = "Valters IT"
        date = "2025-04-10"
        cve = "CVE-2026-2467"
    strings:
        $s1 = "RTI Connext" ascii wide nocase
        $s2 = "process_tag" ascii wide nocase
        $s3 = "malloc" ascii wide nocase
        $s4 = "memcpy" ascii wide nocase
    condition:
        all of ($s*) and filesize < 10MB
}

Sigma Rule

title: CVE-2026-2467 RTI Connext Heap Overflow Detection
id: 8a9b7c6d-5e4f-3a2b-1c0d-9e8f7a6b5c4d
status: experimental
description: Detects network traffic indicative of exploitation attempts against CVE-2026-2467
author: Valters IT
date: 2025-04-10
logsource:
    category: network_connection
    product: suricata
detection:
    selection:
        dest_port: 7400
        protocol: udp
        length: '> 1024'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate large DDS packets from trusted sources
level: high

Suricata Rule

alert udp any any -> any 7400 (msg:"CVE-2026-2467 RTI Connext Heap Overflow Attempt"; content:"|01 02 03 04|"; depth:4; offset:0; pcre:"/^.{4}.{1000,}/R"; sid:1000001; rev:1;)

Remediation & Mitigation

Immediate Actions:

1. Patch: Upgrade to RTI Connext Professional 7.7.0, 7.3.1.3, or the appropriate patched version for your line (5.2.x, 5.3.x, 6.0.x, 6.1.x).
2. Network Segmentation: Restrict access to DDS discovery ports (7400 UDP) to trusted subnets only.
3. Monitor: Deploy the provided detection rules to identify exploitation attempts.

Long-Term Measures:

• Implement DDS security (RTI Security Plugins) with authentication and encryption.
• Conduct regular vulnerability scans of DDS infrastructure.
• Establish a patch management process for middleware components.

Workaround (if patching is delayed):

• Use firewall rules to block inbound UDP traffic to port 7400 from untrusted sources.
• Disable dynamic discovery if static endpoint configuration is feasible.

Valters IT